<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl/ssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_2i</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2i</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2i'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2016-09-22T08:22:05Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Avoid KCI attack for GOST</title>
<updated>2016-09-22T08:22:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Belyavsky</name>
<email>beldmit@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-19T15:05:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=92c8d6ae0d741fdca3b72baf627d16908dae64ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:92c8d6ae0d741fdca3b72baf627d16908dae64ce</id>
<content type='text'>
Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix a mem leak in NPN handling</title>
<updated>2016-09-22T08:22:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-09T09:53:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=38f59bd1f1da9f5ef67044b35af26528e5b183dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:38f59bd1f1da9f5ef67044b35af26528e5b183dd</id>
<content type='text'>
If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth</title>
<updated>2016-09-22T08:22:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-09T09:08:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f</id>
<content type='text'>
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't allow too many consecutive warning alerts</title>
<updated>2016-09-21T19:14:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-21T13:48:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=22646a075e75991b4e8f5d67171e45a6aead5b48'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22646a075e75991b4e8f5d67171e45a6aead5b48</id>
<content type='text'>
Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make message buffer slightly larger than message.</title>
<updated>2016-09-21T18:56:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-21T12:26:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=006a788c84e541c8920dd2ad85fb62b52185c519'/>
<id>urn:sha1:006a788c84e541c8920dd2ad85fb62b52185c519</id>
<content type='text'>
Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against
OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer
will be large enough already.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH instead of 4.</title>
<updated>2016-09-21T18:56:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-21T11:54:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=bc9563f83d28342b5ec0073ec12d9e581e4f3317'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc9563f83d28342b5ec0073ec12d9e581e4f3317</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove unnecessary check.</title>
<updated>2016-09-21T18:56:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-21T11:57:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=709ec8b3848e2ac201b86f49c5561debb8572ccd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:709ec8b3848e2ac201b86f49c5561debb8572ccd</id>
<content type='text'>
The overflow check will never be triggered because the
the n2l3 result is always less than 2^24.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix small OOB reads.</title>
<updated>2016-09-21T13:10:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-17T11:36:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=ff553f837172ecb2b5c8eca257ec3c5619a4b299'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ff553f837172ecb2b5c8eca257ec3c5619a4b299</id>
<content type='text'>
In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and
ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room
before reading a length.

Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs.

CVE-2016-6306

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "Abort on unrecognised warning alerts"</title>
<updated>2016-09-15T21:53:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-15T19:53:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=502fcc67cccda4d997fc121eae4f2789f50adae6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:502fcc67cccda4d997fc121eae4f2789f50adae6</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 15d81749322c3498027105f8ee44e8c25479d475.

There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a
warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a
Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the
connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases
like this so we need to have a rethink on this.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix memory leak on realloc error.</title>
<updated>2016-09-15T11:49:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-14T22:42:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d69247598991c61dfb68d4fe3b08346b02644812</id>
<content type='text'>
Backport leak fix from master branch.

Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
