<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl/ssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_2t</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2t</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2t'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2019-05-28T12:41:38Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Update copyright year</title>
<updated>2019-05-28T12:41:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>richard@levitte.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-28T12:41:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=66c236c44060366a9f2c87f30fc648e47898af27'/>
<id>urn:sha1:66c236c44060366a9f2c87f30fc648e47898af27</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9032)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Go into the error state if a fatal alert is sent or received</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:13:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-14T07:28:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=e9bbefbf0f24c57645e7ad6a5a71ae649d18ac8e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e9bbefbf0f24c57645e7ad6a5a71ae649d18ac8e</id>
<content type='text'>
If an application calls SSL_shutdown after a fatal alert has occured and
then behaves different based on error codes from that function then the
application may be vulnerable to a padding oracle.

CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Honour mandatory digest on private key in tls1_process_sigalgs()</title>
<updated>2018-11-24T07:01:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw2@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T14:59:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=63262bd2768797e140f7d0328fb6ccf81aba87b0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:63262bd2768797e140f7d0328fb6ccf81aba87b0</id>
<content type='text'>
If the private key says it can only support one specific digest, then
don't ask it to perform a different one.

Fixes: #7348

(cherry picked from commit 2d263a4a73f852005b16359873475d48755999ad
 and reworked for 1.0.2)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri &lt;nic.tuv@gmail.com&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7610)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update copyright year</title>
<updated>2018-11-20T13:29:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-20T13:23:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=8ea167207d2a014bf592eb21b7e33ed2204d5063'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ea167207d2a014bf592eb21b7e33ed2204d5063</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7671)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix 'no-ecdh' build</title>
<updated>2018-11-09T23:45:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Matthias St. Pierre</name>
<email>Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-09T20:37:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=59b9c67fcaf1c1e2c0e30de6facca85910ac361a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:59b9c67fcaf1c1e2c0e30de6facca85910ac361a</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes #3302

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7606)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Properly handle duplicated messages from the next epoch</title>
<updated>2018-11-02T10:00:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T16:08:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=f1e5009c1c95b708b9ba21c23693f95468089419'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f1e5009c1c95b708b9ba21c23693f95468089419</id>
<content type='text'>
Since 3884b47b7c we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch
that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred.

We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record.

Fixes #6902

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7415)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update copyright year</title>
<updated>2018-08-14T12:40:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T12:29:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=c24e2f1891c147be3c6e277cf09f2bee486a7812'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c24e2f1891c147be3c6e277cf09f2bee486a7812</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6955)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't create an invalid CertificateRequest</title>
<updated>2018-07-03T10:24:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-02T13:09:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=434af36f9778abe274bb637396f60977fbee98d2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:434af36f9778abe274bb637396f60977fbee98d2</id>
<content type='text'>
We should validate that the various fields we put into the
CertificateRequest are not too long. Otherwise we will construct an
invalid message.

Fixes #6609

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6629)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix some more gcc-9 warnings [-Wstringop-truncation]</title>
<updated>2018-06-25T13:30:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bernd Edlinger</name>
<email>bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-25T07:53:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:da0bbdd62614df6d6a33f91142a3e72525f7186e</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6586)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't memcpy the contents of an empty fragment</title>
<updated>2018-05-12T09:09:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-11T09:28:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=f54b665e29a0ed8df2ea322a1f9e1b8057f13894'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f54b665e29a0ed8df2ea322a1f9e1b8057f13894</id>
<content type='text'>
In DTLS if we have buffered a fragment for a zero length message (e.g.
ServerHelloDone) then, when we unbuffered the fragment, we were attempting
to memcpy the contents of the fragment which is zero length and a NULL
pointer. This is undefined behaviour. We should check first whether we
have a zero length fragment.

Fixes a travis issue.

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6225)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
