diff options
author | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2011-02-03 15:31:42 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Werner Koch <[email protected]> | 2011-02-03 15:35:33 +0000 |
commit | 0b5bcb40cf17a0e1032c113af6024c08b47d7a5c (patch) | |
tree | 6196c497d9734a6a022dd713df373416d2f9f067 /agent/protect.c | |
parent | Compute the fingerprint for ECDH only on demand. (diff) | |
download | gnupg-ECC-INTEGRATION-2-1.tar.gz gnupg-ECC-INTEGRATION-2-1.zip |
Finished ECC integration.ECC-INTEGRATION-2-1
Wrote the ChangeLog 2011-01-13 entry for Andrey's orginal work modulo
the cleanups I did in the last week. Adjusted my own ChangeLog
entries to be consistent with that entry.
Nuked quite some trailing spaces; again sorry for that, I will better
take care of not saving them in the future. "git diff -b" is useful
to read the actual changes ;-).
The ECC-INTEGRATION-2-1 branch can be closed now.
Diffstat (limited to 'agent/protect.c')
-rw-r--r-- | agent/protect.c | 165 |
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 83 deletions
diff --git a/agent/protect.c b/agent/protect.c index 61ed8ee38..94de89311 100644 --- a/agent/protect.c +++ b/agent/protect.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* protect.c - Un/Protect a secret key * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, - * 2003, 2007, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * @@ -85,14 +85,14 @@ calibrate_get_time (struct calibrate_time_s *data) #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM # ifdef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM GetThreadTimes (GetCurrentThread (), -# else +# else GetProcessTimes (GetCurrentProcess (), # endif &data->creation_time, &data->exit_time, &data->kernel_time, &data->user_time); #else struct tms tmp; - + times (&tmp); data->ticks = tmp.tms_utime; #endif @@ -103,12 +103,12 @@ static unsigned long calibrate_elapsed_time (struct calibrate_time_s *starttime) { struct calibrate_time_s stoptime; - + calibrate_get_time (&stoptime); #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM { unsigned long long t1, t2; - + t1 = (((unsigned long long)starttime->kernel_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) + starttime->kernel_time.dwLowDateTime); t1 += (((unsigned long long)starttime->user_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ calibrate_s2k_count_one (unsigned long count) /* Measure the time we need to do the hash operations and deduce an - S2K count which requires about 100ms of time. */ + S2K count which requires about 100ms of time. */ static unsigned long calibrate_s2k_count (void) { @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ get_standard_s2k_count (void) /* Calculate the MIC for a private key or shared secret S-expression. SHA1HASH should point to a 20 byte buffer. This function is suitable for all algorithms. */ -static int +static int calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) { const unsigned char *hash_begin, *hash_end; @@ -211,13 +211,13 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) is_shared_secret = 0; else if (smatch (&s, n, "shared-secret")) is_shared_secret = 1; else - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); hash_begin = s; @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; /* Skip the algorithm name. */ } @@ -235,18 +235,18 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; if ( *s != ')' ) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s++; } if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s++; hash_end = s; @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) - (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) + (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) the returned block is the S-Expression: @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) */ static int -do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, +do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, const char *passphrase, const unsigned char *sha1hash, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { @@ -330,14 +330,14 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, { unsigned char *key; size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN; - + key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen); if (!key) rc = out_of_core (); else { rc = hash_passphrase (passphrase, GCRY_MD_SHA1, - 3, iv+2*blklen, + 3, iv+2*blklen, get_standard_s2k_count (), key, keylen); if (!rc) rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, keylen); @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, p += 20; *p++ = ')'; *p++ = ')'; - memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); + memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); p += blklen; assert ( p - outbuf == outlen); rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, enclen, NULL, 0); @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc ((sha1 salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv) encrypted_octet_string) - + in canoncical format of course. We use asprintf and %n modifier and dummy values as placeholders. */ { @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, p = xtryasprintf ("(9:protected%d:%s((4:sha18:%n_8bytes_%u:%s)%d:%n%*s)%d:%n%*s)", (int)strlen (modestr), modestr, - &saltpos, + &saltpos, (unsigned int)strlen (countbuf), countbuf, blklen, &ivpos, blklen, "", enclen, &encpos, enclen, ""); @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, /* Protect the key encoded in canonical format in PLAINKEY. We assume a valid S-Exp here. */ -int +int agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { @@ -442,9 +442,9 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); depth++; @@ -452,13 +452,13 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++) ; if (!protect_info[infidx].algo) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); prot_begin = prot_end = NULL; for (i=0; (c=protect_info[infidx].parmlist[i]); i++) @@ -471,23 +471,23 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (n != 1 || c != *s) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s +=n; /* skip value */ if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; if (i == protect_info[infidx].prot_to) prot_end = s; s++; } if (*s != ')' || !prot_begin || !prot_end ) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; hash_end = s; s++; @@ -499,10 +499,10 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, assert (!depth); real_end = s-1; - + /* Hash the stuff. Because the timestamp_exp won't get protected, we can't simply hash a continuous buffer but need to use several - md_writes. */ + md_writes. */ rc = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0 ); if (rc) return rc; @@ -555,8 +555,8 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, /* Do the actual decryption and check the return list for consistency. */ static int -do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, - const char *passphrase, +do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, + const char *passphrase, const unsigned char *s2ksalt, unsigned long s2kcount, const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, unsigned char **result) @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, { unsigned char *key; size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN; - + key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen); if (!key) rc = out_of_core (); @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, calculation but then be removed. */ static int merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, - size_t replacepos, + size_t replacepos, const unsigned char *cleartext, unsigned char *sha1hash, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen, @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const unsigned char *s; const unsigned char *startpos, *endpos; int i, rc; - + *result = NULL; *resultlen = 0; *cutoff = 0; @@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, goto invalid_sexp; n = snext (&s); if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1")) - goto invalid_sexp; + goto invalid_sexp; n = snext (&s); if (n != 20) goto invalid_sexp; @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, /* append the parameter list */ memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos); p += endpos - startpos; - + /* Skip over the protected list element in the original list. */ s = protectedkey + replacepos; assert (*s == '('); @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, *cutoff = p - newlist; memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos); p += endpos - startpos; - + /* ready */ *result = newlist; @@ -781,14 +781,14 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, /* Unprotect the key encoded in canonical format. We assume a valid S-Exp here. If a protected-at item is available, its value will be stored at protocted_at unless this is NULL. */ -int +int agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, - gnupg_isotime_t protected_at, + gnupg_isotime_t protected_at, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { int rc; const unsigned char *s; - const unsigned char *protect_list; + const unsigned char *protect_list; size_t n; int infidx, i; unsigned char sha1hash[20], sha1hash2[20]; @@ -810,21 +810,21 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "protected-private-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++) ; if (!protect_info[infidx].algo) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); /* See wether we have a protected-at timestamp. */ @@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, /* Now find the list with the protected information. Here is an example for such a list: - (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc + (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc ((sha1 <salt> <count>) <Initialization_Vector>) <encrypted_data>) */ @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "protected")) break; s += n; @@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, /* found */ n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc")) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION); if (*s != '(' || s[1] != '(') @@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s += 2; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1")) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION); n = snext (&s); @@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, is nothing we should worry about */ if (s[n] != ')' ) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); - + /* Old versions of gpg-agent used the funny floating point number in a byte encoding as specified by OpenPGP. However this is not needed and thus we now store it as a plain unsigned integer. We @@ -938,8 +938,8 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); - + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + cleartext = NULL; /* Avoid cc warning. */ rc = do_decryption (s, n, passphrase, s2ksalt, s2kcount, @@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ agent_private_key_type (const unsigned char *privatekey) store this key in the caller provided buffer KEY. The caller must provide an HASHALGO, a valid S2KMODE (see rfc-2440) and depending on that mode an S2KSALT of 8 random bytes and an S2KCOUNT. - + Returns an error code on failure. */ static int hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, @@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); if ((s2kmode == 1 ||s2kmode == 3) && !s2ksalt) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); - + rc = gcry_md_open (&md, hashalgo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, } if (count < 8) gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, count); - else + else { gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, 8); count -= 8; @@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, } else gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, pwlen); - + gcry_md_final (md); i = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hashalgo); if (i > keylen - used) @@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ s2k_hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, unsigned int s2kcount, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { - return hash_passphrase (passphrase, hashalgo, s2kmode, s2ksalt, + return hash_passphrase (passphrase, hashalgo, s2kmode, s2ksalt, (16ul + (s2kcount & 15)) << ((s2kcount >> 4) + 6), key, keylen); } @@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ make_shadow_info (const char *serialno, const char *idstring) S-expression is returned in an allocated buffer RESULT will point to. The input parameters are expected to be valid canonicalized S-expressions */ -int +int agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, const unsigned char *shadow_info, unsigned char **result) @@ -1162,16 +1162,16 @@ agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "public-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); depth++; s++; - n = snext (&s); + n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ while (*s != ')') @@ -1181,15 +1181,15 @@ agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, depth++; s++; n = snext (&s); - if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s +=n; /* skip value */ if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; s++; } @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, /* Parse a canonical encoded shadowed key and return a pointer to the inner list with the shadow_info */ -int +int agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, unsigned char const **shadow_info) { @@ -1236,16 +1236,16 @@ agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "shadowed-private-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); depth++; s++; - n = snext (&s); + n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ for (;;) @@ -1257,24 +1257,24 @@ agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, depth++; s++; n = snext (&s); - if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "shadowed")) break; s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s +=n; /* skip value */ if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; s++; } /* Found the shadowed list, S points to the protocol */ n = snext (&s); - if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "t1-v1")) { if (*s != '(') @@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, parameters addresses. If the serial number or the ID string is not required, NULL may be passed for them. */ gpg_error_t -parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, +parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, char **r_hexsn, char **r_idstr) { const unsigned char *s; @@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, } return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); } - + if (r_idstr) { *r_idstr = xtrymalloc (n+1); @@ -1350,4 +1350,3 @@ parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, return 0; } - |