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authorEric Paris <[email protected]>2009-03-05 18:40:35 +0000
committerJames Morris <[email protected]>2009-03-05 21:50:18 +0000
commit6a25b27d602aac24f3c642722377ba5d778417ec (patch)
treeba334617326c65ccd98e7f4733c75fa0ac2ae5ca /security/selinux/hooks.c
parentsmack: fixes for unlabeled host support (diff)
downloadkernel-6a25b27d602aac24f3c642722377ba5d778417ec.tar.gz
kernel-6a25b27d602aac24f3c642722377ba5d778417ec.zip
SELinux: open perm for sock files
When I did open permissions I didn't think any sockets would have an open. Turns out AF_UNIX sockets can have an open when they are bound to the filesystem namespace. This patch adds a new SOCK_FILE__OPEN permission. It's safe to add this as the open perms are already predicated on capabilities and capabilities means we have unknown perm handling so systems should be as backwards compatible as the policy wants them to be. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=475224 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 309648c573d8..cd3307a26d11 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1838,6 +1838,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
av |= DIR__OPEN;
+ else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
+ av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
else
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
"unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);