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authorDan Williams <[email protected]>2018-01-30 01:02:49 +0000
committerThomas Gleixner <[email protected]>2018-01-30 20:54:31 +0000
commit304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301 (patch)
tree453a5094b3bdcf3a9cb331850d93d112a04f7d5f /arch/x86/entry/common.c
parentx86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} (diff)
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x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. __uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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