aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>2020-06-05 01:09:05 +0000
committerNIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>2020-06-05 01:09:05 +0000
commit2b118516240b4bddd34c68c23a99bea56682a509 (patch)
tree7060eb69303d79c81cff9d83dbd858de2cd57969
parentagent,ssh: Tighten condition for EdDSA. (diff)
downloadgnupg-2b118516240b4bddd34c68c23a99bea56682a509.tar.gz
gnupg-2b118516240b4bddd34c68c23a99bea56682a509.zip
agent: For ECC, use opaque MPI for key representation.
* agent/cvt-openpgp.c (scan_pgp_format): New with SOS support. (do_unprotect): Use scan_pgp_format, handle opaque MPI for ECC. (convert_from_openpgp_main): Use opaque MPI for ECC. (apply_protection): Set GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1 flag for encrypted secret. (extract_private_key): Use "/qd" for ECC, opaque MPI. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>
-rw-r--r--agent/cvt-openpgp.c89
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
index 003402956..5d60b66f3 100644
--- a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
+++ b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
@@ -374,6 +374,38 @@ prepare_unprotect (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
}
+/* Scan octet string in the PGP format (length-in-two-octet octets) */
+static int
+scan_pgp_format (gcry_mpi_t *r_mpi, int pubkey_algo,
+ const unsigned char *buffer,
+ size_t buflen, size_t *r_nbytes)
+{
+ /* Using gcry_mpi_scan with GCRYMPI_FLAG_PGP can be used if it is
+ MPI, but it will be "normalized" removing leading zeros. */
+ unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
+
+ if (pubkey_algo != GCRY_PK_ECC)
+ return gcry_mpi_scan (r_mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buffer, buflen, r_nbytes);
+
+ /* It's ECC, where we use SOS. */
+
+ if (buflen < 2)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
+
+ nbits = (buffer[0] << 8) | buffer[1];
+ if (nbits >= 16384)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
+
+ nbytes = (nbits + 7) / 8;
+ if (buflen < nbytes + 2)
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
+
+ *r_nbytes = nbytes + 2;
+ *r_mpi = gcry_mpi_set_opaque_copy (NULL, buffer+2, nbits);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/* Note that this function modifies SKEY. SKEYSIZE is the allocated
size of the array including the NULL item; this is used for a
bounds check. On success a converted key is stored at R_KEY. */
@@ -407,29 +439,43 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
actual_csum = 0;
for (i=npkey; i < nskey; i++)
{
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+
if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
unsigned int nbits;
- const unsigned char *buffer;
buffer = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (skey[i], &nbits);
nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
+
+ nbits = nbytes * 8;
+ if (*buffer)
+ if (nbits >= 8 && !(*buffer & 0x80))
+ if (--nbits >= 7 && !(*buffer & 0x40))
+ if (--nbits >= 6 && !(*buffer & 0x20))
+ if (--nbits >= 5 && !(*buffer & 0x10))
+ if (--nbits >= 4 && !(*buffer & 0x08))
+ if (--nbits >= 3 && !(*buffer & 0x04))
+ if (--nbits >= 2 && !(*buffer & 0x02))
+ if (--nbits >= 1 && !(*buffer & 0x01))
+ --nbits;
+
+ actual_csum += (nbits >> 8);
+ actual_csum += (nbits & 0xff);
actual_csum += checksum (buffer, nbytes);
}
else
{
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, &buffer, &nbytes,
skey[i]);
- if (!err)
- actual_csum += checksum (buffer, nbytes);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ actual_csum += checksum (buffer, nbytes);
xfree (buffer);
}
- if (err)
- return err;
}
if (actual_csum != desired_csum)
@@ -487,7 +533,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
unsigned char *data;
u16 csum_pgp7 = 0;
- if (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ))
+ if (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
{
gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
@@ -556,7 +602,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
{
for (i=npkey; i < nskey; i++ )
{
- if (gcry_mpi_scan (&tmpmpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, p, ndata, &nbytes))
+ if (scan_pgp_format (&tmpmpi, pubkey_algo, p, ndata, &nbytes))
{
/* Checksum was okay, but not correctly decrypted. */
desired_csum = 0;
@@ -587,7 +633,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
size_t ndata;
unsigned int ndatabits;
- if (!skey[i] || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
+ if (!skey[i] || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
{
gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
@@ -614,7 +660,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
buffer[1] = p[1];
gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, ndata-2, p+2, ndata-2);
actual_csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
- err = gcry_mpi_scan (&tmpmpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buffer, ndata, &ndata);
+ err = scan_pgp_format (&tmpmpi, pubkey_algo, buffer, ndata, &nbytes);
xfree (buffer);
if (err)
{
@@ -837,13 +883,14 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, int dontcare_exist,
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, ++idx, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen)
goto bad_seckey;
- if (is_enc)
+ if (is_enc || npkey == 1 /* This is ECC */)
{
- /* Encrypted parameters need to be stored as opaque. */
skey[skeyidx] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque_copy (NULL, value, valuelen*8);
if (!skey[skeyidx])
goto outofmem;
- gcry_mpi_set_flag (skey[skeyidx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
+ if (is_enc)
+ /* Encrypted parameters need to have a USER1 flag. */
+ gcry_mpi_set_flag (skey[skeyidx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
}
else
{
@@ -1171,6 +1218,7 @@ apply_protection (gcry_mpi_t *array, int npkey, int nskey,
array[i] = NULL;
}
array[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, ndata*8);
+ gcry_mpi_set_flag (array[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
return 0;
}
@@ -1199,7 +1247,7 @@ extract_private_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key, int req_private_key_data,
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t list, l2;
char *name;
- const char *algoname, *format;
+ const char *algoname, *format, *elems;
int npkey, nskey;
gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t flags = NULL;
@@ -1244,7 +1292,7 @@ extract_private_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key, int req_private_key_data,
if (!strcmp (name, "rsa"))
{
algoname = "rsa";
- format = "ned?p?q?u?";
+ format = elems = "ned?p?q?u?";
npkey = 2;
nskey = 6;
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (list, NULL, format,
@@ -1254,7 +1302,7 @@ extract_private_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key, int req_private_key_data,
else if (!strcmp (name, "elg"))
{
algoname = "elg";
- format = "pgyx?";
+ format = elems = "pgyx?";
npkey = 3;
nskey = 4;
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (list, NULL, format,
@@ -1264,7 +1312,7 @@ extract_private_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key, int req_private_key_data,
else if (!strcmp (name, "dsa"))
{
algoname = "dsa";
- format = "pqgyx?";
+ format = elems = "pqgyx?";
npkey = 4;
nskey = 5;
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (list, NULL, format,
@@ -1274,7 +1322,8 @@ extract_private_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key, int req_private_key_data,
else if (!strcmp (name, "ecc") || !strcmp (name, "ecdsa"))
{
algoname = "ecc";
- format = "qd?";
+ format = "/qd?";
+ elems = "qd?";
npkey = 1;
nskey = 2;
curve = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, "curve", 0);
@@ -1298,7 +1347,7 @@ extract_private_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key, int req_private_key_data,
{
*r_algoname = algoname;
if (r_elems)
- *r_elems = format;
+ *r_elems = elems;
*r_npkey = npkey;
if (r_nskey)
*r_nskey = nskey;