diff options
| author | Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | 2025-07-28 15:13:57 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | 2025-07-29 12:36:43 +0000 |
| commit | 1a14928e2e91a098c6117ba52b06327e3fc5072c (patch) | |
| tree | 62092d38056c86b639deeb180ea1fe53acc2796b /arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | |
| parent | Merge tag 'kvm-x86-no_assignment-6.17' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux in... (diff) | |
| parent | KVM: x86: Reject KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ VM ioctl when vCPUs have been created (diff) | |
| download | kernel-1a14928e2e91a098c6117ba52b06327e3fc5072c.tar.gz kernel-1a14928e2e91a098c6117ba52b06327e3fc5072c.zip | |
Merge tag 'kvm-x86-misc-6.17' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD
KVM x86 misc changes for 6.17
- Prevert the host's DEBUGCTL.FREEZE_IN_SMM (Intel only) when running the
guest. Failure to honor FREEZE_IN_SMM can bleed host state into the guest.
- Explicitly check vmcs12.GUEST_DEBUGCTL on nested VM-Enter (Intel only) to
prevent L1 from running L2 with features that KVM doesn't support, e.g. BTF.
- Intercept SPEC_CTRL on AMD if the MSR shouldn't exist according to the
vCPU's CPUID model.
- Rework the MSR interception code so that the SVM and VMX APIs are more or
less identical.
- Recalculate all MSR intercepts from the "source" on MSR filter changes, and
drop the dedicated "shadow" bitmaps (and their awful "max" size defines).
- WARN and reject loading kvm-amd.ko instead of panicking the kernel if the
nested SVM MSRPM offsets tracker can't handle an MSR.
- Advertise support for LKGS (Load Kernel GS base), a new instruction that's
loosely related to FRED, but is supported and enumerated independently.
- Fix a user-triggerable WARN that syzkaller found by stuffing INIT_RECEIVED,
a.k.a. WFS, and then putting the vCPU into VMX Root Mode (post-VMXON). Use
the same approach KVM uses for dealing with "impossible" emulation when
running a !URG guest, and simply wait until KVM_RUN to detect that the vCPU
has architecturally impossible state.
- Add KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_APERFMPERF to allow disabling interception of
APERF/MPERF reads, so that a "properly" configured VM can "virtualize"
APERF/MPERF (with many caveats).
- Reject KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ if vCPUs have been created, as changing the "default"
frequency is unsupported for VMs with a "secure" TSC, and there's no known
use case for changing the default frequency for other VM types.
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index b201f77fcd49..d061ebb430ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -4390,16 +4390,17 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in) count, in); } -static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm) +void sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; - - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) { - bool v_tsc_aux = guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || - guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID); + /* Clear intercepts on MSRs that are context switched by hardware. */ + svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, MSR_TYPE_RW); + svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_EFER, MSR_TYPE_RW); + svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_RW); - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_TSC_AUX, v_tsc_aux, v_tsc_aux); - } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_TYPE_RW, + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) && + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID)); /* * For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if @@ -4413,11 +4414,9 @@ static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm) * XSAVES being exposed to the guest so that KVM can at least honor * guest CPUID for RDMSR and WRMSR. */ - if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && - guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1); - else - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 0, 0); + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XSS, MSR_TYPE_RW, + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) || + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)); } void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm) @@ -4429,16 +4428,12 @@ void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm) best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001F); if (best) vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); - - if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) - sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm); } static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(svm->vcpu.kvm); struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE; @@ -4496,10 +4491,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV); - - /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */ - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1); - set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1); } void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) |
