<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl/ssl/kssl.h, branch OpenSSL_0_9_7c</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_0_9_7c</id>
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<updated>2003-09-27T17:55:18Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Include the instance in the Kerberos ticket information.</title>
<updated>2003-09-27T17:55:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2003-09-27T17:55:18Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ec4e600da656088b5efbabf0c4b32e5dd3e68ac8</id>
<content type='text'>
In s_server, print the received Kerberos information.
PR: 693
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Small bugfixes to the KSSL implementation.</title>
<updated>2002-11-26T10:09:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2002-11-26T10:09:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dc199cfaa23a5c75d3a5d89e8d7ef2f0cdfed328</id>
<content type='text'>
PR: 349
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Many security improvements (CHATS) and a warning fix.</title>
<updated>2002-11-12T13:23:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Laurie</name>
<email>ben@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2002-11-12T13:23:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9831d941ca3d46eab3e61e6983921220b9d5d09a</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>To avoid commit wars over dependencies, let's make it so things that</title>
<updated>2001-10-10T07:55:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2001-10-10T07:55:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:116daf4c2f20b43a7ea349fcff407a4c85943d65</id>
<content type='text'>
depend on the environment, like the presence of the OpenBSD crypto
device or of Kerberos, do not change the dependencies within OpenSSL.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Private functions do not belong in an exported header file, so move</title>
<updated>2001-07-11T21:09:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2001-07-11T21:09:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1cf9bf00f48a9b877d1c1d61aa8d57c2ed693921</id>
<content type='text'>
them to one that won't get exported.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Changes to the Kerberos SSL code by Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@columbia.edu&gt;</title>
<updated>2001-07-11T19:03:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2001-07-11T19:03:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a5224c3420d20ef08a1db9cc1f90e952dcd75826</id>
<content type='text'>
His comments are:

 . adds use of replay cache to protect against replay attacks

 . adds functions kssl_tgt_is_available() and
   kssl_keytab_is_available() which are used within s3_lib.c
   and ssl_lib.c to determine at runtime whether or not
   KRB5 ciphers can be supported during the current session.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Patches from Vern Staats &lt;staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil&gt; to get Kerberos 5 in</title>
<updated>2001-07-09T21:46:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2001-07-09T21:46:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2a1ef754358e35c8e86df903e0a2f92c35a550d0</id>
<content type='text'>
SSL according to RFC 2712.  His comment is:

This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication.  I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week.  The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients.  The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .

Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct.  I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field.  I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make all configuration macros available for application by making</title>
<updated>2001-02-19T16:06:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2001-02-19T16:06:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cf1b7d96647d55e533f779e476e3d4371f40445a</id>
<content type='text'>
sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
opensslconf.h.

I've checked fairly well that nothing breaks with this (apart from
external software that will adapt if they have used something like
NO_KRB5), but I can't guarantee it completely, so a review of this
change would be a good thing.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>First tentative impementation of Kerberos 5 cryptos and keys for SSL/TLS.  Implemented by Vern Staats &lt;staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil&gt;, further hacked and distributed by Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltnab@columbia.edu&gt;</title>
<updated>2000-11-30T22:53:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2000-11-30T22:53:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f9b3bff6f7e38960bb87a5623fbcbc45ee952c49</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>I've checked again and again.  There really is no need to expand a to</title>
<updated>2000-11-16T21:35:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2000-11-16T21:35:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:43fcc1b096c47f5d5c10e09cf8a0f75ca4707e35</id>
<content type='text'>
4 times it's size when bn_sqr_recursive() won't look farther than the
original length.  Thereby, constification is no longer a problem.
</content>
</entry>
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