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| author | Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> | 2025-04-08 21:47:34 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | 2025-04-09 10:42:09 +0000 |
| commit | 27ce8299bc1ec6df8306073785ff82b30b3cc5ee (patch) | |
| tree | 3e4353283b8c310eaaf8874e7f0d8049d2ab7829 /rust/helpers/platform.c | |
| parent | x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline (diff) | |
| download | kernel-27ce8299bc1ec6df8306073785ff82b30b3cc5ee.tar.gz kernel-27ce8299bc1ec6df8306073785ff82b30b3cc5ee.zip | |
x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on context switch with eIBRS
User->user Spectre v2 attacks (including RSB) across context switches
are already mitigated by IBPB in cond_mitigation(), if enabled globally
or if either the prev or the next task has opted in to protection. RSB
filling without IBPB serves no purpose for protecting user space, as
indirect branches are still vulnerable.
User->kernel RSB attacks are mitigated by eIBRS. In which case the RSB
filling on context switch isn't needed, so remove it.
Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/98cdefe42180358efebf78e3b80752850c7a3e1b.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/helpers/platform.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions