<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl, branch feature/hqc</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=feature%2Fhqc</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=feature%2Fhqc'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2026-03-12T18:04:07Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>QUIC LCID hash table collapse on Windows/32-bit due to SipHash digest size misuse</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T18:04:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandr Nedvedicky</name>
<email>sashan@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-28T07:03:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=6d621e6729d41a809d87c221728d11a52d913a13'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6d621e6729d41a809d87c221728d11a52d913a13</id>
<content type='text'>
Using sizeof(unsigned long) as SipHash digest size; SipHash supports
only 8 or 16 bytes. On platforms where sizeof(unsigned long) == 4,
the call fails, and lcid_hash returns the zero-initialized value,
degrading the hash table into list.

The issue was kindly reported and fix provided by Stanislav Fort at Aisle Research.

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 18:04:10 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29814)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rand_egd: harden EGD I/O and bounds; defer fdopen until post connect</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T17:58:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joshua Rogers</name>
<email>MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-12T13:52:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e6aabdfb452de672f5c25ffc490ba35b82c6db76</id>
<content type='text'>
Tighten RAND_query_egd_bytes and fix edge cases:

* Reject nonpositive request sizes to avoid wrap when storing the
  length byte in tempbuf[1].
* Treat server length byte as untrusted; bound by the requested size
  and by sizeof(tempbuf) to avoid overrunning caller or stack buffers.
* Defer fdopen until after a successful connect. On HPE NonStop
  (OPENSSL_SYS_TANDEM) the connect retry path may swap the socket fd;
  creating the FILE* early could leave a stale stream pointing at a
  closed descriptor, causing EBADF or short I/O, and leaking the new
  socket. Creating the stream after connect avoids this.
* Initialize fd to -1 and close the raw fd when fdopen fails; ensure
  we close either FILE* or the raw fd on all error paths.
* Remove unused code.

Behavior is unchanged on platforms that do not swap fds during connect.
On TANDEM it prevents stale I/O and descriptor leaks. Overall this
improves robustness and bounds checking for EGD interactions.

Signed-off-by: Joshua Rogers &lt;MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com&gt;

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 17:58:21 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28905)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix a one byte buffer overflow in s_client</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T17:56:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.foundation</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-11T15:06:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:440ac348bf7ad86aaed3eb6a18c7ce587dccb350</id>
<content type='text'>
The buffer used to process user commands when using advanced mode ("-adv")
can overflow the buffer by one byte if the the read buffer is exactly
BUFSIZZ bytes in length (16k). When processing the buffer we add a NUL
terminator to the buffer, so if the buffer is already full then we
overwrite by one byte when we add the NUL terminator.

This does not represent a security issue because this is entirely local
and would be "self-inflicted", i.e. not under attacker control.

This issue was reported to use by Igor Morgenstern from AISLE.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 17:56:37 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30376)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix error handling in SSL_CTX_add_session</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T17:51:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bernd Edlinger</name>
<email>bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-22T14:23:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0a72e6ae74a6d32977ac53cbf314f414c08b327b</id>
<content type='text'>
An out-of-memory error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert
could trigger various use-after-free errors.

Fixes #28632

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;nikolap@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 17:51:38 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28636)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc: clarify OPENSSL_clear_free() w/ NULL</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T17:43:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>dann frazier</name>
<email>dann.frazier@chainguard.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T14:51:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=4adb40393c073fd5ac34495efd083e981a6a6d69'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4adb40393c073fd5ac34495efd083e981a6a6d69</id>
<content type='text'>
It wasn't explicitly clear that it was safe to call OPENSSL_clear_free()
with a NULL because, as worded, it sounded like it may call
OPENSSL_cleanse() on NULL before calling OPENSSL_free().

CLA: trivial

Signed-off-by: dann frazier &lt;dann.frazier@chainguard.dev&gt;

Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický &lt;sashan@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 17:43:51 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28127)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix stack buffer over-read in DES OFB/CFB64 via unchecked num parameter</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T14:24:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>OwenSanzas</name>
<email>zesheng@tamu.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-10T00:05:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:134342e194a23b1d3cc0687b05d97cfdd0f31c4a</id>
<content type='text'>
The `num` parameter in DES OFB64/CFB64 functions tracks the byte offset
within an 8-byte DES block, so valid values are 0-7. However, neither
the EVP set_params path nor the low-level DES functions validated this
bound, allowing an out-of-range `num` to cause a stack buffer over-read
when used as an array index into the 8-byte keystream buffer.

Fix at two levels:
1. Provider layer: reject num &gt;= blocksize in
   ossl_cipher_common_set_ctx_params() before it reaches the cipher.
2. Low-level DES: mask `*num` with `&amp; 0x07` on entry to
   DES_ofb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt, DES_cfb64_encrypt,
   and DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt, consistent with how `n` is already
   masked at the end of these functions before being written back.

Fixes #30284

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;nikolap@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 14:24:12 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30332)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix NULL pointer dereference when pass1 is NULL</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:29:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandr Nedvedicky</name>
<email>sashan@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-11T07:30:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=22be3f1b8e3d8d09de89794a6d59f00176b32b2d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22be3f1b8e3d8d09de89794a6d59f00176b32b2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Resolves: https://scan5.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/62622/10222?selectedIssue=1684201
Complements: #adc8e4abd96 Fix Memory leak in app_passwd

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;nikolap@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov &lt;esyr@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 11:32:05 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30365)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PKCS12: Document that the range for key length when using PBMAC1 is (1..64).</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T10:47:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>slontis</name>
<email>shane.lontis@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-06T04:25:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a65de3d6bc393f59c5d14583f99185fb403ba4bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes #30246

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy &lt;beldmit@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 10:47:32 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30279)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PKCS12: Avoid bypassing the provider when doing HMAC operations.</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T10:47:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>slontis</name>
<email>shane.lontis@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-06T04:20:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=b1295c90bcb2aa14edf46a4599e5acd81b778cd9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1295c90bcb2aa14edf46a4599e5acd81b778cd9</id>
<content type='text'>
pkcs12_gen_mac() now used EVP_MAC instead of direct HMAC_ calls.

PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC() added additional data to raised parsing errors.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy &lt;beldmit@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 10:47:31 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30279)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PKCS12 app fix</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T10:47:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>slontis</name>
<email>shane.lontis@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-06T04:07:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=a191c2de80a07db754cef3b8cc409b0576e767d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a191c2de80a07db754cef3b8cc409b0576e767d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Do not call PKCS12_verify_mac() twice if the UTF8 password matches the mac
password.

In the case of an error in the verify path do not print
"Mac verify error: invalid password?" if there is already an error on the
error stack. An error means something failed in PKCS12_verify_mac(),
If only the password was wrong it does not raise an error.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy &lt;beldmit@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
MergeDate: Thu Mar 12 10:47:29 2026
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30279)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
