diff options
| author | Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> | 2024-03-11 15:56:58 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> | 2024-04-08 17:27:05 +0000 |
| commit | 7390db8aea0d64e9deb28b8e1ce716f5020c7ee5 (patch) | |
| tree | 9f03277c6722e632d0b9778ad3fe6f7bac5d4ff9 /arch/x86/entry/common.c | |
| parent | x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls (diff) | |
| download | kernel-7390db8aea0d64e9deb28b8e1ce716f5020c7ee5.tar.gz kernel-7390db8aea0d64e9deb28b8e1ce716f5020c7ee5.zip | |
x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to
influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch
history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can
still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although
branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled,
the BHB itself is not isolated between modes.
Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to
mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence
to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add
support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to
overwrite the branch history.
For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious
applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the
registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt
entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become
necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future.
This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/common.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/common.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index cea0e2a23b42..6de50b80702e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static __always_inline bool int80_is_external(void) } /** - * int80_emulation - 32-bit legacy syscall entry + * do_int80_emulation - 32-bit legacy syscall C entry from asm * * This entry point can be used by 32-bit and 64-bit programs to perform * 32-bit system calls. Instances of INT $0x80 can be found inline in @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static __always_inline bool int80_is_external(void) * eax: system call number * ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi, ebp: arg1 - arg 6 */ -DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(int80_emulation) +__visible noinstr void do_int80_emulation(struct pt_regs *regs) { int nr; |
