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authorWerner Koch <[email protected]>2022-12-02 09:03:36 +0000
committerWerner Koch <[email protected]>2022-12-02 09:09:58 +0000
commit1a85ee9a431bd2243e0ad79ce5eefa78e274a491 (patch)
tree9b2e33d41d5c373110efd33e00aafba723ca2308 /g10/export.c
parentgpg: Remove a mostly duplicated function. (diff)
downloadgnupg-1a85ee9a431bd2243e0ad79ce5eefa78e274a491.tar.gz
gnupg-1a85ee9a431bd2243e0ad79ce5eefa78e274a491.zip
gpg: New export option "mode1003".
* agent/command.c (cmd_export_key): Add option --mode1003. (command_has_option): Ditto. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Implement mode 1003. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Ditto. * g10/options.h (EXPORT_MODE1003): New.o * g10/call-agent.c (agent_export_key): Add arg mode1003. * g10/export.c (parse_export_options): Add "mode1003" (secret_key_to_mode1003): New. (receive_seckey_from_agent): Add arg mode1003. (do_export_one_keyblock): Pass option down. -- This option allows to export a secret key in GnuPG's native format. Thus no re-encryption is required and further the public key parameters are also authenticated if a protection passphrase has been used. Note that --import is not yet able to handle this new mode. Although old version of GnuPG will bail out with "invalid packet" if a mode1003 exported secret key is seen.
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/export.c')
-rw-r--r--g10/export.c202
1 files changed, 196 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c
index 3d4413068..cab00d10c 100644
--- a/g10/export.c
+++ b/g10/export.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
* 2005, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Werner Koch
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@@ -140,6 +141,9 @@ parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
N_("use the GnuPG key backup format")},
{"export-backup", EXPORT_BACKUP, NULL, NULL },
+ {"mode1003", EXPORT_MODE1003, NULL,
+ N_("export secret keys using the GnuPG format") },
+
/* Aliases for backward compatibility */
{"include-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
{"include-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL,NULL},
@@ -639,6 +643,183 @@ canon_pk_algo (enum gcry_pk_algos algo)
}
+/* Take an s-expression wit the public and private key and change the
+ * parameter array in PK to include the secret parameters. */
+static gpg_error_t
+secret_key_to_mode1003 (gcry_sexp_t s_key, PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ gcry_sexp_t list = NULL;
+ gcry_sexp_t l2;
+ enum gcry_pk_algos pk_algo;
+ struct seckey_info *ski;
+ int idx;
+ char *string;
+ size_t npkey, nskey;
+ gcry_mpi_t pub_params[10] = { NULL };
+
+ /* We look for a private-key, then the first element in it tells us
+ the type */
+ list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "protected-private-key", 0);
+ if (!list)
+ list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "private-key", 0);
+ if (!list)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ log_assert (!pk->seckey_info);
+
+ /* Parse the gcrypt PK algo and check that it is okay. */
+ l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list);
+ if (!l2)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ gcry_sexp_release (list);
+ list = l2;
+ string = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 0);
+ if (!string)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ pk_algo = gcry_pk_map_name (string);
+ xfree (string); string = NULL;
+ if (gcry_pk_algo_info (pk_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NPKEY, NULL, &npkey)
+ || gcry_pk_algo_info (pk_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSKEY, NULL, &nskey)
+ || !npkey || npkey >= nskey)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the pubkey algo and the received parameters matches
+ * those from the public key. */
+ switch (canon_pk_algo (pk_algo))
+ {
+ case GCRY_PK_RSA:
+ if (!is_RSA (pk->pubkey_algo) || npkey != 2)
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); /* Does not match. */
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (list, NULL, "ne",
+ &pub_params[0],
+ &pub_params[1],
+ NULL);
+ break;
+
+ case GCRY_PK_DSA:
+ if (!is_DSA (pk->pubkey_algo) || npkey != 4)
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); /* Does not match. */
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (list, NULL, "pqgy",
+ &pub_params[0],
+ &pub_params[1],
+ &pub_params[2],
+ &pub_params[3],
+ NULL);
+ break;
+
+ case GCRY_PK_ELG:
+ if (!is_ELGAMAL (pk->pubkey_algo) || npkey != 3)
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); /* Does not match. */
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (list, NULL, "pgy",
+ &pub_params[0],
+ &pub_params[1],
+ &pub_params[2],
+ NULL);
+ break;
+
+ case GCRY_PK_ECC:
+ err = 0;
+ if (!(pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
+ || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
+ || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); /* Does not match. */
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ npkey = 2;
+ if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
+ npkey++;
+ /* Dedicated check of the curve. */
+ pub_params[0] = NULL;
+ err = match_curve_skey_pk (list, pk);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ /* ... and of the Q parameter. */
+ err = sexp_extract_param_sos (list, "q", &pub_params[1]);
+ if (!err && (gcry_mpi_cmp (pk->pkey[1], pub_params[1])))
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); /* Unknown. */
+ break;
+ }
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ nskey = npkey + 1; /* We only have one skey param. */
+ if (nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the public key parameters match. For ECC we already
+ * did this in the switch above. */
+ if (canon_pk_algo (pk_algo) != GCRY_PK_ECC)
+ {
+ for (idx=0; idx < npkey; idx++)
+ if (gcry_mpi_cmp (pk->pkey[idx], pub_params[idx]))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Store the maybe protected secret key as an s-expression. */
+ pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
+ if (!ski)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
+ if (!ski)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ ski->is_protected = 1;
+ ski->s2k.mode = 1003;
+
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t buflen;
+
+ err = make_canon_sexp (s_key, &buf, &buflen);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buf, buflen*8);
+ for (idx=npkey+1; idx < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; idx++)
+ pk->pkey[idx] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ leave:
+ gcry_sexp_release (list);
+ for (idx=0; idx < DIM(pub_params); idx++)
+ gcry_mpi_release (pub_params[idx]);
+ return err;
+}
+
+
/* Take a cleartext dump of a secret key in PK and change the
* parameter array in PK to include the secret parameters. */
static gpg_error_t
@@ -1248,6 +1429,11 @@ print_status_exported (PKT_public_key *pk)
* passphrase-protected. Otherwise, store secret key material in the
* clear.
*
+ * If MODE1003 is set, the key is requested in raw GnuPG format from
+ * the agent. This usually does not require a passphrase unless the
+ * gpg-agent has not yet used the key and needs to convert it to its
+ * internal format first.
+ *
* CACHE_NONCE_ADDR is used to share nonce for multiple key retrievals.
*
* If PK is NULL, the raw key is returned (e.g. for ssh export) at
@@ -1255,7 +1441,7 @@ print_status_exported (PKT_public_key *pk)
*/
gpg_error_t
receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd,
- int cleartext,
+ int cleartext, int mode1003,
char **cache_nonce_addr, const char *hexgrip,
PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_sexp_t *r_key)
{
@@ -1275,7 +1461,7 @@ receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd,
if (pk)
{
prompt = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_EXPORT, 1);
- err = agent_export_key (ctrl, hexgrip, prompt, !cleartext,
+ err = agent_export_key (ctrl, hexgrip, prompt, !cleartext, mode1003,
cache_nonce_addr,
&wrappedkey, &wrappedkeylen,
pk->keyid, pk->main_keyid, pk->pubkey_algo);
@@ -1283,7 +1469,7 @@ receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd,
else
{
prompt = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, NULL, FORMAT_KEYDESC_KEYGRIP, 1);
- err = agent_export_key (ctrl, hexgrip, prompt, 0,
+ err = agent_export_key (ctrl, hexgrip, prompt, 0, 0,
NULL,
&wrappedkey, &wrappedkeylen,
NULL, NULL, 0);
@@ -1314,7 +1500,9 @@ receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd,
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, NULL, key, realkeylen);
if (!err)
{
- if (pk && cleartext)
+ if (pk && mode1003)
+ err = secret_key_to_mode1003 (s_skey, pk);
+ else if (pk && cleartext)
err = cleartext_secret_key_to_openpgp (s_skey, pk);
else if (pk)
err = transfer_format_to_openpgp (s_skey, pk);
@@ -1832,7 +2020,9 @@ do_export_one_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid,
else if (!err)
{
err = receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl, cipherhd,
- cleartext, &cache_nonce,
+ cleartext,
+ !!(options & EXPORT_MODE1003),
+ &cache_nonce,
hexgrip, pk, NULL);
if (err)
{
@@ -2781,7 +2971,7 @@ export_secret_ssh_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *userid)
if ((err = get_keywrap_key (ctrl, &cipherhd)))
goto leave;
- err = receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl, cipherhd, 0, NULL, hexgrip, NULL,
+ err = receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl, cipherhd, 0, 0, NULL, hexgrip, NULL,
&skey);
if (err)
goto leave;