diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | NEWS | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/gpgme.texi | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/decrypt.c | 27 |
3 files changed, 24 insertions, 8 deletions
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ Noteworthy changes in version 1.11.2 (unreleased) ------------------------------------------------- + * Even for old versions of gpg a missing MDC will now lead to a + decryption failure. + Noteworthy changes in version 1.11.1 (2018-04-20) ------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/doc/gpgme.texi b/doc/gpgme.texi index c4a29d54..c745675b 100644 --- a/doc/gpgme.texi +++ b/doc/gpgme.texi @@ -5408,7 +5408,7 @@ or @code{gpgme_get_ctx_flag (ctx, "export-session-key")} returns true @since{1.11.0} A string with the symmetric encryption algorithm and mode using the -format "<algo>.<mode>". Note that old non-MDC encryption mode of +format "<algo>.<mode>". Note that the deprecated non-MDC encryption mode of OpenPGP is given as "PGPCFB". @end table diff --git a/src/decrypt.c b/src/decrypt.c index 0fc7019c..ecd9c144 100644 --- a/src/decrypt.c +++ b/src/decrypt.c @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ typedef struct * message that the general DECRYPTION_FAILED. */ int any_no_seckey; + /* If the engine emits a DECRYPTION_INFO status and that does not + * indicate that an integrity proetction mode is active, this flag + * is set. */ + int not_integrity_protected; + /* A pointer to the next pointer of the last recipient in the list. This makes appending new invalid signers painless while preserving the order. */ @@ -280,7 +285,7 @@ parse_decryption_info (char *args, op_data_t opd, gpgme_protocol_t protocol) char *field[3]; int nfields; char *args2; - int mdc, mode; + int mdc, aead_algo; const char *algostr, *modestr; if (!args) @@ -296,19 +301,22 @@ parse_decryption_info (char *args, op_data_t opd, gpgme_protocol_t protocol) mdc = atoi (field[0]); algostr = _gpgme_cipher_algo_name (atoi (field[1]), protocol); - mode = nfields < 3? 0 : atoi (field[2]); - modestr = _gpgme_cipher_mode_name (mode, protocol); + aead_algo = nfields < 3? 0 : atoi (field[2]); + modestr = _gpgme_cipher_mode_name (aead_algo, protocol); free (args2); free (opd->result.symkey_algo); - if (!mode && mdc != 2) + if (!aead_algo && mdc != 2) opd->result.symkey_algo = _gpgme_strconcat (algostr, ".PGPCFB", NULL); else opd->result.symkey_algo = _gpgme_strconcat (algostr, ".", modestr, NULL); if (!opd->result.symkey_algo) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + if (!mdc && !aead_algo) + opd->not_integrity_protected = 1; + return 0; } @@ -338,13 +346,18 @@ _gpgme_decrypt_status_handler (void *priv, gpgme_status_code_t code, break; case GPGME_STATUS_EOF: - /* FIXME: These error values should probably be attributed to - the underlying crypto engine (as error source). */ + /* We force an encryption failure if we know that integrity + * protection is missing. For modern version of gpg using + * modern cipher algorithms this is not required because gpg + * will issue a failure anyway. However older gpg versions emit + * only a warning. + * Fixme: These error values should probably be attributed to + * the underlying crypto engine (as error source). */ if (opd->failed && opd->pkdecrypt_failed) return opd->pkdecrypt_failed; else if (opd->failed && opd->any_no_seckey) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); - else if (opd->failed) + else if (opd->failed || opd->not_integrity_protected) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED); else if (!opd->okay) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA); |