diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/sign.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sign.c | 67 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c index b437190af..6a90fe16e 100644 --- a/g10/sign.c +++ b/g10/sign.c @@ -905,7 +905,8 @@ write_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, * and ignore the detached mode. Sign the file with all secret keys * which can be taken from LOCUSR, if this is NULL, use the default one * If ENCRYPTFLAG is true, use REMUSER (or ask if it is NULL) to encrypt the - * signed data for these users. + * signed data for these users. If ENCRYPTFLAG is 2 symmetric encryption + * is also used. * If OUTFILE is not NULL; this file is used for output and the function * does not ask for overwrite permission; output is then always * uncompressed, non-armored and in binary mode. @@ -1035,17 +1036,16 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr, select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, opt.def_digest_algo, NULL)!=opt.def_digest_algo) - log_info(_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)" - " violates recipient preferences\n"), - gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo), - opt.def_digest_algo ); + log_info(_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)" + " violates recipient preferences\n"), + gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo), + opt.def_digest_algo ); } else { - int algo, smartcard=0; - union pref_hint hint; - - hint.digest_length = 0; + int algo; + int conflict = 0; + struct pref_hint hint = { 0 }; /* Of course, if the recipient asks for something unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then @@ -1073,31 +1073,40 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr, (sk_rover->pk->pkey[1])); if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) - temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen); - temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; + { + temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen); + if (!temp_hashlen) + conflict = 1; /* Better don't use the prefs. */ + temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; + /* Fixup for that funny nistp521 (yes, 521) + * were we need to use a 512 bit hash algo. */ + if (temp_hashlen == 66) + temp_hashlen = 64; + } + else + temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; /* Pick a hash that is large enough for our - largest q */ - - if (hint.digest_length<temp_hashlen) - hint.digest_length=temp_hashlen; + largest q or matches our Q but if tehreare + several of them we run into a conflict and + don't use the preferences. */ + + if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen) + { + if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) + { + if (hint.exact) + conflict = 1; + hint.exact = 1; + } + hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen; + } } - /* FIXME: need to check gpg-agent for this. */ - /* else if (sk_rover->pk->is_protected */ - /* && sk_rover->pk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) */ - /* smartcard = 1; */ } - /* Current smartcards only do 160-bit hashes. If we have - to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the - recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the - same time and recipient prefs currently require a - single hash for all signatures. All this may well have - to change as the cards add algorithms. */ - - if ((!smartcard || (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20)) - && (algo = select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, - -1,&hint)) > 0) + if (!conflict + && (algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, + -1,&hint)) > 0) { /* Note that we later check that the algo is not weak. */ recipient_digest_algo = algo; |