diff options
| author | Jacob Keller <[email protected]> | 2023-02-22 17:09:08 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> | 2023-03-13 17:32:31 +0000 |
| commit | 28756d9ec93e6588b1c3a00cc9123e238a71c709 (patch) | |
| tree | ae11c73c6f9824fc521895598643dccb84fd4e25 /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | |
| parent | ice: re-order ice_mbx_reset_snapshot function (diff) | |
| download | kernel-28756d9ec93e6588b1c3a00cc9123e238a71c709.tar.gz kernel-28756d9ec93e6588b1c3a00cc9123e238a71c709.zip | |
ice: convert ice_mbx_clear_malvf to void and use WARN
The ice_mbx_clear_malvf function checks for a few error conditions before
clearing the appropriate data. These error conditions are really warnings
that should never occur in a properly initialized driver. Every caller of
ice_mbx_clear_malvf just prints a dev_dbg message on failure which will
generally be ignored.
Convert this function to void and switch the error return values to
WARN_ON. This will make any potentially misconfiguration more visible and
makes future refactors that involve changing how we store the malicious VF
data easier.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c index 0e57bd1b85fd..116b43588389 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c @@ -496,10 +496,8 @@ void ice_reset_all_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) /* clear all malicious info if the VFs are getting reset */ ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) - if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id)) - dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", - vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); /* If VFs have been disabled, there is no need to reset */ if (test_and_set_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state)) { @@ -705,10 +703,8 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags) ice_eswitch_replay_vf_mac_rule(vf); /* if the VF has been reset allow it to come up again */ - if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id)) - dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", - vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); out_unlock: if (flags & ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK) |