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author | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2011-12-07 15:15:15 +0000 |
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committer | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2011-12-07 15:15:15 +0000 |
commit | 8a12a2000d82acfa881e8c18d028290100bf5e43 (patch) | |
tree | 3e212fdf3888181fa70570580bf7dbed65e3756a /sm/keylist.c | |
parent | Correct punctuation in the ChangeLog summary line. (diff) | |
download | gnupg-8a12a2000d82acfa881e8c18d028290100bf5e43.tar.gz gnupg-8a12a2000d82acfa881e8c18d028290100bf5e43.zip |
gpgsm: Add new validation model "steed".
* sm/gpgsm.h (VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED): New.
* sm/gpgsm.c (gpgsm_parse_validation_model): Add model "steed".
* sm/server.c (option_handler): Allow validation model "steed".
* sm/certlist.c (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key): New.
* sm/certchain.c (do_validate_chain): Handle the
well-known-private-key attribute. Support the "steed" model.
(gpgsm_validate_chain): Ditto.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Return "steed" in the trust status line.
* sm/keylist.c (list_cert_colon): Print the new 'w' flag.
--
This is the first part of changes to implement the STEED proposal as
described at http://g10code.com/steed.html . The idea for X.509 is
not to use plain self-signed certificates but certificates signed by a
dummy CA (i.e. one for which the private key is known). Having a
single CA as an indication for the use of STEED might help other X.509
implementations to implement STEED.
Diffstat (limited to 'sm/keylist.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sm/keylist.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/sm/keylist.c b/sm/keylist.c index a5023601f..42c533a6d 100644 --- a/sm/keylist.c +++ b/sm/keylist.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* keylist.c - Print certificates in various formats. - * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, - * 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, + * 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * @@ -421,7 +421,12 @@ list_cert_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int validity, && *not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 ) *truststring = 'e'; else if (valerr) - *truststring = 'i'; + { + if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (cert)) + *truststring = 'w'; /* Well, this is dummy CA. */ + else + *truststring = 'i'; + } else if (ctrl->with_validation && !is_root) *truststring = 'f'; } @@ -433,12 +438,17 @@ list_cert_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int validity, { struct rootca_flags_s dummy_flags; - rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, cert, NULL, &dummy_flags); - if (!rc) - *truststring = 'u'; /* Yes, we trust this one (ultimately). */ - else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED) - *truststring = 'n'; /* No, we do not trust this one. */ - /* (in case of an error we can't tell anything.) */ + if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (cert)) + *truststring = 'w'; /* Well, this is dummy CA. */ + else + { + rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, cert, NULL, &dummy_flags); + if (!rc) + *truststring = 'u'; /* Yes, we trust this one (ultimately). */ + else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED) + *truststring = 'n'; /* No, we do not trust this one. */ + /* (in case of an error we can't tell anything.) */ + } } if (*truststring) |