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authorDaniel Sneddon <[email protected]>2025-05-05 21:35:12 +0000
committerDave Hansen <[email protected]>2025-05-06 15:18:32 +0000
commitd4e89d212d401672e9cdfe825d947ee3a9fbe3f5 (patch)
tree33b398ce7e7f2c1feff1887b293305dd75cff755 /net/unix/af_unix.c
parentLinux 6.15-rc5 (diff)
downloadkernel-d4e89d212d401672e9cdfe825d947ee3a9fbe3f5.tar.gz
kernel-d4e89d212d401672e9cdfe825d947ee3a9fbe3f5.zip
x86/bpf: Call branch history clearing sequence on exit
Classic BPF programs have been identified as potential vectors for intra-mode Branch Target Injection (BTI) attacks. Classic BPF programs can be run by unprivileged users. They allow unprivileged code to execute inside the kernel. Attackers can use unprivileged cBPF to craft branch history in kernel mode that can influence the target of indirect branches. Introduce a branch history buffer (BHB) clearing sequence during the JIT compilation of classic BPF programs. The clearing sequence is the same as is used in previous mitigations to protect syscalls. Since eBPF programs already have their own mitigations in place, only insert the call on classic programs that aren't run by privileged users. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c')
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