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<title>openssl/ssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_1f</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_1f</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_1f'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2014-01-06T14:35:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353</title>
<updated>2014-01-06T14:35:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-06T14:35:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=197e0ea817ad64820789d86711d55ff50d71f631'/>
<id>urn:sha1:197e0ea817ad64820789d86711d55ff50d71f631</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>make update</title>
<updated>2014-01-06T13:33:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-06T13:33:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=c776a3f398b1fd0d59e9247c0c4c6b79f5692b33'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c776a3f398b1fd0d59e9247c0c4c6b79f5692b33</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Restore SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING</title>
<updated>2014-01-04T14:00:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-04T13:50:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=25c9fa6026e6a200a291bc4fd3464718aae9775e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:25c9fa6026e6a200a291bc4fd3464718aae9775e</id>
<content type='text'>
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
(cherry picked from commit b17d6b8d1d49fa4732deff17cfd1833616af0d9c)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't change version number if session established</title>
<updated>2014-01-02T15:12:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-24T18:17:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f3dcc8411e518fb0835c7d72df4a58718205260d</id>
<content type='text'>
When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.

Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.

PR#3191
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix DTLS retransmission from previous session.</title>
<updated>2013-12-20T23:12:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-20T15:26:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=34628967f1e65dc8f34e000f0f5518e21afbfc7b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:34628967f1e65dc8f34e000f0f5518e21afbfc7b</id>
<content type='text'>
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use version in SSL_METHOD not SSL structure.</title>
<updated>2013-12-19T21:04:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-19T14:37:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75</id>
<content type='text'>
When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms
use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure
instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes
inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already.
(CVE-2013-6449)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Check EVP errors for handshake digests.</title>
<updated>2013-12-18T13:26:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-14T13:55:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=0294b2be5f4c11e60620c0018674ff0e17b14238'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0294b2be5f4c11e60620c0018674ff0e17b14238</id>
<content type='text'>
Partial mitigation of PR#3200
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>make update</title>
<updated>2013-12-08T13:23:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-08T13:13:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=60df657b3a72065c0df0349abf228d7399e20bac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60df657b3a72065c0df0349abf228d7399e20bac</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Enable PSK in FIPS mode.</title>
<updated>2013-11-06T14:40:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-06T14:38:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ddfe486e4c4869ac73fd8556cb6c64324c86621d</id>
<content type='text'>
Enable PSK ciphersuites with AES or DES3 in FIPS mode.
(cherry picked from commit e0ffd129c16af90eb5e2ce54e57832c0046d1aaf)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>DTLS/SCTP Finished Auth Bug</title>
<updated>2013-11-01T22:44:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Robin Seggelmann</name>
<email>seggelmann@fh-muenster.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-09T17:28:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:025f7dbdd18f8392f5bd58143b113ab6a0716f7a</id>
<content type='text'>
PR: 2808

With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key.  Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523adce6fd6015b68da2ca8e4ac4900ac2be2)
(cherry picked from commit b9ef52b07897f249a9fa44943dba33fba8fb2721)
</content>
</entry>
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