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author | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2017-10-17 19:10:19 +0000 |
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committer | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2017-10-17 19:10:19 +0000 |
commit | 825abec0e7f38667a34dce3025fc2f3a05001dde (patch) | |
tree | 8508d92f6b68271377353c15756cec57f03fc694 /common/pkscreening.c | |
parent | sm: Fix colon listing of fields > 12 in crt records. (diff) | |
download | gnupg-825abec0e7f38667a34dce3025fc2f3a05001dde.tar.gz gnupg-825abec0e7f38667a34dce3025fc2f3a05001dde.zip |
gpg,sm: New option --with-key-screening.
* common/pkscreening.c: New.
* common/pkscreening.h: New.
* common/Makefile.am (common_sources): Add them.
* g10/gpg.c (opts): New option --with-key-screening.
* g10/options.h (struct opt): New field with_key_screening.
* g10/keylist.c: Include pkscreening.h.
(print_pk_screening): New.
(list_keyblock_print): Call it.
(print_compliance_flags): Call it.
* sm/gpgsm.c (opts): New option --with-key-screening.
* sm/gpgsm.h (scruct opt): New field with_key_screening.
* sm/keylist.c: Include pkscreening.h.
(print_pk_screening): New.
(print_compliance_flags): Call it. Add new arg cert.
(list_cert_colon): Pass arg cert
(list_cert_std): Call print_pk_screening.
* sm/fingerprint.c (gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus): New.
--
This new option can be used to detect ROCA affected keys. To scan an
entire keyring and print the affected fingerprints use this:
gpg -k --with-key-screening --with-colons | gawk -F: \
'$1~/pub|sub|sec|ssb|crt/ && $18~/\<6001\>/ {found=1;next};
$1=="fpr" && found {print $10}; {found=0}'
The same works for gpgsm. Note that we need gawk due to the "\<" in
the r.e.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'common/pkscreening.c')
-rw-r--r-- | common/pkscreening.c | 159 |
1 files changed, 159 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/pkscreening.c b/common/pkscreening.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a3bfb474e --- /dev/null +++ b/common/pkscreening.c @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* pkscreening.c - Screen public keys for vulnerabilities + * Copyright (C) 2017 Werner Koch + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of + * the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +#include "util.h" +#include "pkscreening.h" + + +/* Helper */ +static inline gpg_error_t +my_error (gpg_err_code_t ec) +{ + return gpg_err_make (default_errsource, ec); +} + + +/* Emulation of the new gcry_mpi_get_ui function. */ +static gpg_error_t +my_mpi_get_ui (unsigned int *v, gcry_mpi_t a) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char buf[8]; + size_t n; + int i, mul; + + if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui (a, 16384) > 0) + return my_error (GPG_ERR_ERANGE); /* Clearly too large for our purpose. */ + + err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, sizeof buf, &n, a); + if (err) + return err; + + *v = 0; + for (i = n - 1, mul = 1; i >= 0; i--, mul *= 256) + *v += mul * buf[i]; + + return 0; +} + + +/* Detect whether the MODULUS of a public RSA key is affected by the + * ROCA vulnerability as found in the Infinion RSA library + * (CVE-2017-15361). Returns 0 if not affected, GPG_ERR_TRUE if + * affected, GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI if an opaque RSA was passed, or other + * error codes if something weird happened */ +gpg_error_t +screen_key_for_roca (gcry_mpi_t modulus) +{ + static struct { + unsigned int prime_ui; + const char *print_hex; + gcry_mpi_t prime; + gcry_mpi_t print; + } table[] = { + { 3, "0x6" }, + { 5, "0x1E" }, + { 7, "0x7E" }, + { 11, "0x402" }, + { 13, "0x161A" }, + { 17, "0x1A316" }, + { 19, "0x30AF2" }, + { 23, "0x7FFFFE" }, + { 29, "0x1FFFFFFE" }, + { 31, "0x7FFFFFFE" }, + { 37, "0x4000402" }, + { 41, "0x1FFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 43, "0x7FFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 47, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 53, "0x12DD703303AED2" }, + { 59, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 61, "0x1434026619900B0A" }, + { 67, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 71, "0x1164729716B1D977E" }, + { 73, "0x147811A48004962078A" }, + { 79, "0xB4010404000640502" }, + { 83, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 89, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 97, "0x1000000006000001800000002" }, + { 101, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 103, "0x16380E9115BD964257768FE396" }, + { 107, "0x27816EA9821633397BE6A897E1A" }, + { 109, "0x1752639F4E85B003685CBE7192BA" }, + { 113, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 127, "0x6CA09850C2813205A04C81430A190536" }, + { 131, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 137, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 139, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 149, "0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 151, "0x50C018BC00482458DAC35B1A2412003D18030A" }, + { 157, "0x161FB414D76AF63826461899071BD5BACA0B7E1A" }, + { 163, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" }, + { 167, "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" } + }; + gpg_error_t err; + int i; + gcry_mpi_t rem; + unsigned int bitno; + + /* Initialize on the first call. */ + if (!table[0].prime) + { + /* We pass primes[i] to the call so that in case of a concurrent + * second thread the already allocated space is reused. */ + for (i = 0; i < DIM (table); i++) + { + table[i].prime = gcry_mpi_set_ui (table[i].prime, table[i].prime_ui); + if (gcry_mpi_scan (&table[i].print, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, + table[i].print_hex, 0, NULL)) + BUG (); + } + } + + /* Check that it is not NULL or an opaque MPI. */ + if (!modulus || gcry_mpi_get_flag (modulus, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) + return my_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI); + + /* We divide the modulus of an RSA public key by a set of small + * PRIMEs and examine all the remainders. If all the bits at the + * index given by the remainder are set in the corresponding PRINT + * masks the key is very likely vulnerable. If any of the tested + * bits is zero, the key is not vulnerable. */ + rem = gcry_mpi_new (0); + for (i = 0; i < DIM (table); i++) + { + gcry_mpi_mod (rem, modulus, table[i].prime); + err = my_mpi_get_ui (&bitno, rem); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ERANGE) + continue; + if (err) + goto leave; + if (!gcry_mpi_test_bit (table[i].print, bitno)) + goto leave; /* Not vulnerable. */ + } + + /* Very likely vulnerable */ + err = my_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE); + + leave: + gcry_mpi_release (rem); + return err; +} |