diff options
| author | Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> | 2008-12-03 19:17:33 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <[email protected]> | 2008-12-07 22:16:27 +0000 |
| commit | 7657d90497f98426af17f0ac633a9b335bb7a8fb (patch) | |
| tree | 6344dc4715a85383f6492a4102ae406c6b86d79d /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
| parent | user namespaces: let user_ns be cloned with fairsched (diff) | |
| download | kernel-7657d90497f98426af17f0ac633a9b335bb7a8fb.tar.gz kernel-7657d90497f98426af17f0ac633a9b335bb7a8fb.zip | |
user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER
While ideally CLONE_NEWUSER will eventually require no
privilege, the required permission checks are currently
not there. As a result, CLONE_NEWUSER has the same effect
as a setuid(0)+setgroups(1,"0"). While we already require
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, requiring CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID seems
appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions