xen-netback: fix guest-receive-side array sizes

The sizes chosen for the metadata and grant_copy_op arrays on the guest
receive size are wrong;

- The meta array is needlessly twice the ring size, when we only ever
  consume a single array element per RX ring slot
- The grant_copy_op array is way too small. It's sized based on a bogus
  assumption: that at most two copy ops will be used per ring slot. This
  may have been true at some point in the past but it's clear from looking
  at start_new_rx_buffer() that a new ring slot is only consumed if a frag
  would overflow the current slot (plus some other conditions) so the actual
  limit is MAX_SKB_FRAGS grant_copy_ops per ring slot.

This patch fixes those two sizing issues and, because grant_copy_ops grows
so much, it pulls it out into a separate chunk of vmalloc()ed memory.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Cc: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index 870f1fa58370..34ca4e58a43d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -307,6 +307,15 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
 	SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, parent);
 
 	vif = netdev_priv(dev);
+
+	vif->grant_copy_op = vmalloc(sizeof(struct gnttab_copy) *
+				     MAX_GRANT_COPY_OPS);
+	if (vif->grant_copy_op == NULL) {
+		pr_warn("Could not allocate grant copy space for %s\n", name);
+		free_netdev(dev);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
 	vif->domid  = domid;
 	vif->handle = handle;
 	vif->can_sg = 1;
@@ -487,6 +496,7 @@ void xenvif_free(struct xenvif *vif)
 
 	unregister_netdev(vif->dev);
 
+	vfree(vif->grant_copy_op);
 	free_netdev(vif->dev);
 
 	module_put(THIS_MODULE);