* hkp.c (hkp_search): Return proper error code on failure.

* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not allow signing a user ID without a
self-signature.  --expert overrides.

* options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver.

* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired
uids do not count in the web of trust.

5 files changed, 49 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index f41ff4752..358e90360 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+2003-06-17  David Shaw  <[email protected]>
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_search): Return proper error code on failure.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not allow signing a user ID without a
+	self-signature.  --expert overrides.
+
+	* options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver.
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or
+	expired uids do not count in the web of trust.
+
 2003-06-14  David Shaw  <[email protected]>
 
 	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values
diff --git a/g10/hkp.c b/g10/hkp.c
index 56c942166..287638371 100644
--- a/g10/hkp.c
+++ b/g10/hkp.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ parse_hkp_index(IOBUF buffer,char *line)
     {
       m_free(key);
       m_free(uid);
-      log_error(_("this keyserver is not fully HKP compatible\n"));
+      log_error(_("this keyserver does not support --search-keys\n"));
       return -1;
     }
 
@@ -598,7 +598,10 @@ int hkp_search(STRLIST tokens)
 
 	  ret=parse_hkp_index(buffer,line);
 	  if(ret==-1)
-	    break;
+	    {
+	      rc=G10ERR_KEYSERVER;
+	      break;
+	    }
 
 	  if(rc!=0)
 	    count+=ret;
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 8ac7c1125..062fb992d 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -397,10 +397,26 @@ sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
 			    tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
 			  }
 		      }
-		    else if(!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
+		    else if(!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
 		      {
-			tty_printf(_("WARNING: user ID \"%s\" is not "
-				     "self-signed.\n"),user);
+			tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
+				   user);
+
+			if(opt.expert)
+			  {
+			    tty_printf("\n");
+			    /* No, so remove the mark and continue */
+			    if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
+						      _("Are you sure you "
+							"still want to sign "
+							"it? (y/N) ")))
+			      uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+			  }
+			else
+			  {
+			    uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+			    tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
+			  }
 		      }
 
 		    m_free(user);
diff --git a/g10/options.skel b/g10/options.skel
index 5c8afced2..c03221ff3 100644
--- a/g10/options.skel
+++ b/g10/options.skel
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
 # support).
 #
 # Example HKP keyserver:
-#      x-hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
+#      hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
 #
 # Example email keyserver:
 #      mailto:[email protected]
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
 #
 # Regular URL syntax applies, and you can set an alternate port
 # through the usual method:
-#      x-hkp://keyserver.example.net:22742
+#      hkp://keyserver.example.net:22742
 #
 # If you have problems connecting to a HKP server through a buggy http
 # proxy, you can use keyserver option broken-http-proxy (see below),
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
 # Most servers do synchronize with each other and DNS round-robin may
 # give you a quasi-random server each time.
 
-#keyserver x-hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
+keyserver hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
 #keyserver mailto:[email protected]
 #keyserver ldap://pgp.surfnet.nl:11370
 #keyserver ldap://keyserver.pgp.com
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
index 3b972e339..55cc8d80e 100644
--- a/g10/trustdb.c
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -1329,10 +1329,14 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
 	 signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
 	 even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
 	 key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key.  I'm
-	 going with the latter. -dshaw */
+	 going with the latter.  However, if the user ID was
+	 explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that
+	 should stop validity through the user ID until it is
+	 resigned.  -dshaw */
 
-      /* && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created) */
-      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+	  && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+	  && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
         {
           if (uidnode && issigned)
             {
@@ -1346,12 +1350,11 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
             }
           uidnode = node;
 	  uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
-#if 0
-	  /* If the selfsig is going to expire...  This is disabled as
-	     we do count un-self-signed uids in the web of trust. */
+
+	  /* If the selfsig is going to expire... */
 	  if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
 	    *next_expire = uid->expiredate;
-#endif
+
           issigned = 0;
 	  get_validity_counts(pk,uid);
           mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,