diff options
| author | Yafang Shao <[email protected]> | 2023-10-05 08:41:23 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | 2023-10-06 18:16:44 +0000 |
| commit | bc5bc309db45a7ab218ce8259ba9bc7659be61ca (patch) | |
| tree | 658e32196afca145b29b0c268385fd2a57046df1 /tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_basic.c | |
| parent | bpf: Fix the comment for bpf_restore_data_end() (diff) | |
| download | kernel-bc5bc309db45a7ab218ce8259ba9bc7659be61ca.tar.gz kernel-bc5bc309db45a7ab218ce8259ba9bc7659be61ca.zip | |
bpf: Inherit system settings for CPU security mitigations
Currently, there exists a system-wide setting related to CPU security
mitigations, denoted as 'mitigations='. When set to 'mitigations=off', it
deactivates all optional CPU mitigations. Therefore, if we implement a
system-wide 'mitigations=off' setting, it should inherently bypass Spectre
v1 and Spectre v4 in the BPF subsystem.
Please note that there is also a more specific 'nospectre_v1' setting on
x86 and ppc architectures, though it is not currently exported. For the
time being, let's disregard more fine-grained options.
This idea emerged during our discussion about potential Spectre v1 attacks
with Luis [0].
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Luis Gerhorst <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_basic.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions