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-rw-r--r--cipher/ChangeLog6
-rw-r--r--cipher/rsa.c93
-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog7
-rw-r--r--g10/keyedit.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/ringedit.c8
-rw-r--r--g10/seckey-cert.c15
6 files changed, 122 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/cipher/ChangeLog b/cipher/ChangeLog
index c85d958f2..7616fe521 100644
--- a/cipher/ChangeLog
+++ b/cipher/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+
+ * rsa.c (secret): Speed up by using the CRT. For a 2k keys this
+ is about 3 times faster.
+ (stronger_key_check): New but unused code to check the secret key.
+
Wed Sep 6 17:55:47 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* rsa.c: Changed the comment about the patent.
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index 36b0802e2..2daa0547f 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ generate( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
MPI t1, t2;
MPI n; /* the public key */
MPI e; /* the exponent */
- MPI phi; /* helper: (p-a)(q-1) */
+ MPI phi; /* helper: (p-1)(q-1) */
MPI g;
MPI f;
@@ -201,19 +201,106 @@ public(MPI output, MPI input, RSA_public_key *pkey )
mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
}
+#if 0
+static void
+stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
+{
+ MPI t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+ MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+ MPI t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+ MPI phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+
+ /* check that n == p * q */
+ mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q);
+ if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: n != p * q\n" );
+
+ /* check that p is less than q */
+ if( mpi_cmp( skey->p, skey->q ) > 0 )
+ log_info ("RSA Oops: p >= q\n");
+
+
+ /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */
+ mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->p, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
+ if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides p-1\n" );
+ mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->q, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
+ if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides q-1\n" );
+
+ /* check that d is correct */
+ mpi_sub_ui( t1, skey->p, 1 );
+ mpi_sub_ui( t2, skey->q, 1 );
+ mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
+ mpi_gcd(t, t1, t2);
+ mpi_fdiv_q(t, phi, t);
+ mpi_invm(t, skey->e, t );
+ if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->d ) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: d is wrong\n");
+
+ /* check for crrectness of u */
+ mpi_invm(t, skey->p, skey->q );
+ if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->u ) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: u is wrong\n");
+
+ log_info ( "RSA secret key check finished\n");
+
+ mpi_free (t);
+ mpi_free (t1);
+ mpi_free (t2);
+ mpi_free (phi);
+}
+#endif
+
+
/****************
* Secret key operation. Encrypt INPUT with SKEY and put result into OUTPUT.
*
* m = c^d mod n
*
- * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n are elements of PKEY.
+ * Or faster:
+ *
+ * m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p
+ * m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q
+ * h = u * (m2 - m1) mod q
+ * m = m1 + h * p
*
- * FIXME: We should better use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
+ * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY.
*/
static void
secret(MPI output, MPI input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
+ #if 0
mpi_powm( output, input, skey->d, skey->n );
+ #else
+ MPI m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+ MPI m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+ MPI h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+
+ /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
+ mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
+ mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p );
+ /* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
+ mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
+ mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q );
+ /* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
+ mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 );
+ if ( mpi_is_neg( h ) )
+ mpi_add ( h, h, skey->q );
+ mpi_mulm( h, skey->u, h, skey->q );
+ /* m = m2 + h * p */
+ mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
+ mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
+ /* ready */
+
+ mpi_free ( h );
+ mpi_free ( m1 );
+ mpi_free ( m2 );
+ #endif
}
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 5acfd4f0f..4dd7ad675 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+
+ * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow to use "debug" on the secret key.
+
+ * ringedit.c (cmp_seckey): Fix for v4 RSA keys.
+ * seckey-cert.c (do_check): Workaround for PGP 7 bug.
+
Wed Sep 6 17:55:47 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* misc.c (print_pubkey_algo_note): Do not print the RSA notice.
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 84e8cd194..79f7c6350 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr, STRLIST commands,
{ N_("sign") , cmdSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key") },
{ N_("s") , cmdSIGN , 0,1,1, NULL },
{ N_("lsign") , cmdLSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key locally") },
- { N_("debug") , cmdDEBUG , 0,1,0, NULL },
+ { N_("debug") , cmdDEBUG , 0,0,0, NULL },
{ N_("adduid") , cmdADDUID , 1,1,0, N_("add a user ID") },
{ N_("deluid") , cmdDELUID , 0,1,0, N_("delete user ID") },
{ N_("addkey") , cmdADDKEY , 1,1,0, N_("add a secondary key") },
diff --git a/g10/ringedit.c b/g10/ringedit.c
index 5fcd458b0..382d7281f 100644
--- a/g10/ringedit.c
+++ b/g10/ringedit.c
@@ -1070,7 +1070,13 @@ cmp_seckey( PKT_secret_key *req_sk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
n = pubkey_get_nskey( req_sk->pubkey_algo );
for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
- if( mpi_cmp( req_sk->skey[i], sk->skey[i] ) )
+ /* Note: becuase v4 protected keys have nothing in the
+ * mpis except for the first one, we skip all NULL MPIs.
+ * This might not be always correct in cases where the both
+ * keys do not match in their secret parts but we can ignore that
+ * because the need for this function is quite ugly. */
+ if( req_sk->skey[1] && sk->skey[i]
+ && mpi_cmp( req_sk->skey[i], sk->skey[i] ) )
return -1;
}
return 0;
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index 5cb10ee13..55a11939f 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -80,10 +80,13 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
int ndata;
byte *p, *data;
+ u16 csumc = 0;
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
+ if ( ndata > 1 )
+ csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata );
mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
@@ -96,9 +99,14 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
else {
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
+ if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
+ /* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
+ sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
+ }
}
+
/* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
- * because the length das an abritary value */
+ * because the length may have an arbitrary value */
if( sk->csum == csum ) {
for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
nbytes = ndata;
@@ -106,6 +114,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
ndata -= nbytes;
p += nbytes;
}
+ /* at this point ndata should be equal to 2 (the checksum) */
}
m_free(data);
}
@@ -237,9 +246,7 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
- /* FIXME: There is a bug in this function for all algorithms
- * where the secret MPIs are more than 1 */
- byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+ byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
int ndata=0;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-06-17 21:35:35 +0000