diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'scd/app-nks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | scd/app-nks.c | 109 |
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 33 deletions
diff --git a/scd/app-nks.c b/scd/app-nks.c index 3113d343c..d2ba9789d 100644 --- a/scd/app-nks.c +++ b/scd/app-nks.c @@ -19,10 +19,11 @@ /* Notes: - - This is still work in progress. We are now targeting TCOS 3 cards - but try to keep compatibility to TCOS 2. Both are not fully - working as of now. TCOS 3 PIN management seems to work. Use GPA - from SVN trunk to test it. + - We are now targeting TCOS 3 cards and it may happen that there is + a regression towards TCOS 2 cards. Please report. + + - The TKS3 AUT key is not used by our authentication command but + accessible via the decrypt command. - If required, we automagically switch between the NKS application and the SigG application. This avoids to use the DINSIG @@ -63,25 +64,26 @@ static struct int fid; /* File ID. */ int nks_ver; /* 0 for NKS version 2, 3 for version 3. */ int certtype; /* Type of certificate or 0 if it is not a certificate. */ - int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the correspoding certificate. */ + int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the corresponding certificate. */ int issignkey; /* True if file is a key usable for signing. */ int isenckey; /* True if file is a key usable for decryption. */ + unsigned char kid; /* Corresponding key references. */ } filelist[] = { - { 0, 0x4531, 0, 0, 0xC000, 1, 0 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.SIG */ - { 1, 0x4531, 3, 0, 0x0000, 1, 1 }, /* EF_PK.CH.SIG */ - { 0, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.SIG */ - { 1, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.CH.SIG */ + { 0, 0x4531, 0, 0, 0xC000, 1, 0, 0x80 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.SIG */ + { 1, 0x4531, 3, 0, 0x0000, 1, 1, 0x84 }, /* EF_PK.CH.SIG */ + { 0, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.SIG */ + { 1, 0xC000, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.CH.SIG */ { 0, 0x4331, 0, 100 }, { 0, 0x4332, 0, 100 }, - { 0, 0xB000, 0, 110 }, /* EF_PK.RCA.NKS */ - { 0, 0x45B1, 0, 0, 0xC200, 0, 1 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC */ - { 0, 0xC200, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC */ + { 0, 0xB000, 0, 110 }, /* EF_PK.RCA.NKS */ + { 0, 0x45B1, 0, 0, 0xC200, 0, 1, 0x81 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC */ + { 0, 0xC200, 0, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC */ { 0, 0x43B1, 0, 100 }, { 0, 0x43B2, 0, 100 }, - { 0, 0x4571, 3, 0, 0xc500, 0, 0 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.AUT */ - { 0, 0xC500, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.AUT */ - { 0, 0x45B2, 3, 0, 0xC201, 0, 1 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC1024 */ - { 0, 0xC201, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC1024 */ + { 0, 0x4571, 3, 0, 0xc500, 0, 0, 0x82 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.AUT */ + { 0, 0xC500, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.AUT */ + { 0, 0x45B2, 3, 0, 0xC201, 0, 1, 0x83 }, /* EF_PK.NKS.ENC1024 */ + { 0, 0xC201, 3, 101 }, /* EF_C.NKS.ENC1024 */ /* { 1, 0xB000, 3, ... */ { 0, 0 } }; @@ -303,10 +305,12 @@ do_getattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name) { case 1: /* $AUTHKEYID */ { - /* NetKey 3.0 cards define this key for authentication. - FIXME: We don't have the readkey command, so this - information is pretty useless. */ - char const tmp[] = "NKS-NKS3.4571"; + /* NetKey 3.0 cards define an authentication key but according + to the specs this key is only usable for encryption and not + signing. it might work anyway but it has not yet been + tested - fixme. Thus for now we use the NKS signature key + for authentication. */ + char const tmp[] = "NKS-NKS3.4531"; send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); } break; @@ -685,13 +689,18 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo, int rc, i; int is_sigg = 0; int fid; - unsigned char data[35]; /* Must be large enough for a SHA-1 digest - + the largest OID _prefix above. */ + unsigned char kid; + unsigned char data[83]; /* Must be large enough for a SHA-1 digest + + the largest OID prefix. */ + size_t datalen; if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); - if (indatalen != 20 && indatalen != 16 && indatalen != 35) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + switch (indatalen) + { + case 16: case 20: case 35: case 47: case 51: case 67: case 83: break; + default: return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } /* Check that the provided ID is valid. This is not really needed but we do it to enforce correct usage by the caller. */ @@ -721,22 +730,35 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo, return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); if (!filelist[i].issignkey) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); - - /* Prepare the DER object from INDATA. */ - if (indatalen == 35) + kid = filelist[i].kid; + + /* Prepare the DER object from INDATA. */ + if (app->app_local->nks_version > 2 && (indatalen == 35 + || indatalen == 47 + || indatalen == 51 + || indatalen == 67 + || indatalen == 83)) + { + /* The caller send data matching the length of the ASN.1 encoded + hash for SHA-{1,224,256,384,512}. Assume that is okay. */ + assert (indatalen <= sizeof data); + memcpy (data, indata, indatalen); + datalen = indatalen; + } + else if (indatalen == 35) { /* Alright, the caller was so kind to send us an already - prepared DER object. Check that it is waht we want and that - it matches the hash algorithm. */ + prepared DER object. This is for TCOS 2. */ if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1 && !memcmp (indata, sha1_prefix, 15)) ; - else if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160 && !memcmp (indata, rmd160_prefix,15)) + else if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160 && !memcmp (indata,rmd160_prefix,15)) ; else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); memcpy (data, indata, indatalen); + datalen = 35; } - else + else if (indatalen == 20) { if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1) memcpy (data, sha1_prefix, 15); @@ -745,11 +767,32 @@ do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo, else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); memcpy (data+15, indata, indatalen); + datalen = 35; } + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + - rc = verify_pin (app, 0, NULL, pincb, pincb_arg); + /* Send an MSE for PSO:Computer_Signature. */ + if (app->app_local->nks_version > 2) + { + unsigned char mse[6]; + + mse[0] = 0x80; /* Algorithm reference. */ + mse[1] = 1; + mse[2] = 2; /* RSA, card does pkcs#1 v1.5 padding, no ASN.1 check. */ + mse[3] = 0x84; /* Private key reference. */ + mse[4] = 1; + mse[5] = kid; + rc = iso7816_manage_security_env (app->slot, 0x41, 0xB6, + mse, sizeof mse); + } + /* Verify using PW1.CH. */ + if (!rc) + rc = verify_pin (app, 0, NULL, pincb, pincb_arg); + /* Compute the signature. */ if (!rc) - rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app->slot, data, 35, outdata, outdatalen); + rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app->slot, data, datalen, outdata, outdatalen); return rc; } |