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-rw-r--r--ChangeLog10
-rw-r--r--NEWS1
-rw-r--r--TODO4
-rw-r--r--acinclude.m41
-rw-r--r--configure.ac136
-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog13
-rw-r--r--g10/encode.c9
-rw-r--r--g10/encr-data.c3
-rw-r--r--g10/g10.c17
-rw-r--r--g10/main.h1
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c35
-rw-r--r--g10/passphrase.c14
-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c322
-rw-r--r--include/ChangeLog4
-rw-r--r--include/cipher.h1
-rw-r--r--util/ChangeLog4
-rw-r--r--util/secmem.c11
17 files changed, 522 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 6f9228cec..5216100d1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+ * acinclude.m4: Add check for plock if mlock is broken.
+ * configure.ac: Use regular tests for -lsocket and -lnsl,
+ more thorough test for gethrtime, allow specifying the path to
+ the zlib library if it is not in the default compiler/linker
+ search path, use ${datadir}. All these test enhancements are by
+ Albert Chin.
+
+ * configure.ac: Set some compiler flags for dec-osf and hpux. By
+ Tim Mooney.
+
* configure.ac: Create g10defs.h with EXTSEP_S et al.
2001-08-03 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 110e04e8e..7340915d0 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
* Merged Stefan's patches for RISCOS in. See comments in
scripts/build-riscos.
+ * It is now possible to sign an convenional encrypt a message (-cs).
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.6 (2001-05-29)
------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index dd7e43b51..79cd1768c 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@
* Put a note into readme.w32 that there is a man page and a options
file; write the registry stuff in regedit format.
- * Allow "gpg -cs"
-
* Show more info does not work from edit->trust
* keyedit_menu: We first look for a secret key and then for a public
@@ -77,6 +75,8 @@
* Using --list-only to check for recipients while decrypting may
yield an error about an unknown packet.
+ * Check that the way we select cipher and digest algorithms w/o
+ preferences is okay and make AES the default.
Scheduled for 1.1
-----------------
diff --git a/acinclude.m4 b/acinclude.m4
index 5a245fe29..4ba4be9b9 100644
--- a/acinclude.m4
+++ b/acinclude.m4
@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ define(GNUPG_CHECK_MLOCK,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BROKEN_MLOCK,1,
[Defined if the mlock() call does not work])
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(plock)
else
if test "$gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock" = "no"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0180bfa44..5d65e6774 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -239,6 +239,15 @@ case "${target}" in
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -w"
fi
;;
+ *-dec-osf5*)
+ if test -z "$GCC" ; then
+ # Use the newer compiler `-msg_disable ptrmismatch' to
+ # get rid of the unsigned/signed char mismatch warnings.
+ # Using this may hide other pointer mismatch warnings, but
+ # it at least lets other warning classes through
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -msg_disable ptrmismatch"
+ fi
+ ;;
m68k-atari-mint)
;;
*)
@@ -279,7 +288,13 @@ esac
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRINTABLE_OS_NAME, "$PRINTABLE_OS_NAME",
[A human readable text with the name of the OS])
-dnl Fixme: Are these the best flags for OpenBSD????
+
+#
+# 1. Set flags to be used for the extension modules
+# 2. Set names of random devices
+#
+NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
+NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
case "${target}" in
*-openbsd* | *-netbsd*)
NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/srandom"
@@ -287,15 +302,39 @@ case "${target}" in
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared -rdynamic $CFLAGS_PIC -Wl,-Bshareable -Wl,-x"
;;
+ hpux*)
+ # if using the vendor (ANSI) compiler, arrange to have `-b' passed
+ # to the linker. If using gcc, it supports `-shared' to do the same.
+ if test -n "$GCC" ; then
+ DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
+ else
+ DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS='-Wl,-b'
+ fi
+ ;;
+
+ *-irix6.5*)
+ # Irix 6.5 (and probably a lot earlier, but I only still have
+ # access to 6.5.x) doesn't require any additional flags, as `-KPIC'
+ # is the default. Also, `-shared' works with the vendor compiler
+ DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared"
+ ;;
+
+ alpha*-dec-osf*)
+ # osf (i.e. OSF/1, Digital UNIX, or Tru64 UNIX, pick any one...)
+ # on alpha doesn't require any PIC flags, everything is PIC.
+ # This may not be the case for osf ports to other machines, so
+ # hence the more specific match for target.
+ #
+ # Also, `-shared' works with the vendor compiler or gcc.
+ # -expect_unresolved turns off warnings about unresolved symbols.
+ DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS='-shared -Wl,-expect_unresolved,\*'
+ ;;
+
*-solaris* | *-irix* | *-dec-osf* )
- NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
- NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
;;
*)
- NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
- NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
# -shared is a gcc-ism. Find pic flags from GNUPG_CHECK_PIC.
if test -n "$GCC" ; then
DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
@@ -335,28 +374,33 @@ if test "$ac_cv_header_gdbm_h" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+dnl This old test is here just for reference tin case it fails:
+dnl
dnl Solaris needs -lsocket and -lnsl. Unisys system includes
dnl gethostbyname in libsocket but needs libnsl for socket.
dnl The test does not workfor all system, so some are hardcoded here.
-case "${target}" in
- i386-univel-sysv4*)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket -lnsl"
- ;;
- *)
- AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname)
- AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, socket, ac_need_libsocket=1, ac_try_nsl=1)
- if test x$ac_need_libsocket = x1; then
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket"
- fi
- if test x$ac_try_nsl = x1; then
- AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname, ac_need_libnsl=1)
- if test x$ac_need_libnsl = x1
- then
- LIBS="$LIBS -lnsl"
- fi
- fi
- ;;
-esac
+dnl case "${target}" in
+dnl i386-univel-sysv4*)
+dnl LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket -lnsl"
+dnl ;;
+dnl *)
+dnl AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname)
+dnl AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, socket, ac_need_libsocket=1, ac_try_nsl=1)
+dnl if test x$ac_need_libsocket = x1; then
+dnl LIBS="$LIBS -lsocket"
+dnl fi
+dnl if test x$ac_try_nsl = x1; then
+dnl AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname, ac_need_libnsl=1)
+dnl if test x$ac_need_libnsl = x1
+dnl then
+dnl LIBS="$LIBS -lnsl"
+dnl fi
+dnl fi
+dnl ;;
+dnl esac
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(gethostbyname, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname))
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt))
if test "$try_dynload" = yes ; then
@@ -446,10 +490,17 @@ fi
dnl Checks for library functions.
AC_FUNC_VPRINTF
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strerror stpcpy strlwr stricmp tcgetattr rand strtoul mmap)
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memmove gettimeofday getrusage gethrtime setrlimit clock_gettime)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memmove gettimeofday getrusage setrlimit clock_gettime)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memicmp atexit raise getpagesize strftime nl_langinfo)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(waitpid wait4 sigaction sigprocmask fseeko)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gethrtime)
+AC_TRY_LINK([#include <sys/times.h>],[
+ hrtime_t tv;
+ tv = gethrtime();
+ ],[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETHRTIME)], AC_MSG_RESULT(no))
+
+
GNUPG_CHECK_MLOCK
GNUPG_FUNC_MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG
@@ -696,12 +747,25 @@ use_local_zlib=yes
if test "$g10_force_zlib" = "yes"; then
:
else
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS(zlib.h)
- if test "$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = yes ; then
- AC_CHECK_LIB(z,deflateInit2_,use_local_zlib=no,:)
- fi
+ _cppflags="${CPPFLAGS}"
+ _ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
+
+ AC_ARG_WITH(zlib,
+ [ --with-zlib=DIR use libz in DIR],[
+ if test -d "$withval"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -I$withval/include"
+ LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} -L$withval/lib"
+ fi
+ ])
+
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(zlib.h,
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflateInit2_,
+ use_local_zlib=no
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lz",
+ CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags}),
+ CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags})
fi
-
+
if test "$use_local_zlib" = yes ; then
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB, true)
AC_CONFIG_LINKS(zlib.h:zlib/zlib.h zconf.h:zlib/zconf.h )
@@ -709,7 +773,6 @@ if test "$use_local_zlib" = yes ; then
else
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB, false)
ZLIBS=
- LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
fi
AC_SUBST(ZLIBS)
@@ -757,7 +820,7 @@ cat >g10defs.tmp <<G10EOF
#define GNUPG_DATADIR "c:/lib/gnupg"
#define GNUPG_HOMEDIR "c:/gnupg"
#else
- #define G10_LOCALEDIR "${prefix}/${DATADIRNAME}/locale"
+ #define G10_LOCALEDIR "${datadir}/locale"
#define GNUPG_LIBDIR "${libdir}/gnupg"
#define GNUPG_DATADIR "${datadir}/gnupg"
#ifdef __VMS
@@ -806,14 +869,15 @@ checks/Makefile
AC_OUTPUT
# Give some feedback
-echo "Configured for: $PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ($target)"
+echo
+echo " Configured for: $PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ($target)"
if test -n "$show_dynlink"; then
- echo "Dynamically linked modules:$show_dynlink"
+ echo " Dynamically linked modules:$show_dynlink"
fi
if test -n "$show_statlink"; then
- echo "Statically linked modules:$show_statlink"
+ echo " Statically linked modules:$show_statlink"
fi
if test -n "$show_extraasm"; then
- echo "Extra cpu specific functions:$show_extraasm"
+ echo " Extra cpu specific functions:$show_extraasm"
fi
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 7d583db9d..0ffbf1f0c 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+ * encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Keep track on whether we already
+ printed information about the used algorithm.
+ * mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Removed the non-working IDEA hack
+ and print a message about the assumed algorithm.
+ * passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Use the same algorithm as above.
+ (proc_symkey_enc): Print the algorithm, so that the user knows it
+ before entering the passphrase.
+ (proc_pubkey_enc, proc_pubkey_enc): Zero the DEK out.
+ * encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Ditto.
+
+ * g10.c: Allow for --sign --symmetric.
+ * sign.c (sign_and_symencrypt): New.
+
Applied patches from Stefan Bellon <[email protected]> to support
the RISCOS. Nearly all of these patches are identified by the
__riscos__ macro.
diff --git a/g10/encode.c b/g10/encode.c
index 5726be5a4..8cc44c152 100644
--- a/g10/encode.c
+++ b/g10/encode.c
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ encode_crypt( const char *filename, STRLIST remusr )
}
#endif
/* create a session key */
- cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *cfx.dek );
+ cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure_clear (sizeof *cfx.dek);
if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
cfx.dek->algo = select_algo_from_prefs( pk_list, PREFTYPE_SYM );
if( cfx.dek->algo == -1 )
@@ -415,13 +415,16 @@ encrypt_filter( void *opaque, int control,
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
if( !efx->header_okay ) {
- efx->cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *efx->cfx.dek );
+ efx->cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *efx->cfx.dek );
if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
efx->cfx.dek->algo =
select_algo_from_prefs( efx->pk_list, PREFTYPE_SYM );
- if( efx->cfx.dek->algo == -1 )
+ if( efx->cfx.dek->algo == -1 ) {
+ /* because 3DES is implicitly in the prefs, this can only
+ * happen if we do not have any public keys in the list */
efx->cfx.dek->algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
+ }
}
else
efx->cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
diff --git a/g10/encr-data.c b/g10/encr-data.c
index ee8c188fc..e2752bf36 100644
--- a/g10/encr-data.c
+++ b/g10/encr-data.c
@@ -60,12 +60,13 @@ decrypt_data( void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
unsigned nprefix;
memset( &dfx, 0, sizeof dfx );
- if( opt.verbose ) {
+ if( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed ) {
const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string( dek->algo );
if( s )
log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
else
log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), dek->algo );
+ dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
if( (rc=check_cipher_algo(dek->algo)) )
goto leave;
diff --git a/g10/g10.c b/g10/g10.c
index 77b0c8246..8ae76f62a 100644
--- a/g10/g10.c
+++ b/g10/g10.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
aStore,
aKeygen,
aSignEncr,
+ aSignSym,
aSignKey,
aLSignKey,
aListPackets,
@@ -607,6 +608,10 @@ set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
cmd = aSignEncr;
+ else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
+ cmd = aSignSym;
+ else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
+ cmd = aSignSym;
else if( cmd == aKMode && new_cmd == aSym )
cmd = aKModeC;
else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign )
@@ -1316,11 +1321,21 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
free_strlist(sl);
break;
+ case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
+ if (argc > 1)
+ wrong_args(_("--sign --symmetric [filename]"));
+ rc = sign_symencrypt_file (fname, locusr);
+ if (rc)
+ log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
+ print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ break;
+
case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--clearsign [filename]"));
if( (rc = clearsign_file(fname, locusr, NULL)) )
- log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n",
+ print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
break;
case aVerify:
diff --git a/g10/main.h b/g10/main.h
index 353d5bd94..43dd72ee3 100644
--- a/g10/main.h
+++ b/g10/main.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ int complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_key *sk, MD_HANDLE md );
int sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
int do_encrypt, STRLIST remusr, const char *outfile );
int clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile );
+int sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr);
/*-- sig-check.c --*/
int check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig );
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index af50f6a58..02a423804 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -247,8 +247,19 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if (enc->seskeylen)
log_error ("symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n");
else {
+ int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+ const char *s;
+
+ s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
+ if( s )
+ log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+ else
+ log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
+
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, enc->cipher_algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
+ if (c->dek)
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
free_packet(pkt);
}
@@ -276,10 +287,10 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
}
if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
- /* It does not make nuch sense to store the session key in
+ /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
* command line and the GCHQ knows about it */
- c->dek = m_alloc( sizeof *c->dek );
+ c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
if ( result ) {
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
@@ -293,7 +304,7 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else {
- c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
+ c->dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
/* error: delete the DEK */
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
@@ -409,14 +420,14 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
- int def_algo;
- /* assume this is old conventional encrypted data
- * We use IDEA here if it is installed */
- def_algo = check_cipher_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)?
- DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO : CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0,
- opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo
- : DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO, NULL, 0 );
+ int algo = opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo
+ : opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+ /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
+ log_info(_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+ cipher_algo_to_string (algo) );
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, NULL, 0);
+ if (c->dek)
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
else if( !c->dek )
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
diff --git a/g10/passphrase.c b/g10/passphrase.c
index c626e9adc..c6c7cb27d 100644
--- a/g10/passphrase.c
+++ b/g10/passphrase.c
@@ -513,16 +513,14 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
STRING2KEY help_s2k;
if( !s2k ) {
- int def_algo;
+ /* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
+ * Note: This must match the code in encode.c with opt.rfc1991 set */
+ int algo = opt.def_digest_algo ? opt.def_digest_algo
+ : opt.s2k_digest_algo;
s2k = &help_s2k;
s2k->mode = 0;
- /* If we have IDEA installed we use MD5 otherwise the default
- * hash algorithm. This can always be overriden from the
- * commandline */
- def_algo = check_cipher_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)?
- DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
- s2k->hash_algo = opt.def_digest_algo? opt.def_digest_algo : def_algo;
+ s2k->hash_algo = algo;
}
if( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() ) {
@@ -632,7 +630,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
if( !pw || !*pw )
write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
- dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
+ dek = m_alloc_secure_clear ( sizeof *dek );
dek->algo = cipher_algo;
if( !*pw && mode == 2 )
dek->keylen = 0;
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index bd3faf2b5..913d82be7 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -797,6 +797,328 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file.
+ * FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file.
+ */
+int
+sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr)
+{
+ armor_filter_context_t afx;
+ compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+ md_filter_context_t mfx;
+ text_filter_context_t tfx;
+ cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
+ IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+ PACKET pkt;
+ PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
+ STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+ u32 filesize;
+ int rc = 0;
+ SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+ SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+ int old_style = opt.rfc1991;
+ int compr_algo = -1; /* unknown */
+ int algo;
+
+ memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+ memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+ memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
+ memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+ memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
+ init_packet( &pkt );
+
+ rc = build_sk_list (locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+ if( !old_style )
+ old_style = only_old_style( sk_list );
+
+ /* prepare iobufs */
+ inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+ if( !inp ) {
+ log_error("can't open %s: %s\n", fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+ strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* prepare key */
+ s2k = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
+ s2k->mode = opt.rfc1991? 0:opt.s2k_mode;
+ s2k->hash_algo = opt.def_digest_algo ? opt.def_digest_algo
+ : opt.s2k_digest_algo;
+
+ algo = opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo : opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+ if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
+ log_info (_("%s encryption will be used\n"),
+ cipher_algo_to_string(algo) );
+ cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 2 );
+
+ if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
+ rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
+ log_error(_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* now create the outfile */
+ rc = open_outfile (fname, opt.armor? 1:0, &out);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
+ if (opt.textmode)
+ iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
+ mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+
+ for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version ));
+ }
+
+ iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);
+
+ /* Push armor output filter */
+ if (opt.armor)
+ iobuf_push_filter (out, armor_filter, &afx);
+
+ /* Write the symmetric key packet */
+ /*(current filters: armor)*/
+ if (!opt.rfc1991) {
+ PKT_symkey_enc *enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
+ enc->version = 4;
+ enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
+ enc->s2k = *s2k;
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
+ pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
+ if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+ log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ m_free(enc);
+ }
+
+ /* Push the encryption filter */
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
+
+ /* Push the Zip filter */
+ if (opt.compress) {
+ if (!compr_algo)
+ ; /* don't use compression */
+ else {
+ if( old_style || compr_algo == 1 )
+ zfx.algo = 1; /* use the non optional algorithm */
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, compress_filter, &zfx );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Write the one-pass signature packets */
+ /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+ if (!old_style) {
+ int skcount=0;
+ /* loop over the secret certificates and build headers
+ * The specs now say that the data should be bracket by
+ * the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we must build it
+ * here in reverse order */
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
+ skcount++;
+ for( ; skcount; skcount-- ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk;
+ PKT_onepass_sig *ops;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
+ if( ++i == skcount )
+ break;
+
+ sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ ops = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *ops );
+ ops->sig_class = opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00;
+ ops->digest_algo = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
+ ops->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+ keyid_from_sk( sk, ops->keyid );
+ ops->last = skcount == 1;
+
+ init_packet(&pkt);
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
+ pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops;
+ rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
+ free_packet( &pkt );
+ if( rc ) {
+ log_error("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n",
+ g10_errstr(rc));
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff */
+ /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+ if (!opt.no_literal) {
+ if (fname || opt.set_filename) {
+ char *s = make_basename (opt.set_filename? opt.set_filename
+ : fname );
+ pt = m_alloc (sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1 );
+ pt->namelen = strlen (s);
+ memcpy (pt->name, s, pt->namelen );
+ m_free (s);
+ }
+ else { /* no filename */
+ pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
+ pt->namelen = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* try to calculate the length of the data */
+ if (fname) {
+ if( !(filesize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
+ log_info(_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), fname );
+ /* we can't yet encode the length of very large files,
+ * so we switch to partial length encoding in this case */
+ if (filesize >= IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT)
+ filesize = 0;
+
+ /* because the text_filter modifies the length of the
+ * data, it is not possible to know the used length
+ * without a double read of the file - to avoid that
+ * we simple use partial length packets.
+ */
+ if (opt.textmode)
+ filesize = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
+ }
+
+ if (!opt.no_literal) {
+ pt->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+ pt->mode = opt.textmode? 't':'b';
+ pt->len = filesize;
+ pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !opt.rfc1991;
+ pt->buf = inp; /* take data from this iobuf */
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+ pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
+ /* build packet automagically write all the data */
+ if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+ log_error("build_packet(PLAINTEXT) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ pt->buf = NULL;
+ }
+ else {
+ byte copy_buffer[4096];
+ int bytes_copied;
+ while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
+ if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
+ rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+ log_error("copying input to output failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+ break;
+ }
+ memset(copy_buffer, 0, 4096); /* burn buffer */
+ }
+
+ /* catch errors from above */
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* Write the signature by looping over the secret certificates */
+ /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk;
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ MD_HANDLE md;
+
+ sk = sk_rover->sk;
+
+ /* build the signature packet */
+ /* fixme: this code is partly duplicated in make_keysig_packet */
+ sig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
+ sig->version = old_style || opt.force_v3_sigs ? 3 : sk->version;
+ keyid_from_sk( sk, sig->keyid );
+ sig->digest_algo = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
+ sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+ sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+ sig->sig_class = opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00;
+
+ md = md_copy( mfx.md );
+
+ if( sig->version >= 4 ) {
+ build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+ md_putc( md, sig->version );
+ }
+
+ mk_notation_and_policy( sig );
+
+ md_putc( md, sig->sig_class );
+ if( sig->version < 4 ) {
+ u32 a = sig->timestamp;
+ md_putc( md, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
+ md_putc( md, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
+ md_putc( md, (a >> 8) & 0xff );
+ md_putc( md, a & 0xff );
+ }
+ else {
+ byte buf[6];
+ size_t n;
+
+ md_putc( md, sig->pubkey_algo );
+ md_putc( md, sig->digest_algo );
+ if( sig->hashed ) {
+ n = sig->hashed->len;
+ md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
+ md_putc (md, n );
+ md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
+ n += 6;
+ }
+ else {
+ md_putc( md, 0 ); /* always hash the length of the subpacket*/
+ md_putc( md, 0 );
+ n = 6;
+ }
+ /* add some magic */
+ buf[0] = sig->version;
+ buf[1] = 0xff;
+ buf[2] = n >> 24; /* hmmm, n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0 */
+ buf[3] = n >> 16;
+ buf[4] = n >> 8;
+ buf[5] = n;
+ md_write( md, buf, 6 );
+
+ }
+ md_final( md );
+
+ rc = do_sign( sk, sig, md, hash_for(sig->pubkey_algo, sk->version) );
+ md_close( md );
+
+ if( !rc ) { /* and write it */
+ init_packet(&pkt);
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+ pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
+ rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
+ if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
+ print_status_sig_created ( sk, sig, 'S');
+ }
+ free_packet( &pkt );
+ if( rc )
+ log_error("build signature packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ }
+ if( rc )
+ goto leave;
+
+ }
+
+
+ leave:
+ if( rc )
+ iobuf_cancel(out);
+ else {
+ iobuf_close(out);
+ write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+ }
+ iobuf_close(inp);
+ release_sk_list( sk_list );
+ md_close( mfx.md );
+ m_free(cfx.dek);
+ m_free(s2k);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/****************
* Create a signature packet for the given public key certificate and
diff --git a/include/ChangeLog b/include/ChangeLog
index 128176c10..aecb92b4a 100644
--- a/include/ChangeLog
+++ b/include/ChangeLog
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+ * cipher.h (DEK): Added algo_info_printed;
+
* util.h [__riscos__]: Added prototypes and made sure that we
never use __attribute__.
* cipher.h, iobuf.h, memory.h, mpi.h [__riscos__]: extern hack.
* i18n.h [__riscos__]: Use another include file
-
+
2001-05-30 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* ttyio.h (tty_printf): Add missing parenthesis for non gcc.
diff --git a/include/cipher.h b/include/cipher.h
index 6863f98ec..ef00e5c3f 100644
--- a/include/cipher.h
+++ b/include/cipher.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
typedef struct {
int algo;
int keylen;
+ int algo_info_printed;
byte key[32]; /* this is the largest used keylen (256 bit) */
} DEK;
diff --git a/util/ChangeLog b/util/ChangeLog
index 3e361bcdb..c70c28596 100644
--- a/util/ChangeLog
+++ b/util/ChangeLog
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
* memory.c [__riscos__]: Minor patches
* riscos.c (set_filetype): New.
+ * secmem.c (lock_pool): Under HPUX mlock is broken but we might
+ have plock, so we use this to lock the entire process. By Albert
+ Chin.
+
2001-07-03 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* strgutil.c (utf8_to_native): Fixed printing of invalid utf-8
diff --git a/util/secmem.c b/util/secmem.c
index 148ea1e88..c7fc597ee 100644
--- a/util/secmem.c
+++ b/util/secmem.c
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
#include <sys/capability.h>
#endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_PLOCK
+ #include <sys/lock.h>
+ #endif
#endif
#include "types.h"
@@ -120,6 +123,13 @@ lock_pool( void *p, size_t n )
uid = getuid();
#ifdef HAVE_BROKEN_MLOCK
+ /* ick. but at least we get secured memory. about to lock
+ entire data segment. */
+ #ifdef HAVE_PLOCK
+ err = plock( DATLOCK );
+ if( err && errno )
+ err = errno;
+#else /*!HAVE_PLOCK*/
if( uid ) {
errno = EPERM;
err = errno;
@@ -129,6 +139,7 @@ lock_pool( void *p, size_t n )
if( err && errno )
err = errno;
}
+ #endif /*!HAVE_PLOCK*/
#else
err = mlock( p, n );
if( err && errno )