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authorWerner Koch <[email protected]>2017-10-17 19:10:19 +0000
committerWerner Koch <[email protected]>2017-10-17 19:10:19 +0000
commit825abec0e7f38667a34dce3025fc2f3a05001dde (patch)
tree8508d92f6b68271377353c15756cec57f03fc694 /common/pkscreening.c
parentsm: Fix colon listing of fields > 12 in crt records. (diff)
downloadgnupg-825abec0e7f38667a34dce3025fc2f3a05001dde.tar.gz
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gpg,sm: New option --with-key-screening.
* common/pkscreening.c: New. * common/pkscreening.h: New. * common/Makefile.am (common_sources): Add them. * g10/gpg.c (opts): New option --with-key-screening. * g10/options.h (struct opt): New field with_key_screening. * g10/keylist.c: Include pkscreening.h. (print_pk_screening): New. (list_keyblock_print): Call it. (print_compliance_flags): Call it. * sm/gpgsm.c (opts): New option --with-key-screening. * sm/gpgsm.h (scruct opt): New field with_key_screening. * sm/keylist.c: Include pkscreening.h. (print_pk_screening): New. (print_compliance_flags): Call it. Add new arg cert. (list_cert_colon): Pass arg cert (list_cert_std): Call print_pk_screening. * sm/fingerprint.c (gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus): New. -- This new option can be used to detect ROCA affected keys. To scan an entire keyring and print the affected fingerprints use this: gpg -k --with-key-screening --with-colons | gawk -F: \ '$1~/pub|sub|sec|ssb|crt/ && $18~/\<6001\>/ {found=1;next}; $1=="fpr" && found {print $10}; {found=0}' The same works for gpgsm. Note that we need gawk due to the "\<" in the r.e. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'common/pkscreening.c')
-rw-r--r--common/pkscreening.c159
1 files changed, 159 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/pkscreening.c b/common/pkscreening.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a3bfb474e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/pkscreening.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/* pkscreening.c - Screen public keys for vulnerabilities
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Werner Koch
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "pkscreening.h"
+
+
+/* Helper */
+static inline gpg_error_t
+my_error (gpg_err_code_t ec)
+{
+ return gpg_err_make (default_errsource, ec);
+}
+
+
+/* Emulation of the new gcry_mpi_get_ui function. */
+static gpg_error_t
+my_mpi_get_ui (unsigned int *v, gcry_mpi_t a)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ unsigned char buf[8];
+ size_t n;
+ int i, mul;
+
+ if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui (a, 16384) > 0)
+ return my_error (GPG_ERR_ERANGE); /* Clearly too large for our purpose. */
+
+ err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, sizeof buf, &n, a);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ *v = 0;
+ for (i = n - 1, mul = 1; i >= 0; i--, mul *= 256)
+ *v += mul * buf[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Detect whether the MODULUS of a public RSA key is affected by the
+ * ROCA vulnerability as found in the Infinion RSA library
+ * (CVE-2017-15361). Returns 0 if not affected, GPG_ERR_TRUE if
+ * affected, GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI if an opaque RSA was passed, or other
+ * error codes if something weird happened */
+gpg_error_t
+screen_key_for_roca (gcry_mpi_t modulus)
+{
+ static struct {
+ unsigned int prime_ui;
+ const char *print_hex;
+ gcry_mpi_t prime;
+ gcry_mpi_t print;
+ } table[] = {
+ { 3, "0x6" },
+ { 5, "0x1E" },
+ { 7, "0x7E" },
+ { 11, "0x402" },
+ { 13, "0x161A" },
+ { 17, "0x1A316" },
+ { 19, "0x30AF2" },
+ { 23, "0x7FFFFE" },
+ { 29, "0x1FFFFFFE" },
+ { 31, "0x7FFFFFFE" },
+ { 37, "0x4000402" },
+ { 41, "0x1FFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 43, "0x7FFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 47, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 53, "0x12DD703303AED2" },
+ { 59, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 61, "0x1434026619900B0A" },
+ { 67, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 71, "0x1164729716B1D977E" },
+ { 73, "0x147811A48004962078A" },
+ { 79, "0xB4010404000640502" },
+ { 83, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 89, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 97, "0x1000000006000001800000002" },
+ { 101, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 103, "0x16380E9115BD964257768FE396" },
+ { 107, "0x27816EA9821633397BE6A897E1A" },
+ { 109, "0x1752639F4E85B003685CBE7192BA" },
+ { 113, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 127, "0x6CA09850C2813205A04C81430A190536" },
+ { 131, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 137, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 139, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 149, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 151, "0x50C018BC00482458DAC35B1A2412003D18030A" },
+ { 157, "0x161FB414D76AF63826461899071BD5BACA0B7E1A" },
+ { 163, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" },
+ { 167, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }
+ };
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ int i;
+ gcry_mpi_t rem;
+ unsigned int bitno;
+
+ /* Initialize on the first call. */
+ if (!table[0].prime)
+ {
+ /* We pass primes[i] to the call so that in case of a concurrent
+ * second thread the already allocated space is reused. */
+ for (i = 0; i < DIM (table); i++)
+ {
+ table[i].prime = gcry_mpi_set_ui (table[i].prime, table[i].prime_ui);
+ if (gcry_mpi_scan (&table[i].print, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX,
+ table[i].print_hex, 0, NULL))
+ BUG ();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that it is not NULL or an opaque MPI. */
+ if (!modulus || gcry_mpi_get_flag (modulus, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
+ return my_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
+
+ /* We divide the modulus of an RSA public key by a set of small
+ * PRIMEs and examine all the remainders. If all the bits at the
+ * index given by the remainder are set in the corresponding PRINT
+ * masks the key is very likely vulnerable. If any of the tested
+ * bits is zero, the key is not vulnerable. */
+ rem = gcry_mpi_new (0);
+ for (i = 0; i < DIM (table); i++)
+ {
+ gcry_mpi_mod (rem, modulus, table[i].prime);
+ err = my_mpi_get_ui (&bitno, rem);
+ if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ERANGE)
+ continue;
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ if (!gcry_mpi_test_bit (table[i].print, bitno))
+ goto leave; /* Not vulnerable. */
+ }
+
+ /* Very likely vulnerable */
+ err = my_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE);
+
+ leave:
+ gcry_mpi_release (rem);
+ return err;
+}