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authorWerner Koch <[email protected]>2018-01-23 11:07:25 +0000
committerWerner Koch <[email protected]>2018-01-23 11:07:57 +0000
commit9aab9167bca38323973e853845ca95ae8e9b6871 (patch)
treef06594e52ed3722b0cc37979c7d6d3829dcb0d96
parentgpg: Unify AEAD parameter retrieval. (diff)
downloadgnupg-9aab9167bca38323973e853845ca95ae8e9b6871.tar.gz
gnupg-9aab9167bca38323973e853845ca95ae8e9b6871.zip
gpg: Implement AEAD for SKESK packets.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_symkey_enc): Add field aead_algo. * g10/build-packet.c (do_symkey_enc): Support version 5 packets. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Ditto. * g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_symmetric): Force using a random session key in AEAD mode. (encrypt_seskey): Add and support arg aead_algo. (write_symkey_enc): Ditto. (encrypt_simple): Adjust accordingly. (encrypt_filter): Ditto. * g10/gpgcompose.c (sk_esk): For now call encrypt_seskey without AEAD support. * g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Support AEAD. Nver call BUG but return an error. (proc_symkey_enc): Call symkey_decrypt_seskey in a bug compatible way. * g10/import.c (check_prefs): Check AEAD preferences. * g10/keyedit.c (show_prefs): Print AEAD preferences. -- For easier debugging this patch also changes some diagnostics to also print the encryption mode with the cipher algorithm. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
-rw-r--r--g10/build-packet.c36
-rw-r--r--g10/decrypt-data.c6
-rw-r--r--g10/encrypt.c151
-rw-r--r--g10/gpgcompose.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/import.c19
-rw-r--r--g10/keyedit.c18
-rw-r--r--g10/main.h2
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c118
-rw-r--r--g10/packet.h13
-rw-r--r--g10/parse-packet.c32
-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c9
11 files changed, 301 insertions, 105 deletions
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index fc64c9c9f..b4e03d007 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -617,11 +617,8 @@ do_symkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
log_assert (ctb_pkttype (ctb) == PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
+ log_assert (enc->version == 4 || enc->version == 5);
- /* The only acceptable version. */
- log_assert( enc->version == 4 );
-
- /* RFC 4880, Section 3.7. */
switch (enc->s2k.mode)
{
case 0: /* Simple S2K. */
@@ -632,23 +629,26 @@ do_symkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
default:
log_bug ("do_symkey_enc: s2k=%d\n", enc->s2k.mode);
}
- iobuf_put( a, enc->version );
- iobuf_put( a, enc->cipher_algo );
- iobuf_put( a, enc->s2k.mode );
- iobuf_put( a, enc->s2k.hash_algo );
- if( enc->s2k.mode == 1 || enc->s2k.mode == 3 ) {
- iobuf_write(a, enc->s2k.salt, 8 );
- if( enc->s2k.mode == 3 )
- iobuf_put(a, enc->s2k.count);
+ iobuf_put (a, enc->version);
+ iobuf_put (a, enc->cipher_algo);
+ if (enc->version == 5)
+ iobuf_put (a, enc->aead_algo);
+ iobuf_put (a, enc->s2k.mode);
+ iobuf_put (a, enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+ if (enc->s2k.mode == 1 || enc->s2k.mode == 3)
+ {
+ iobuf_write (a, enc->s2k.salt, 8);
+ if (enc->s2k.mode == 3)
+ iobuf_put (a, enc->s2k.count);
}
- if( enc->seskeylen )
- iobuf_write(a, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen );
+ if (enc->seskeylen)
+ iobuf_write (a, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
- write_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
- rc = iobuf_write_temp( out, a );
+ write_header (out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a));
+ rc = iobuf_write_temp (out, a);
- iobuf_close(a);
- return rc;
+ iobuf_close (a);
+ return rc;
}
diff --git a/g10/decrypt-data.c b/g10/decrypt-data.c
index 7ed0bf006..46650f269 100644
--- a/g10/decrypt-data.c
+++ b/g10/decrypt-data.c
@@ -212,8 +212,10 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek)
if ( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed )
{
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (dek->algo))
- log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"),
- openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo));
+ log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted data\n"),
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo),
+ ed->aead_algo? openpgp_aead_algo_name (ed->aead_algo)
+ /**/ : "CFB");
else
log_info (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), dek->algo );
dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
diff --git a/g10/encrypt.c b/g10/encrypt.c
index 4cc4b1a29..c6c9e3a03 100644
--- a/g10/encrypt.c
+++ b/g10/encrypt.c
@@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ static int write_pubkey_enc_from_list (ctrl_t ctrl,
/****************
* Encrypt FILENAME with only the symmetric cipher. Take input from
- * stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
+ * stdin if FILENAME is NULL. If --force-aead is used we use an SKESK.
*/
int
encrypt_symmetric (const char *filename)
{
- return encrypt_simple( filename, 1, 0 );
+ return encrypt_simple( filename, 1, opt.force_aead);
}
@@ -70,14 +70,16 @@ encrypt_store (const char *filename)
/* Encrypt a session key using DEK and store a pointer to the result
* at R_ENCKEY and its length at R_ENCKEYLEN.
*
- * R_SESKEY points to the unencrypted session key (.KEY, >KEYLEN) and
+ * R_SESKEY points to the unencrypted session key (.KEY, .KEYLEN) and
* the algorithm that will be used to encrypt the contents of the
* SKESK packet (.ALGO). If R_SESKEY points to NULL, then a random
* session key that is appropriate for DEK->ALGO is generated and
- * stored at R_SESKEY.
+ * stored at R_SESKEY. If AEAD_ALGO is not 0 the given AEAD algorithm
+ * is used for encryption.
*/
gpg_error_t
-encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, DEK **r_seskey, void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen)
+encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, aead_algo_t aead_algo,
+ DEK **r_seskey, void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = NULL;
@@ -102,30 +104,84 @@ encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, DEK **r_seskey, void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen)
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", c->key, c->keylen );*/
}
- buf = xtrymalloc_secure (1 + seskey->keylen);
- if (!buf)
+
+ if (aead_algo)
{
- err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
- goto leave;
- }
+ unsigned int noncelen;
+ enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
+ byte ad[4];
+
+ err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (aead_algo, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the nonce, the key, and the authentication
+ * tag (16). */
+ buf = xtrymalloc_secure (noncelen + seskey->keylen + 16);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+ goto leave;
+ }
- /* The encrypted session key is prefixed with a one-octet algorithm id. */
- buf[0] = seskey->algo;
- memcpy (buf + 1, seskey->key, seskey->keylen);
-
- err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1);
- if (!err)
- err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
- if (!err)
- err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, NULL, 0);
- if (!err)
- err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, buf, seskey->keylen + 1, NULL, 0);
- if (err)
- goto leave;
+ gcry_randomize (buf, noncelen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+
+ err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo,
+ ciphermode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, buf, noncelen);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
+ ad[1] = 5;
+ ad[2] = dek->algo;
+ ad[3] = aead_algo;
+ err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ memcpy (buf + noncelen, seskey->key, seskey->keylen);
+ gcry_cipher_final (hd);
+ err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, buf + noncelen, seskey->keylen, NULL,0);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ err = gcry_cipher_gettag (hd, buf + noncelen + seskey->keylen, 16);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ *r_enckeylen = noncelen + seskey->keylen + 16;
+ *r_enckey = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* In the old version 4 SKESK the encrypted session key is
+ * prefixed with a one-octet algorithm id. */
+ buf = xtrymalloc_secure (1 + seskey->keylen);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ buf[0] = seskey->algo;
+ memcpy (buf + 1, seskey->key, seskey->keylen);
+
+ err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, NULL, 0);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, buf, seskey->keylen + 1, NULL, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ *r_enckeylen = seskey->keylen + 1;
+ *r_enckey = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
- *r_enckey = buf;
- buf = NULL;
- *r_enckeylen = seskey->keylen + 1;
/* Return the session key in case we allocated it. */
*r_seskey = seskey;
seskey = NULL;
@@ -332,7 +388,7 @@ encrypt_simple (const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey)
{
DEK *dek = NULL;
- rc = encrypt_seskey (cfx.dek, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
+ rc = encrypt_seskey (cfx.dek, aead_algo, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
if (rc)
{
xfree (cfx.dek);
@@ -346,14 +402,16 @@ encrypt_simple (const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey)
cfx.dek = dek;
}
- if (opt.verbose)
- log_info(_("using cipher %s\n"),
- openpgp_cipher_algo_name (cfx.dek->algo));
-
if (aead_algo)
cfx.dek->use_aead = aead_algo;
else
cfx.dek->use_mdc = !!use_mdc (NULL, cfx.dek->algo);
+
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info(_("using cipher %s.%s\n"),
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (cfx.dek->algo),
+ cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead)
+ /**/ : "CFB");
}
if (do_compress
@@ -385,8 +443,9 @@ encrypt_simple (const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey)
{
/* Fixme: This is quite similar to write_symkey_enc. */
PKT_symkey_enc *enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *enc + enckeylen);
- enc->version = 4;
+ enc->version = cfx.dek->use_aead ? 5 : 4;
enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
+ enc->aead_algo = cfx.dek->use_aead;
enc->s2k = *s2k;
if (enckeylen)
{
@@ -535,8 +594,8 @@ setup_symkey (STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek)
static int
-write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek,
- iobuf_t out)
+write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, aead_algo_t aead_algo,
+ DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek, iobuf_t out)
{
int rc;
void *enckey;
@@ -544,7 +603,7 @@ write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek,
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
PACKET pkt;
- rc = encrypt_seskey (symkey_dek, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
+ rc = encrypt_seskey (symkey_dek, aead_algo, &dek, &enckey, &enckeylen);
if (rc)
return rc;
enc = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof (PKT_symkey_enc) + enckeylen);
@@ -555,8 +614,9 @@ write_symkey_enc (STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k, DEK *symkey_dek, DEK *dek,
return rc;
}
- enc->version = 4;
+ enc->version = aead_algo? 5 : 4;
enc->cipher_algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+ enc->aead_algo = aead_algo;
enc->s2k = *symkey_s2k;
enc->seskeylen = enckeylen;
memcpy (enc->seskey, enckey, enckeylen);
@@ -813,10 +873,11 @@ encrypt_crypt (ctrl_t ctrl, int filefd, const char *filename,
goto leave;
/* We put the passphrase (if any) after any public keys as this
- seems to be the most useful on the recipient side - there is no
- point in prompting a user for a passphrase if they have the
- secret key needed to decrypt. */
- if(use_symkey && (rc = write_symkey_enc(symkey_s2k,symkey_dek,cfx.dek,out)))
+ * seems to be the most useful on the recipient side - there is no
+ * point in prompting a user for a passphrase if they have the
+ * secret key needed to decrypt. */
+ if (use_symkey && (rc = write_symkey_enc (symkey_s2k, cfx.dek->use_aead,
+ symkey_dek, cfx.dek, out)))
goto leave;
if (!opt.no_literal)
@@ -1014,9 +1075,9 @@ encrypt_filter (void *opaque, int control,
if(efx->symkey_s2k && efx->symkey_dek)
{
- rc=write_symkey_enc(efx->symkey_s2k,efx->symkey_dek,
- efx->cfx.dek,a);
- if(rc)
+ rc = write_symkey_enc (efx->symkey_s2k, efx->cfx.dek->use_aead,
+ efx->symkey_dek, efx->cfx.dek, a);
+ if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -1084,9 +1145,11 @@ write_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl,
if ( opt.verbose )
{
char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (ctrl, enc->keyid);
- log_info (_("%s/%s encrypted for: \"%s\"\n"),
+ log_info (_("%s/%s.%s encrypted for: \"%s\"\n"),
openpgp_pk_algo_name (enc->pubkey_algo),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo),
+ dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (dek->use_aead)
+ /**/ : "CFB",
ustr );
xfree (ustr);
}
diff --git a/g10/gpgcompose.c b/g10/gpgcompose.c
index f22c7c202..094bc7614 100644
--- a/g10/gpgcompose.c
+++ b/g10/gpgcompose.c
@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ sk_esk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie)
/* Now encrypt the session key (or rather, the algorithm used to
encrypt the SKESK plus the session key) using ENCKEY. */
- err = encrypt_seskey (&s2kdek, &sesdekp,
+ err = encrypt_seskey (&s2kdek, 0, &sesdekp,
(void**)&ske->seskey, (size_t *)&ske->seskeylen);
if (err)
log_fatal ("encrypt_seskey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
index 71e39557c..ed679d5c0 100644
--- a/g10/import.c
+++ b/g10/import.c
@@ -1113,6 +1113,24 @@ check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
problem=1;
}
}
+ else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_AEAD)
+ {
+ if (openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs->value))
+ {
+ /* FIXME: The test below is wrong. We should
+ * check if ...algo_name yields a "?" and
+ * only in that case use NUM. */
+ const char *algo =
+ (openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs->value)
+ ? num
+ : openpgp_aead_algo_name (prefs->value));
+ if(!problem)
+ check_prefs_warning(pk);
+ log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for AEAD"
+ " algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
+ problem=1;
+ }
+ }
else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
{
if(openpgp_md_test_algo(prefs->value))
@@ -2255,6 +2273,7 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats,
{
char countbuf[35];
+ /* FIXME: Support AEAD */
/* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a
dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and
thus we send dummy data for the IV. */
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 81344eb79..3ae96a3b2 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -3064,6 +3064,23 @@ show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
+ tty_printf (_("AEAD: "));
+ for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
+ {
+ if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_AEAD)
+ {
+ if (any)
+ tty_printf (", ");
+ any = 1;
+ /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
+ if (!openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs[i].value)
+ && prefs[i].value < 100)
+ tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_aead_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
+ else
+ tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
+ }
+ }
+ tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
@@ -3172,6 +3189,7 @@ show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
+ prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_AEAD ? 'A' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
prefs[i].value);
diff --git a/g10/main.h b/g10/main.h
index 96899acf5..a02c5740f 100644
--- a/g10/main.h
+++ b/g10/main.h
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ void display_online_help( const char *keyword );
/*-- encode.c --*/
int setup_symkey (STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek);
-gpg_error_t encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, DEK **r_seskey,
+gpg_error_t encrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, aead_algo_t aead_algo, DEK **r_seskey,
void **r_enckey, size_t *r_enckeylen);
aead_algo_t use_aead (pk_list_t pk_list, int algo);
int use_mdc (pk_list_t pk_list,int algo);
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 92da98242..d1d44d774 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -245,46 +245,102 @@ add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
return 1;
}
-static int
+static gpg_error_t
symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
{
+ gpg_error_t err;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+ unsigned int noncelen, keylen;
+ enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
+ byte ad[4];
+
+ if (dek->use_aead)
+ {
+ err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (dek->use_aead, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ciphermode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
+ noncelen = 0;
+ }
- if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
+ /* Check that the session key has a size of 16 to 32 bytes. */
+ if ((dek->use_aead && (slen < (noncelen + 16 + 16)
+ || slen > (noncelen + 32 + 16)))
+ || (!dek->use_aead && (slen < 17 || slen > 33)))
{
log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
(int)slen);
- return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
}
- if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
- BUG ();
- if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
- BUG ();
- gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
- gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
- gcry_cipher_close ( hd );
-
- /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
- decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
-
- dek->keylen=slen-1;
- dek->algo=seskey[0];
+ err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, noncelen? seskey : NULL, noncelen);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
- if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
- BUG ();
-
- memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+ if (dek->use_aead)
+ {
+ byte ad[4];
+
+ ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
+ ad[1] = 5;
+ ad[2] = dek->algo;
+ ad[3] = dek->use_aead;
+ err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ gcry_cipher_final (hd);
+ keylen = slen - noncelen - 16;
+ err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey+noncelen, keylen, NULL, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ err = gcry_cipher_checktag (hd, seskey+noncelen+keylen, 16);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+ * decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+ if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ dek->keylen = keylen;
+ memcpy (dek->key, seskey + noncelen, dek->keylen);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
+ /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+ * decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+ keylen = slen-1;
+ if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ dek->algo = seskey[0];
+ dek->keylen = keylen;
+ memcpy (dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+ }
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
- return 0;
+ leave:
+ gcry_cipher_close (hd);
+ return err;
}
static void
proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
+ gpg_error_t err;
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
@@ -294,19 +350,21 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
+ const char *a = (enc->aead_algo ? openpgp_aead_algo_name (enc->aead_algo)
+ /**/ : "CFB");
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
{
if (!opt.quiet)
{
if (enc->seskeylen)
- log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
+ log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted session key\n"), s, a );
else
- log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+ log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted data\n"), s, a );
}
}
else
- log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
+ log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d.%s\n"), algo, a);
if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
{
@@ -334,6 +392,7 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
if (c->dek)
{
c->dek->symmetric = 1;
+ c->dek->use_aead = enc->aead_algo;
/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
comes before a public key in the message - if the
@@ -344,9 +403,16 @@ proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
come later. */
if (enc->seskeylen)
{
- if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
- enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
+ err = symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
+ enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
+ if (err)
{
+ log_info ("decryption of the symmetrically encrypted"
+ " session key failed: %s\n",
+ gpg_strerror (err));
+ if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY)
+ log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible"
+ " with GnuPG <= 2.2\n");
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
index 4d155746e..4f4569f66 100644
--- a/g10/packet.h
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -94,12 +94,14 @@ typedef struct
/* A symmetric-key encrypted session key packet as defined in RFC
4880, Section 5.3. All fields are serialized. */
typedef struct {
- /* RFC 4880: this must be 4. */
+ /* We support version 4 (rfc4880) and 5 (rfc4880bis). */
byte version;
- /* The cipher algorithm used to encrypt the session key. (This may
- be different from the algorithm that is used to encrypt the SED
- packet.) */
+ /* The cipher algorithm used to encrypt the session key. Note that
+ * this may be different from the algorithm that is used to encrypt
+ * bulk data. */
byte cipher_algo;
+ /* The AEAD algorithm or 0 for CFB encryption. */
+ byte aead_algo;
/* The string-to-key specifier. */
STRING2KEY s2k;
/* The length of SESKEY in bytes or 0 if this packet does not
@@ -107,7 +109,8 @@ typedef struct {
S2K function on the password is the session key. See RFC 4880,
Section 5.3.) */
byte seskeylen;
- /* The session key as encrypted by the S2K specifier. */
+ /* The session key as encrypted by the S2K specifier. For AEAD this
+ * includes the nonce and the authentication tag. */
byte seskey[1];
} PKT_symkey_enc;
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index de51770af..5c6d364ee 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
{
PKT_symkey_enc *k;
int rc = 0;
- int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
+ int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, aead_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
if (pktlen < 4)
{
@@ -1117,7 +1117,11 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
- if (version != 4)
+ if (version == 4)
+ ;
+ else if (version == 5)
+ ;
+ else
{
log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
if (list_mode)
@@ -1135,6 +1139,13 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
+ if (version == 5)
+ {
+ aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
+ pktlen--;
+ }
+ else
+ aead_algo = 0;
s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
@@ -1169,6 +1180,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+ seskeylen - 1);
k->version = version;
k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo;
+ k->aead_algo = aead_algo;
k->s2k.mode = s2kmode;
k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo;
if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
@@ -1199,10 +1211,20 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp,
- ":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, s2k %d, hash %d",
- version, cipher_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
+ ":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, aead %d,"
+ " s2k %d, hash %d",
+ version, cipher_algo, aead_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
if (seskeylen)
- es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8);
+ {
+ /* To compute the size of the session key we need to know
+ * the size of the AEAD nonce which we may not know. Thus
+ * we show only the seize of the entire encrypted session
+ * key. */
+ if (aead_algo)
+ es_fprintf (listfp, ", encrypted seskey %d bytes", seskeylen);
+ else
+ es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8);
+ }
es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
{
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index 7045e8cad..df71ccce1 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -1326,9 +1326,6 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
algo = default_cipher_algo();
- if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
- log_info (_("%s encryption will be used\n"),
- openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo) );
cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 1, 1, NULL, &canceled);
if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
@@ -1341,6 +1338,12 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
if (!cfx.dek->use_aead)
cfx.dek->use_mdc = !!use_mdc (NULL, cfx.dek->algo);
+ if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
+ log_info (_("%s.%s encryption will be used\n"),
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo),
+ cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead)
+ /**/ : "CFB");
+
/* now create the outfile */
rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, opt.armor? 1:0, 0, &out);
if (rc)