diff options
| author | Jacob Keller <[email protected]> | 2023-02-22 17:09:09 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> | 2023-03-13 17:32:32 +0000 |
| commit | e4eaf8938852d092fa447b32adb8ec233621d86a (patch) | |
| tree | 5f3c000c782615c1cac12d4da581efdb878a9ac0 /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | |
| parent | ice: convert ice_mbx_clear_malvf to void and use WARN (diff) | |
| download | kernel-e4eaf8938852d092fa447b32adb8ec233621d86a.tar.gz kernel-e4eaf8938852d092fa447b32adb8ec233621d86a.zip | |
ice: track malicious VFs in new ice_mbx_vf_info structure
Currently the PF tracks malicious VFs in a malvfs bitmap which is used by
the ice_mbx_clear_malvf and ice_mbx_report_malvf functions. This bitmap is
used to ensure that we only report a VF as malicious once rather than
continuously spamming the event log.
This mechanism of storage for the malicious indication works well enough
for SR-IOV. However, it will not work with Scalable IOV. This is because
Scalable IOV VFs can be allocated dynamically and might change VF ID when
their underlying VSI changes.
To support this, the mailbox overflow logic will need to be refactored.
First, introduce a new ice_mbx_vf_info structure which will be used to
store data about a VF. Embed this structure in the struct ice_vf, and
ensure it gets initialized when a new VF is created.
For now this only stores the malicious indicator bit. Pass a pointer to the
VF's mbx_info structure instead of using a bitmap to keep track of these
bits.
A future change will extend this structure and the rest of the logic
associated with the overflow detection.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c index 116b43588389..69e89e960950 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c @@ -496,8 +496,8 @@ void ice_reset_all_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) /* clear all malicious info if the VFs are getting reset */ ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) - ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, vf->vf_id, + &vf->mbx_info); /* If VFs have been disabled, there is no need to reset */ if (test_and_set_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state)) { @@ -703,8 +703,7 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags) ice_eswitch_replay_vf_mac_rule(vf); /* if the VF has been reset allow it to come up again */ - ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, vf->vf_id, &vf->mbx_info); out_unlock: if (flags & ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK) @@ -760,6 +759,9 @@ void ice_initialize_vf_entry(struct ice_vf *vf) ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi(vf); ice_vf_fdir_init(vf); + /* Initialize mailbox info for this VF */ + ice_mbx_init_vf_info(&pf->hw, &vf->mbx_info); + mutex_init(&vf->cfg_lock); } |
