<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl/include/internal, branch openssl-3.3.7</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=openssl-3.3.7</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=openssl-3.3.7'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2026-04-07T12:38:24Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Copyright year updates</title>
<updated>2026-04-07T12:38:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>openssl-machine</name>
<email>openssl-machine@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-07T12:38:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=cf0c4c8fd9ef0f389d458ebe5570454c00d89da4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf0c4c8fd9ef0f389d458ebe5570454c00d89da4</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Tue Apr  7 12:38:26 2026
Release: yes
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Apply clang-format to the source tree</title>
<updated>2026-04-03T14:51:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eugene Syromiatnikov</name>
<email>esyr@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-28T15:42:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=1b06f74e7398a088e448fbe7f3df8d18e41430ef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b06f74e7398a088e448fbe7f3df8d18e41430ef</id>
<content type='text'>
Ensure that all the source files are formatted with the current
.clang-format configuration, to avoid spurious clang-format checker
errors when arbitrary files are touched.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;nikolap@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.foundation&gt;
MergeDate: Fri Apr  3 14:52:06 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29824)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>3.3-POST-CLANG-FORMAT-WEBKIT</title>
<updated>2025-12-09T10:18:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bob Beck</name>
<email>beck@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-09T10:17:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=21a5d2abe54c1f019c686e429a56a1d707111118'/>
<id>urn:sha1:21a5d2abe54c1f019c686e429a56a1d707111118</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický &lt;sashan@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;nikolap@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29258)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>3.3-PRE-CLANG-FORMAT-WEBKIT</title>
<updated>2025-12-09T10:15:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bob Beck</name>
<email>beck@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-09T10:15:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=e691ce314b9d08c2a97d152610bb3c86bdd949b4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e691ce314b9d08c2a97d152610bb3c86bdd949b4</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický &lt;sashan@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;nikolap@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29258)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>freebsd ktls: avoid unaligned 16 bit length store in ktls_read_record</title>
<updated>2025-10-17T17:25:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joshua Rogers</name>
<email>MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-11T06:11:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=4327b93a3dbbfb261004357ff227d45360f8065b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4327b93a3dbbfb261004357ff227d45360f8065b</id>
<content type='text'>
This prevents SIGBUS on strict alignment architectures when p+3 is not aligned
for 16 bit access. Behavior is unchanged on x86 and matches the Linux path.

Signed-off-by: Joshua Rogers &lt;MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com&gt;

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28860)

(cherry picked from commit c33120d0e403b4079e5104fd20040a51930e8d8e)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ktls: move ktls_enable() within ktls_start()</title>
<updated>2025-10-14T14:48:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ulrich Weber</name>
<email>ulrich.weber@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-26T14:16:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=38cfbb5d7bca98dc18b52be6904178137b9886df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:38cfbb5d7bca98dc18b52be6904178137b9886df</id>
<content type='text'>
On linux ktls can only be enabled on established TCP sockets.
When SSL_set_fd() is called before the connection is established
ktls_enable() fails and ktls is not setup.

This moves ktls_enable() call within then ktls_start() function.
Multiple calls to ktls_start() will trigger additional ktls_enable()
calls which fail with EEXIST, but do not affect the ktls socket.

CLA: trivial

Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber &lt;ulrich.weber@gmail.com&gt;

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang &lt;paulyang.inf@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický &lt;sashan@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27908)

(cherry picked from commit f23f706a26f2e7cd5dd5221d57e2d0db28530f4e)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Copyright year updates</title>
<updated>2025-09-30T12:55:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>openssl-machine</name>
<email>openssl-machine@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-30T12:55:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=b08f255364948637069a31e5d393549d9eed0e08'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b08f255364948637069a31e5d393549d9eed0e08</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický &lt;sashan@openssl.org&gt;
Release: yes
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>- changes suggested by @t8m</title>
<updated>2025-07-27T09:02:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandr Nedvedicky</name>
<email>sashan@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-22T20:59:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=d6e07aeb2d4cbf554381ab1af672547c1aa2b669'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6e07aeb2d4cbf554381ab1af672547c1aa2b669</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28023)

(cherry picked from commit 92330c8f80e4dbfc45b7718d9ed526f196daba0a)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ACK manager must avoid infinite probe time when waiting handshake confirmation</title>
<updated>2025-07-27T09:01:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>sashan</name>
<email>anedvedicky@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-15T13:09:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=353e8957949a4ddf2098087d6a3e8c00dd427882'/>
<id>urn:sha1:353e8957949a4ddf2098087d6a3e8c00dd427882</id>
<content type='text'>
According to RFC 9002, section 6.2.2.1 the client the client must keep PTO (probe
time out) armed if it has not seen HANDSHAKE_DONE quic message from server.
Not following RFC spec here may cause the QUIC session to stale during TLS handshake.

Fixes openssl/project#1266

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28023)

(cherry picked from commit cdbfacead0d07ed47fa1087d633acf6f6399aa2c)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Copyright year updates</title>
<updated>2025-07-01T11:59:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>openssl-machine</name>
<email>openssl-machine@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-01T11:59:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=c1a22463776ab86735d290a0b5d1c30620cc8823'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c1a22463776ab86735d290a0b5d1c30620cc8823</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
Release: yes
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
