Nuked almost all trailing white space.post-nuke-of-trailing-ws

We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 21 deletions

diff --git a/kbx/keybox-openpgp.c b/kbx/keybox-openpgp.c
index f1de685cf..30f99ecc8 100644
--- a/kbx/keybox-openpgp.c
+++ b/kbx/keybox-openpgp.c
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ enum packet_types
    follwing data on success:
 
    R_DATAPKT = Pointer to the begin of the packet data.
-   R_DATALEN = Length of this data.  This has already been checked to fit 
-               into the buffer. 
+   R_DATALEN = Length of this data.  This has already been checked to fit
+               into the buffer.
    R_PKTTYPE = The packet type.
    R_NTOTAL  = The total number of bytes of this packet
 
@@ -91,11 +91,11 @@ next_packet (unsigned char const **bufptr, size_t *buflen,
 
   if (!len)
     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
-  
+
   ctb = *buf++; len--;
   if ( !(ctb & 0x80) )
     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Invalid CTB. */
-  
+
   pktlen = 0;
   if ((ctb & 0x40))  /* New style (OpenPGP) CTB.  */
     {
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ next_packet (unsigned char const **bufptr, size_t *buflen,
       if ( c < 192 )
         pktlen = c;
       else if ( c < 224 )
-        { 
+        {
           pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
           if (!len)
             return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* No 2nd length byte. */
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ next_packet (unsigned char const **bufptr, size_t *buflen,
   switch (pkttype)
     {
     case PKT_SIGNATURE:
-    case PKT_SECRET_KEY:	
+    case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
     case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
     case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
     case PKT_MARKER:
@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ next_packet (unsigned char const **bufptr, size_t *buflen,
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
     }
 
-  if (pktlen == 0xffffffff) 
+  if (pktlen == 0xffffffff)
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
-  
+
   if (pktlen > len)
     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Packet length header too long. */
 
@@ -207,14 +207,14 @@ parse_key (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
   version = *data++; datalen--;
   if (version < 2 || version > 4 )
     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Invalid version. */
-  
+
   timestamp = ((data[0]<<24)|(data[1]<<16)|(data[2]<<8)|(data[3]));
   data +=4; datalen -=4;
 
   if (version < 4)
     {
       unsigned short ndays;
-      
+
       if (datalen < 2)
         return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
       ndays = ((data[0]<<8)|(data[1]));
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ parse_key (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
     case 1:
     case 2:
     case 3: /* RSA */
-      npkey = 2; 
+      npkey = 2;
       break;
     case 16:
     case 20: /* Elgamal */
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ parse_key (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
   for (i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
     {
       unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
-      
+
       if (datalen < 2)
         return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
       nbits = ((data[0]<<8)|(data[1]));
@@ -266,14 +266,14 @@ parse_key (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
         return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
       /* For use by v3 fingerprint calculation we need to know the RSA
          modulus and exponent. */
-      if (i==0) 
+      if (i==0)
         {
-          mpi_n = data; 
+          mpi_n = data;
           mpi_n_len = nbytes;
         }
       else if (i==1)
         mpi_e_len = nbytes;
-        
+
       data += nbytes; datalen -= nbytes;
     }
   n = data - data_start;
@@ -293,12 +293,12 @@ parse_key (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
       memcpy (ki->fpr, gcry_md_read (md, 0), 16);
       gcry_md_close (md);
       ki->fprlen = 16;
-      
+
       if (mpi_n_len < 8)
         {
           /* Moduli less than 64 bit are out of the specs scope.  Zero
              them out becuase this is what gpg does too. */
-          memset (ki->keyid, 0, 8); 
+          memset (ki->keyid, 0, 8);
         }
       else
         memcpy (ki->keyid, mpi_n + mpi_n_len - 8, 8);
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ _keybox_parse_openpgp (const unsigned char *image, size_t imagelen,
   int first = 1;
   struct _keybox_openpgp_key_info *k, **ktail = NULL;
   struct _keybox_openpgp_uid_info *u, **utail = NULL;
-  
+
   memset (info, 0, sizeof *info);
   if (nparsed)
     *nparsed = 0;
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ _keybox_parse_openpgp (const unsigned char *image, size_t imagelen,
         }
       else if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
         break; /* Next keyblock encountered - ready. */
-      
+
       if (nparsed)
         *nparsed += n;
 
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ _keybox_parse_openpgp (const unsigned char *image, size_t imagelen,
           if (err)
             break;
         }
-      else if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && datalen && *data == '#' ) 
+      else if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && datalen && *data == '#' )
         {
           /* Early versions of GnuPG used old PGP comment packets;
            * luckily all those comments are prefixed by a hash
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ _keybox_parse_openpgp (const unsigned char *image, size_t imagelen,
 
               if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
                 break; /* Next keyblock encountered - ready. */
-              
+
               if (nparsed)
                 *nparsed += n;
             }