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authorNIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>2024-04-24 06:08:41 +0000
committerNIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>2024-04-24 06:08:41 +0000
commita45243548ed39f91cc6d87804d17c110e3150725 (patch)
tree5a6ced3932f170c00603df32203abb41bf6df934 /agent
parentagent: Simplify diverting operation to the smartcard. (diff)
downloadgnupg-a45243548ed39f91cc6d87804d17c110e3150725.tar.gz
gnupg-a45243548ed39f91cc6d87804d17c110e3150725.zip
agent:kem: Factor out ECC KEM operation from composite KEM.
* agent/pkdecrypt.c (ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt): New. (composite_pgp_kem_decrypt): Use ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt. -- Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'agent')
-rw-r--r--agent/pkdecrypt.c243
1 files changed, 136 insertions, 107 deletions
diff --git a/agent/pkdecrypt.c b/agent/pkdecrypt.c
index ef1280739..cfb268190 100644
--- a/agent/pkdecrypt.c
+++ b/agent/pkdecrypt.c
@@ -244,26 +244,11 @@ reverse_buffer (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
}
-/* For composite PGP KEM (ECC+ML-KEM), decrypt CIPHERTEXT using KEM API.
- First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT
- should follow the format of:
-
- (enc-val(pqc(c%d)(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&)))
- c: cipher identifier (symmetric)
- e: ECDH ciphertext
- k: ML-KEM ciphertext
- s: encrypted session key
- fixed-info: A buffer with the fixed info.
-
- FIXME: For now, possible keys on smartcard are not supported.
- */
static gpg_error_t
-composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
- gcry_sexp_t s_cipher, membuf_t *outbuf)
+ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_skey0,
+ const unsigned char *ecc_ct, size_t ecc_ct_len,
+ unsigned char *ecc_ss, size_t *r_shared_len, size_t *r_point_len)
{
- gcry_sexp_t s_skey0 = NULL;
- gcry_sexp_t s_skey1 = NULL;
- unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
const struct ecc_params *ecc;
@@ -271,92 +256,23 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
- int algo;
- gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi = NULL;
- const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey;
- size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len;
-
gcry_mpi_t ecc_sk_mpi = NULL;
unsigned char ecc_sk[ECC_SCALAR_LEN_MAX];
gcry_mpi_t ecc_pk_mpi = NULL;
unsigned char ecc_pk[ECC_POINT_LEN_MAX];
- gcry_mpi_t ecc_ct_mpi = NULL;
- const unsigned char *ecc_ct;
unsigned char ecc_ecdh[ECC_POINT_LEN_MAX];
- unsigned char ecc_ss[ECC_HASH_LEN_MAX];
-
- enum gcry_kem_algos mlkem_kem_algo;
- gcry_mpi_t mlkem_sk_mpi = NULL;
- gcry_mpi_t mlkem_ct_mpi = NULL;
- const unsigned char *mlkem_sk;
- size_t mlkem_sk_len;
- const unsigned char *mlkem_ct;
- size_t mlkem_ct_len;
- unsigned char mlkem_ss[GCRY_KEM_MLKEM1024_SHARED_LEN];
- size_t mlkem_ss_len;
-
- unsigned char kek[32];
- size_t kek_len = 32; /* AES-256 is mandatory */
-
- gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
- unsigned char sessionkey[256];
- size_t sessionkey_len;
- gcry_buffer_t fixed_info = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL;
char *curve_name = NULL;
- err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
- ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info,
- CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL);
- if (err)
- {
- log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
- goto leave;
- }
+ (void)ctrl;
- err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
- ctrl->keygrip1, &shadow_info,
- CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey1, NULL, NULL);
- if (err)
- {
- log_error ("failed to read the another secret key\n");
- goto leave;
- }
-
- /* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */
-
- err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "%dc/eks&'fixed-info'",
- &algo, &ecc_ct_mpi, &mlkem_ct_mpi,
- &encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &fixed_info, NULL);
- if (err)
- {
- if (opt.verbose)
- log_info ("%s: extracting parameters failed\n", __func__);
- goto leave;
- }
-
- len = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo);
- encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
- encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
- if (len == 0 || encrypted_sessionkey_len != len + 8)
- {
- if (opt.verbose)
- log_info ("%s: encrypted session key length %zu"
- " does not match the length for algo %d\n",
- __func__, encrypted_sessionkey_len, algo);
- err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
- goto leave;
- }
-
- /* Firstly, ECC part. */
curve = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey0, "curve", 0);
if (!curve)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%s: no curve given\n", __func__);
- err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
- goto leave;
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
}
curve_name = gcry_sexp_nth_string (curve, 1);
@@ -369,6 +285,18 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
goto leave;
}
+ *r_shared_len = ecc->shared_len;
+ *r_point_len = ecc->point_len;
+
+ if (ecc->point_len != ecc_ct_len)
+ {
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info ("%s: ECC cipher text length invalid (%zu)\n",
+ __func__, ecc->point_len);
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey0, NULL, "/qd",
&ecc_pk_mpi, &ecc_sk_mpi, NULL);
if (err)
@@ -417,16 +345,6 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
ecc_sk_mpi = NULL;
- ecc_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_ct_mpi, &nbits);
- if (ecc->point_len != (nbits+7)/8)
- {
- if (opt.verbose)
- log_info ("%s: ECC cipher text length invalid (%zu)\n",
- __func__, ecc->point_len);
- err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
- goto leave;
- }
-
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_debug ("ECC curve: %s\n", curve_name);
@@ -460,6 +378,123 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (ecc_ss, ecc->shared_len, "ECC shared:");
+ leave:
+ wipememory (ecc_sk, sizeof ecc_sk);
+ wipememory (ecc_ecdh, sizeof ecc_ecdh);
+
+ mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi);
+ mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
+ xfree (curve_name);
+ gcry_sexp_release (curve);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* For composite PGP KEM (ECC+ML-KEM), decrypt CIPHERTEXT using KEM API.
+ First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT
+ should follow the format of:
+
+ (enc-val(pqc(c%d)(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&)))
+ c: cipher identifier (symmetric)
+ e: ECDH ciphertext
+ k: ML-KEM ciphertext
+ s: encrypted session key
+ fixed-info: A buffer with the fixed info.
+
+ FIXME: For now, possible keys on smartcard are not supported.
+ */
+static gpg_error_t
+composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
+ gcry_sexp_t s_cipher, membuf_t *outbuf)
+{
+ gcry_sexp_t s_skey0 = NULL;
+ gcry_sexp_t s_skey1 = NULL;
+ unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
+ gpg_error_t err = 0;
+
+ unsigned int nbits;
+ size_t len;
+
+ int algo;
+ gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey;
+ size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len;
+
+ gcry_mpi_t ecc_ct_mpi = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *ecc_ct;
+ size_t ecc_ct_len;
+ unsigned char ecc_ss[ECC_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ size_t ecc_shared_len, ecc_point_len;
+
+ enum gcry_kem_algos mlkem_kem_algo;
+ gcry_mpi_t mlkem_sk_mpi = NULL;
+ gcry_mpi_t mlkem_ct_mpi = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *mlkem_sk;
+ size_t mlkem_sk_len;
+ const unsigned char *mlkem_ct;
+ size_t mlkem_ct_len;
+ unsigned char mlkem_ss[GCRY_KEM_MLKEM1024_SHARED_LEN];
+ size_t mlkem_ss_len;
+
+ unsigned char kek[32];
+ size_t kek_len = 32; /* AES-256 is mandatory */
+
+ gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+ unsigned char sessionkey[256];
+ size_t sessionkey_len;
+ gcry_buffer_t fixed_info = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
+
+ err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
+ ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info,
+ CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
+ ctrl->keygrip1, &shadow_info,
+ CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey1, NULL, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_error ("failed to read the another secret key\n");
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */
+
+ err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "%dc/eks&'fixed-info'",
+ &algo, &ecc_ct_mpi, &mlkem_ct_mpi,
+ &encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &fixed_info, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info ("%s: extracting parameters failed\n", __func__);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ ecc_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_ct_mpi, &nbits);
+ ecc_ct_len = (nbits+7)/8;
+
+ len = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo);
+ encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
+ encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
+ if (len == 0 || encrypted_sessionkey_len != len + 8)
+ {
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info ("%s: encrypted session key length %zu"
+ " does not match the length for algo %d\n",
+ __func__, encrypted_sessionkey_len, algo);
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Firstly, ECC part. */
+ err = ecc_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl, s_skey0, ecc_ct, ecc_ct_len,
+ ecc_ss, &ecc_shared_len, &ecc_point_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
/* Secondly, PQC part. For now, we assume ML-KEM. */
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey1, NULL, "/s", &mlkem_sk_mpi, NULL);
if (err)
@@ -521,7 +556,7 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
/* Then, combine two shared secrets and ciphertexts into one KEK */
err = gnupg_kem_combiner (kek, kek_len,
- ecc_ss, ecc->shared_len, ecc_ct, ecc->point_len,
+ ecc_ss, ecc_shared_len, ecc_ct, ecc_point_len,
mlkem_ss, mlkem_ss_len, mlkem_ct, mlkem_ct_len,
fixed_info.data, fixed_info.size);
if (err)
@@ -573,22 +608,16 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
leave:
- wipememory (ecc_sk, sizeof ecc_sk);
- wipememory (ecc_ecdh, sizeof ecc_ecdh);
wipememory (ecc_ss, sizeof ecc_ss);
wipememory (mlkem_ss, sizeof mlkem_ss);
wipememory (kek, sizeof kek);
wipememory (sessionkey, sizeof sessionkey);
- mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi);
- mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi);
- mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
mpi_release (ecc_ct_mpi);
+ mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi);
mpi_release (mlkem_ct_mpi);
mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi);
gcry_free (fixed_info.data);
- gcry_sexp_release (curve);
- xfree (curve_name);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey0);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey1);
return err;