<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl/ssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_2c</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2c</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2c'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2015-06-12T14:43:02Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Allow a zero length extension block</title>
<updated>2015-06-12T14:43:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Adam Langley</name>
<email>agl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-12T07:05:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=fe64245aa1b1f5519ddfe11e3c9d7ad49ae4de95'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe64245aa1b1f5519ddfe11e3c9d7ad49ae4de95</id>
<content type='text'>
It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>More ssl_session_dup fixes</title>
<updated>2015-06-11T09:04:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-11T00:30:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=d44f89c990b4c9c41f77e9a0ffd5dc7c4ca07f84'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d44f89c990b4c9c41f77e9a0ffd5dc7c4ca07f84</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix error handling in ssl_session_dup, as well as incorrect setting up of
the session ticket. Follow on from CVE-2015-1791.

Thanks to LibreSSL project for reporting these issues.

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_sess.c

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Only allow a temporary rsa key exchange when they key is larger than 512.</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T22:06:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kurt Roeckx</name>
<email>kurt@roeckx.be</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-18T17:15:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=57e477b9ec66542afc8c9c13ae7c4271209fb88f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:57e477b9ec66542afc8c9c13ae7c4271209fb88f</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
MR #838
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Properly check certificate in case of export ciphers.</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T22:06:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kurt Roeckx</name>
<email>kurt@roeckx.be</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-06T11:42:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=39a298a1c0e7a76e301b9f2ebe8d33d90ad0a3b4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:39a298a1c0e7a76e301b9f2ebe8d33d90ad0a3b4</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
MR #838
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>DTLS handshake message fragments musn't span packets</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T11:10:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-01T16:25:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=9dcab127e14467733523ff7626da8906e67eedd6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9dcab127e14467733523ff7626da8906e67eedd6</id>
<content type='text'>
It should not be possible for DTLS message fragments to span multiple
packets. However previously if the message header fitted exactly into one
packet, and the fragment body was in the next packet then this would work.
Obviously this would fail if packets get re-ordered mid-flight.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Tighten extension handling</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T09:24:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-30T14:20:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=d272599277092d6cd054417cf671453ca5fd0d9b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d272599277092d6cd054417cf671453ca5fd0d9b</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson &lt;steve@openssl.org&gt;

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix Kerberos issue in ssl_session_dup</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T08:37:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-10T08:32:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=dcad51bc13c9b716d9a66248bcc4038c071ff158'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dcad51bc13c9b716d9a66248bcc4038c071ff158</id>
<content type='text'>
The fix for CVE-2015-1791 introduced an error in ssl_session_dup for
Kerberos.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use CRYPTO_memcmp in s3_cbc.c</title>
<updated>2015-06-08T13:04:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Emilia Kasper</name>
<email>emilia@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-08T13:04:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=05627d57e55517eae21c251fe287760bd1137218'/>
<id>urn:sha1:05627d57e55517eae21c251fe287760bd1137218</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Allow all curves when the client doesn't send an supported elliptic curves extension</title>
<updated>2015-06-04T19:12:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kurt Roeckx</name>
<email>kurt@roeckx.be</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-30T17:20:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=ba9d44b28d312138fefcdc5fc0d499d49a4dca41'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba9d44b28d312138fefcdc5fc0d499d49a4dca41</id>
<content type='text'>
At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
MR #811

(cherry picked from commit 3c06513f3833d4692f620e2c03d7a840871c08a7)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove misleading comment</title>
<updated>2015-06-04T11:53:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-04T10:18:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=da5fab73255c24e0b6ce8717df2441a03f504939'/>
<id>urn:sha1:da5fab73255c24e0b6ce8717df2441a03f504939</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit f3d889523ee84f1e87e4da0d59e2702a4bee7907)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
