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-rw-r--r--g10/seskey.c146
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c
index fc912eeb5..9eeed2c74 100644
--- a/g10/seskey.c
+++ b/g10/seskey.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* seskey.c - make sesssion keys etc.
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "gpg.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "mpi.h"
@@ -36,26 +38,35 @@
void
make_session_key( DEK *dek )
{
- CIPHER_HANDLE chd;
- int i, rc;
-
- dek->keylen = cipher_get_keylen( dek->algo ) / 8;
-
- chd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
- randomize_buffer( dek->key, dek->keylen, 1 );
- for(i=0; i < 16; i++ ) {
- rc = cipher_setkey( chd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
- if( !rc ) {
- cipher_close( chd );
- return;
- }
- log_info(_("weak key created - retrying\n") );
- /* Renew the session key until we get a non-weak key. */
- randomize_buffer( dek->key, dek->keylen, 1 );
+ gcry_cipher_hd_t chd;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ dek->keylen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (dek->algo);
+
+ if (gcry_cipher_open (&chd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
+ (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
+ | (dek->algo >= 100 ?
+ 0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC))) )
+ BUG();
+
+ gcry_randomize (dek->key, dek->keylen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
+ for (i=0; i < 16; i++ )
+ {
+ rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (chd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ gcry_cipher_close (chd);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY)
+ BUG();
+ log_info (_("weak key created - retrying\n") );
+ /* Renew the session key until we get a non-weak key. */
+ gcry_randomize (dek->key, dek->keylen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
}
- log_fatal(_(
- "cannot avoid weak key for symmetric cipher; tried %d times!\n"),
- i);
+
+ log_fatal (_("cannot avoid weak key for symmetric cipher; "
+ "tried %d times!\n"), i);
}
@@ -64,15 +75,15 @@ make_session_key( DEK *dek )
* for packing the session key.
* returns: A mpi with the session key (caller must free)
*/
-MPI
-encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
+gcry_mpi_t
+encode_session_key (DEK *dek, unsigned int nbits)
{
int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *p;
byte *frame;
int i,n;
u16 csum;
- MPI a;
+ gcry_mpi_t a;
/* the current limitation is that we can only use a session key
* whose length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB
@@ -99,13 +110,13 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
for( p = dek->key, i=0; i < dek->keylen; i++ )
csum += *p++;
- frame = m_alloc_secure( nframe );
+ frame = gcry_xmalloc_secure ( nframe );
n = 0;
frame[n++] = 0;
frame[n++] = 2;
i = nframe - 6 - dek->keylen;
assert( i > 0 );
- p = get_random_bits( i*8, 1, 1 );
+ p = gcry_random_bytes_secure (i, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
/* replace zero bytes by new values */
for(;;) {
int j, k;
@@ -118,14 +129,14 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
if( !k )
break; /* okay: no zero bytes */
k += k/128; /* better get some more */
- pp = get_random_bits( k*8, 1, 1);
+ pp = gcry_random_bytes_secure( k, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
for(j=0; j < i && k ; j++ )
if( !p[j] )
p[j] = pp[--k];
- m_free(pp);
+ xfree (pp);
}
memcpy( frame+n, p, i );
- m_free(p);
+ xfree (p);
n += i;
frame[n++] = 0;
frame[n++] = dek->algo;
@@ -133,21 +144,21 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
frame[n++] = csum >>8;
frame[n++] = csum;
assert( n == nframe );
- a = mpi_alloc_secure( (nframe+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
- mpi_set_buffer( a, frame, nframe, 0 );
- m_free(frame);
+ if (gcry_mpi_scan( &a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, &nframe))
+ BUG();
+ xfree (frame);
return a;
}
-static MPI
-do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
+static gcry_mpi_t
+do_encode_md( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
const byte *asn, size_t asnlen, int v3compathack )
{
int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *frame;
int i,n;
- MPI a;
+ gcry_mpi_t a;
if( len + asnlen + 4 > nframe )
log_bug("can't encode a %d bit MD into a %d bits frame\n",
@@ -159,7 +170,7 @@ do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
*
* PAD consists of FF bytes.
*/
- frame = md_is_secure(md)? m_alloc_secure( nframe ) : m_alloc( nframe );
+ frame = gcry_md_is_secure (md)? xmalloc_secure (nframe): xmalloc (nframe);
n = 0;
frame[n++] = 0;
frame[n++] = v3compathack? algo : 1; /* block type */
@@ -168,13 +179,11 @@ do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
memset( frame+n, 0xff, i ); n += i;
frame[n++] = 0;
memcpy( frame+n, asn, asnlen ); n += asnlen;
- memcpy( frame+n, md_read(md, algo), len ); n += len;
+ memcpy( frame+n, gcry_md_read (md, algo), len ); n += len;
assert( n == nframe );
- a = md_is_secure(md)?
- mpi_alloc_secure( (nframe+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB )
- : mpi_alloc( (nframe+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
- mpi_set_buffer( a, frame, nframe, 0 );
- m_free(frame);
+ if (gcry_mpi_scan( &a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, &nframe ))
+ BUG();
+ xfree (frame);
return a;
}
@@ -185,33 +194,40 @@ do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
* which did put the algo identifier inseatd of the block type 1 into
* the encoded value. Setting this flag forces the old behaviour.
*/
-MPI
-encode_md_value( int pubkey_algo, MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo,
- unsigned nbits, int v3compathack )
+gcry_mpi_t
+encode_md_value (int pubkey_algo, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo,
+ unsigned int nbits, int v3compathack )
{
- int algo = hash_algo? hash_algo : md_get_algo(md);
- const byte *asn;
- size_t asnlen, mdlen;
- MPI frame;
-
- if( pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA ) {
- mdlen = md_digest_length (hash_algo);
- if (mdlen != 20) {
- log_error (_("DSA requires the use of a 160 bit hash algorithm\n"));
- return NULL;
+ int algo = hash_algo? hash_algo : gcry_md_get_algo (md);
+ gcry_mpi_t frame;
+
+ if (pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
+ {
+ size_t n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hash_algo);
+ if (n != 20)
+ {
+ log_error (_("DSA requires the use of a 160 bit hash algorithm\n"));
+ return NULL;
}
-
- frame = md_is_secure(md)? mpi_alloc_secure((md_digest_length(hash_algo)
- +BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB )
- : mpi_alloc((md_digest_length(hash_algo)
- +BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
- mpi_set_buffer( frame, md_read(md, hash_algo),
- md_digest_length(hash_algo), 0 );
+ if (gcry_mpi_scan( &frame, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
+ gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), &n ) )
+ BUG();
}
- else {
- asn = md_asn_oid( algo, &asnlen, &mdlen );
- frame = do_encode_md( md, algo, mdlen, nbits, asn, asnlen, v3compathack);
+ else
+ {
+ byte *asn;
+ size_t asnlen;
+
+ if( gcry_md_algo_info( algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ASNOID, NULL, &asnlen ) )
+ log_fatal("can't get OID of algo %d: %s\n",
+ algo, gcry_strerror(-1));
+ asn = xmalloc (asnlen);
+ if( gcry_md_algo_info( algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ASNOID, asn, &asnlen ) )
+ BUG();
+ frame = do_encode_md( md, algo, gcry_md_get_algo_dlen( algo ),
+ nbits, asn, asnlen, v3compathack );
+ xfree (asn);
}
- return frame;
+ return frame;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-04-28 04:46:24 +0000