openssl/crypto, branch OpenSSL_1_1_1w

Copyright year updates

2023-09-11T14:07:52Z

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell Release: yes

Fix error handling in CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt

2023-09-11T08:22:43Z

That caused several memory leaks in case of error. Also when the CMS object that is created by CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt is not used in the normal way, but instead just deleted by CMS_ContentInfo_free some memory was lost. Fixes #21985 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22008)

Fix a possbile memleak in rsa_pub_encode

2023-09-09T14:37:56Z

That seems to be only an issue for RSA-PSS with parameters. Spotted by code review, so it looks like there is no test coverage for this. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22007)

Fix a possible memleak in eckey_priv_encode

2023-09-09T14:37:55Z

Additionally use OPENSSL_clear_free on the private key data in case of error. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22007)

Avoid clobbering non-volatile XMM registers

2023-09-02T08:29:10Z

This affects some Poly1305 assembler functions which are only used for certain CPU types. Remove those functions for Windows targets, as a simple interim solution. Fixes #21522 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Reviewed-by: Paul Dale (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21808) (cherry picked from commit 7b8e27bc2e02238986d89ef0ece067ec1b48e165)

Fix EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy

2023-08-16T08:54:05Z

Add the copy of the omitted ASN1 public key method and other members. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21125)

Copyright year updates

2023-08-01T13:51:30Z

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Release: yes

DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is obviously invalid

2023-07-31T13:30:37Z

If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1. We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that q value. Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long computations. Fixes CVE-2023-3817 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)

Make DH_check set some error bits in recently added error

2023-07-26T11:23:15Z

The pre-existing error cases where DH_check returned zero are not related to the dh params in any way, but are only triggered by out-of-memory errors, therefore having *ret set to zero feels right, but since the new error case is triggered by too large p values that is something different. On the other hand some callers of this function might not be prepared to handle the return value correctly but only rely on *ret. Therefore we set some error bits in *ret as additional safety measure. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21533)

Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus

2023-07-19T09:24:06Z

The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus value even if it is excessively large. There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail. An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack. The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL functions. An application calling any of those other functions may similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check(). CVE-2023-3446 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)