diff options
| author | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2017-08-27 14:42:52 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2017-08-27 14:42:52 +0000 |
| commit | 45d5f5800afe6613f338a26f361cb5e03e861129 (patch) | |
| tree | 3c9be60f53c850081965f8c033bfb7816d7db798 /scd/app-openpgp.c | |
| parent | gpg: Fix memory leak while running --check-trustdb. (diff) | |
| download | gnupg-45d5f5800afe6613f338a26f361cb5e03e861129.tar.gz gnupg-45d5f5800afe6613f338a26f361cb5e03e861129.zip | |
scd: Convey the correct length for Le
* scd/app-openpgp.c (determine_rsa_response): Round bits up.
--
Co-authored-by: Arnaud Fontaine <[email protected]>
Arnaud wrote:
Actually, when the incorrect expected response length (i.e. Le
field) is transmitted to the card, the card's answer is missing a
byte (i.e. ... 6101) so an additional command has to be sent to the
card to retrieve the last byte. Using the correct length avoids to
send the additional command to retrieve the missing byte, when the
computed length is wrong.
Note that an value of 65537 for E is pretty standard and thus we can
avoid the 6101 return code inmost cases.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'scd/app-openpgp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | scd/app-openpgp.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/scd/app-openpgp.c b/scd/app-openpgp.c index 365f24649..f9d07ac46 100644 --- a/scd/app-openpgp.c +++ b/scd/app-openpgp.c @@ -943,8 +943,8 @@ determine_rsa_response (app_t app, int keyno) int size; size = 2 + 3 /* header */ - + 4 /* tag+len */ + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits/8 - + 2 /* tag+len */ + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits/8; + + 4 /* tag+len */ + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits+7)/8 + + 2 /* tag+len */ + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits+7)/8; return size; } |