diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/import.c | 326 |
1 files changed, 183 insertions, 143 deletions
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c index effc38a93..ebfd73805 100644 --- a/g10/import.c +++ b/g10/import.c @@ -2575,6 +2575,186 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl, } + +/* Convert our internal secret key object into an S-expression. PK is + * the public key. R_CURVE received an sexp with the name of the + * curve; caller must free this. R_SKEY will receive the result; + * caller must of course also free this. */ +static gpg_error_t +internal_skey_object_to_sexp (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_sexp_t *r_curve, + gcry_sexp_t *r_skey) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int nskey; + int i, j; + membuf_t mbuf; + const char *curvename; + char *curvestr = NULL; + void *format_args[2*PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; + + *r_curve = NULL; + *r_skey = NULL; + init_membuf (&mbuf, 50); + + nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (pk->pubkey_algo); + if (!nskey || nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + log_error ("internal error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey"); + + if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA + || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA + || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) + { + /* The ECC case. */ + curvestr = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); + if (!curvestr) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + + curvename = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curvestr, 1); + gcry_sexp_release (*r_curve); + err = gcry_sexp_build (r_curve, NULL, "(curve %s)", + curvename?curvename:curvestr); + if (err) + goto leave; + + j = 0; + /* Append the public key element Q. */ + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m"); + format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + 1; + + /* Append the secret key element D. For ECDH we skip PKEY[2] + * because this holds the KEK which is not needed by gpg-agent. */ + i = pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH? 3 : 2; + if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1)) + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m"); + else + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m"); + format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i; + + /* Simple hack to print a warning for an invalid key in case of + * cv25519. We have only opaque MPIs here. */ + if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH + && !strcmp (curvestr, "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.5.1") + && !gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1) + && gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) + { + const unsigned char *pp; + unsigned int nn; + + pp = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &nn); + nn = (nn+7)/8; + if (pp && nn && (pp[nn-1] & 7)) + log_info ("warning: lower 3 bits of the secret key" + " are not cleared\n"); + } + } + else /* Standard case for the old (non-ECC) algorithms. */ + { + for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++) + { + if (!pk->pkey[i]) + continue; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */ + + if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1)) + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m"); + else + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m"); + format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i; + } + } + put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")"); + put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1); + + /* Finally convert to an sexp and store that at R_SKEY. */ + { + char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL); + if (!format) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + err = gcry_sexp_build_array (r_skey, NULL, format, format_args); + xfree (format); + } + + leave: + xfree (curvestr); + xfree (get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL)); + return err; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +build_classic_transfer_sexp (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_sexp_t *result) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_sexp_t skey; + gcry_sexp_t prot = NULL; + gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL; + struct seckey_info *ski = pk->seckey_info; + + *result = NULL; + + /* Convert our internal secret key object into an S-expression. */ + err = internal_skey_object_to_sexp (pk, &curve, &skey); + if (err) + { + log_error ("error building skey array: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + log_assert (skey); + + if (ski->is_protected) + { + char countbuf[35]; + + /* FIXME: Support AEAD */ + /* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a dummy + * key. We can't express that in an S-expression and thus we + * send dummy data for the IV. */ + snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu",(unsigned long)ski->s2k.count); + err = gcry_sexp_build (&prot, NULL, + " (protection %s %s %b %d %s %b %s)\n", + ski->sha1chk? "sha1":"sum", + openpgp_cipher_algo_name (ski->algo), + ski->ivlen? (int)ski->ivlen:1, + ski->ivlen? ski->iv: (const unsigned char*)"X", + ski->s2k.mode, + openpgp_md_algo_name (ski->s2k.hash_algo), + (int)sizeof (ski->s2k.salt), ski->s2k.salt, + countbuf); + } + else + err = gcry_sexp_build (&prot, NULL, " (protection none)\n"); + if (err) + goto leave; + + err = gcry_sexp_build (result, NULL, + "(openpgp-private-key\n" + " (version %d)\n" + " (algo %s)\n" + " %S%S\n" + " (csum %d)\n" + " %S)\n", + pk->version, + openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo), + curve, skey, + (int)(unsigned long)ski->csum, prot); + + leave: + gcry_sexp_release (prot); + gcry_sexp_release (skey); + gcry_sexp_release (curve); + return err; +} + + /* Transfer all the secret keys in SEC_KEYBLOCK to the gpg-agent. The * function prints diagnostics and returns an error code. If BATCH is * true the secret keys are stored by gpg-agent in the transfer format @@ -2593,12 +2773,7 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats, kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *main_pk, *pk; struct seckey_info *ski; - int nskey; - membuf_t mbuf; - int i, j; - void *format_args[2*PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; - gcry_sexp_t skey, prot, tmpsexp; - gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL; + gcry_sexp_t tmpsexp; unsigned char *transferkey = NULL; size_t transferkeylen; gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL; @@ -2678,147 +2853,13 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats, continue; } - /* Convert our internal secret key object into an S-expression. */ - nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (pk->pubkey_algo); - if (!nskey || nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY) - { - err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); - log_error ("internal error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); - goto leave; - } - - init_membuf (&mbuf, 50); - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey"); - if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA - || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA - || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) - { - /* The ECC case. */ - char *curvestr = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); - if (!curvestr) - err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); - else - { - const char *curvename = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curvestr, 1); - gcry_sexp_release (curve); - err = gcry_sexp_build (&curve, NULL, "(curve %s)", - curvename?curvename:curvestr); - if (!err) - { - j = 0; - /* Append the public key element Q. */ - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m"); - format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + 1; - - /* Append the secret key element D. For ECDH we - skip PKEY[2] because this holds the KEK which is - not needed by gpg-agent. */ - i = pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH? 3 : 2; - if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1)) - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m"); - else - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m"); - format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i; - - /* Simple hack to print a warning for an invalid key - * in case of cv25519. We have only opaque MPIs here. */ - if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH - && !strcmp (curvestr, "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.5.1") - && !gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1) - && gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) - { - const unsigned char *pp; - unsigned int nn; - - pp = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &nn); - nn = (nn+7)/8; - if (pp && nn && (pp[nn-1] & 7)) - log_info ("warning: lower 3 bits of the secret key" - " are not cleared\n"); - } - } - xfree (curvestr); - } - } - else - { - /* Standard case for the old (non-ECC) algorithms. */ - for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++) - { - if (!pk->pkey[i]) - continue; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */ - - if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1)) - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m"); - else - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m"); - format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i; - } - } - put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")"); - put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1); - if (err) - xfree (get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL)); - else - { - char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL); - if (!format) - err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); - else - err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&skey, NULL, format, format_args); - xfree (format); - } - if (err) - { - log_error ("error building skey array: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); - goto leave; - } - - if (ski->is_protected) - { - char countbuf[35]; - - /* FIXME: Support AEAD */ - /* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a - dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and - thus we send dummy data for the IV. */ - snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu", - (unsigned long)ski->s2k.count); - err = gcry_sexp_build - (&prot, NULL, - " (protection %s %s %b %d %s %b %s)\n", - ski->sha1chk? "sha1":"sum", - openpgp_cipher_algo_name (ski->algo), - ski->ivlen? (int)ski->ivlen:1, - ski->ivlen? ski->iv: (const unsigned char*)"X", - ski->s2k.mode, - openpgp_md_algo_name (ski->s2k.hash_algo), - (int)sizeof (ski->s2k.salt), ski->s2k.salt, - countbuf); - } - else - err = gcry_sexp_build (&prot, NULL, " (protection none)\n"); - - tmpsexp = NULL; + err = build_classic_transfer_sexp (pk, &tmpsexp); xfree (transferkey); transferkey = NULL; if (!err) - err = gcry_sexp_build (&tmpsexp, NULL, - "(openpgp-private-key\n" - " (version %d)\n" - " (algo %s)\n" - " %S%S\n" - " (csum %d)\n" - " %S)\n", - pk->version, - openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo), - curve, skey, - (int)(unsigned long)ski->csum, prot); - gcry_sexp_release (skey); - gcry_sexp_release (prot); - if (!err) err = make_canon_sexp_pad (tmpsexp, 1, &transferkey, &transferkeylen); gcry_sexp_release (tmpsexp); + tmpsexp = NULL; if (err) { log_error ("error building transfer key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); @@ -2881,7 +2922,6 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats, err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED); leave: - gcry_sexp_release (curve); xfree (cache_nonce); xfree (wrappedkey); xfree (transferkey); |