<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl, branch OpenSSL_1_1_1k</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_1_1k</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_1_1k'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2021-03-25T13:28:38Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Prepare for 1.1.1k release</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T13:28:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-25T13:28:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=fd78df59b0f656aefe96e39533130454aa957c00'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fd78df59b0f656aefe96e39533130454aa957c00</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update copyright year</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T13:21:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-25T13:21:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e83638bc3a3e2f731fd10946bd460b021465b285</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update CHANGES and NEWS for new release</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T13:19:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-25T10:29:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:62f75c999ec8b125f154ad70b028e92ea312d084</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Ensure buffer/length pairs are always in sync</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T09:43:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T16:52:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=d33c2a3d8453a75509bcc8d2cf7d2dc2a3a518d0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d33c2a3d8453a75509bcc8d2cf7d2dc2a3a518d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Following on from CVE-2021-3449 which was caused by a non-zero length
associated with a NULL buffer, other buffer/length pairs are updated to
ensure that they too are always in sync.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;pauli@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ssl sigalg extension: fix NULL pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T09:43:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Kaestle</name>
<email>peter.kaestle@nokia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-15T12:19:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fb9fa6b51defd48157eeb207f52181f735d96148</id>
<content type='text'>
As the variable peer_sigalgslen is not cleared on ssl rehandshake, it's
possible to crash an openssl tls secured server remotely by sending a
manipulated hello message in a rehandshake.

On such a manipulated rehandshake, tls1_set_shared_sigalgs() calls
tls12_shared_sigalgs() with the peer_sigalgslen of the previous
handshake, while the peer_sigalgs has been freed.
As a result tls12_shared_sigalgs() walks over the available
peer_sigalgs and tries to access data of a NULL pointer.

This issue was introduced by c589c34e61 (Add support for the TLS 1.3
signature_algorithms_cert extension, 2018-01-11).

Signed-off-by: Peter Kästle &lt;peter.kaestle@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Samuel Sapalski &lt;samuel.sapalski@nokia.com&gt;

CVE-2021-3449

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;pauli@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add a test for CVE-2021-3449</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T09:43:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T15:29:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=3ff38629a2df6635f36bfb79513cc6440db8cd70'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3ff38629a2df6635f36bfb79513cc6440db8cd70</id>
<content type='text'>
We perform a reneg handshake, where the second ClientHello drops the
sig_algs extension. It must also contain cert_sig_algs for the test to
work.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;pauli@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Teach TLSProxy how to encrypt &lt;= TLSv1.2 ETM records</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T09:43:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T15:25:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=46d81bcabe2d36055bdd37079ed6acf976d967a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:46d81bcabe2d36055bdd37079ed6acf976d967a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Previously TLSProxy only knew how to "repack" messages for TLSv1.3.
Most of the handshake in &lt;= TLSv1.2 is unencrypted so this hasn't been
too much of restriction. However we now want to modify reneg handshakes
which are encrypted so we need to add that capability.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;pauli@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>check_chain_extensions: Do not override error return value by check_curve</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T09:36:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tomas Mraz</name>
<email>tomas@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T08:51:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=2a40b7bc7b94dd7de897a74571e7024f0cf0d63b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2a40b7bc7b94dd7de897a74571e7024f0cf0d63b</id>
<content type='text'>
The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the
certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default.

Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates with
explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters in the chain was added to the
strict checks.

An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a
previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA
certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check
that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.

If a "purpose" has been configured then a subsequent check that the
certificate is consistent with that purpose also checks that it is a
valid CA. Therefore where a purpose is set the certificate chain will
still be rejected even when the strict flag has been used. A purpose is
set by default in libssl client and server certificate verification
routines, but it can be overriden by an application.

Affected applications explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
verification flag and either do not set a purpose for the certificate
verification or, in the case of TLS client or server applications,
override the default purpose to make it not set.

CVE-2021-3450

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;pauli@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix missing INVALID_EXTENSION</title>
<updated>2021-03-22T07:29:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chenglong Zhang</name>
<email>auvkone@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T07:29:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cfd74383d9b06f85cb1e166180346115a3f9a452</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk &lt;kaduk@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz &lt;tomas@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14639)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASN1: Reset the content dump flag after dumping</title>
<updated>2021-03-21T11:30:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-20T08:09:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ffefffa000437da5703dd8a173386623304b055d</id>
<content type='text'>
When encountering a badly coded item, the DER printer (ASN1_print_dump())
sets a flag to ensure that an additional hex dump of the offending content
is printed as part of the output.  Unfortunately, this flag is never reset,
which means that all following items are printed with the extra hex dump,
whether they are faulty or not.

Resetting the flag after hex dumping ensures that only the faulty contents
are printed with the additional hex dump.

Fixes #14626

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14627)

(cherry picked from commit 6e34a1048ce4871371eac224b995c3b4338f6166)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
