<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl/crypto, branch OpenSSL_1_0_2m</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2m</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2m'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2017-11-02T14:33:44Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Prepare for 1.0.2m release</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T14:33:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-02T14:33:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=8b1549a153a62e9878327d05aa3b6622b416ec10'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b1549a153a62e9878327d05aa3b6622b416ec10</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov &lt;appro@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>make update</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T14:33:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-02T14:33:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=c7a906bb6aa2dff81c44832f576d7ecde7fa9f70'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c7a906bb6aa2dff81c44832f576d7ecde7fa9f70</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov &lt;appro@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry bug in bn_sqrx8x_internal.</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T11:06:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Polyakov</name>
<email>appro@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-17T19:08:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=38d600147331d36e74174ebbd4008b63188b321b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:38d600147331d36e74174ebbd4008b63188b321b</id>
<content type='text'>
Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.

CVE-2017-3736

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Address a timing side channel whereby it is possible to determine some</title>
<updated>2017-11-01T16:43:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pauli</name>
<email>paul.dale@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-31T23:47:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=23f7e974d59a576ad7d8cfd9f7ac957a883e361f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:23f7e974d59a576ad7d8cfd9f7ac957a883e361f</id>
<content type='text'>
information about the length of the scalar used in ECDSA operations
from a large number (2^32) of signatures.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Refer to #4576 for further details.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov &lt;appro@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4623)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Address a timing side channel whereby it is possible to determine some</title>
<updated>2017-11-01T16:41:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pauli</name>
<email>paul.dale@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-31T20:58:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=b96bebacfe814deb99fb64a3ed2296d95c573600'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b96bebacfe814deb99fb64a3ed2296d95c573600</id>
<content type='text'>
information about the length of a value used in DSA operations from
a large number of signatures.

This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
  more information.

* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
  to leak a small amount of information.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Original commit by Paul Dale. Backported to 1.0.2 by Matt Caswell

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov &lt;appro@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4642)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use malloc/memset not calloc for WinCE portability</title>
<updated>2017-10-26T20:34:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-26T18:49:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=217534323ec4917c754fb454bf77b6d2ff551e23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:217534323ec4917c754fb454bf77b6d2ff551e23</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes: #2539

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4594)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't use strcasecmp and strncasecmp for IA5 strings</title>
<updated>2017-10-26T13:57:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-20T16:11:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=44cbf6a9fe7db112ae2ed189412ab9e5205028b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:44cbf6a9fe7db112ae2ed189412ab9e5205028b1</id>
<content type='text'>
The functions strcasecmp() and strncasecmp() will use locale specific rules
when performing comparison. This could cause some problems in certain
locales. For example in the Turkish locale an 'I' character is not the
uppercase version of 'i'. However IA5 strings should not use locale specific
rules, i.e. for an IA5 string 'I' is uppercase 'i' even if using the
Turkish locale.

This fixes a bug in name constraints checking reported by Thomas Pornin
(NCCGroup).

This is not considered a security issue because it would require both a
Turkish locale (or other locale with similar issues) and malfeasance by
a trusted name-constrained CA for a certificate to pass name constraints
in error. The constraints also have to be for excluded sub-trees which are
extremely rare. Failure to match permitted subtrees is a bug, not a
vulnerability.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4570)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't make any changes to the lhash structure if we are going to fail</title>
<updated>2017-10-25T10:12:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-18T13:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=1aa0fcfb0a2bae287c2f26fe82d5b792fcc0cf3f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1aa0fcfb0a2bae287c2f26fe82d5b792fcc0cf3f</id>
<content type='text'>
The lhash expand() function can fail if realloc fails. The previous
implementation made changes to the structure and then attempted to do a
realloc. If the realloc failed then it attempted to undo the changes it
had just made. Unfortunately changes to lh-&gt;p were not undone correctly,
ultimately causing subsequent expand() calls to increment num_nodes to a
value higher than num_alloc_nodes, which can cause out-of-bounds reads/
writes. This is not considered a security issue because an attacker cannot
cause realloc to fail.

This commit moves the realloc call to near the beginning of the function
before any other changes are made to the lhash structure. That way if a
failure occurs we can immediately fail without having to undo anything.

Thanks to Pavel Kopyl (Samsung) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4551)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>asn1_item_embed_new(): don't free an embedded item</title>
<updated>2017-10-24T11:42:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-24T11:42:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=65d414434aeecd5aa86a46adbfbcb59b4344503a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:65d414434aeecd5aa86a46adbfbcb59b4344503a</id>
<content type='text'>
The previous change with this intention didn't quite do it.  An
embedded item must not be freed itself, but might potentially contain
non-embedded elements, which must be freed.

So instead of calling ASN1_item_ex_free(), where we can't pass the
combine flag, we call asn1_item_embed_free() directly.

This changes asn1_item_embed_free() from being a static function to
being a private non-static function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger &lt;bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4578)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix memory leak in GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername.</title>
<updated>2017-10-24T08:40:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiangyu Bu</name>
<email>xybu@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-18T00:10:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=deee898ef94a176a22fce3b9effc957cb75bb535'/>
<id>urn:sha1:deee898ef94a176a22fce3b9effc957cb75bb535</id>
<content type='text'>
CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4544)

(cherry picked from commit 04761b557a53f026630dd5916b2b8522d94579db)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
