<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl, branch OpenSSL_1_1_1b</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_1_1b</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_1_1b'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:15:30Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Prepare for 1.1.1b release</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:15:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T14:15:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=50eaac9f3337667259de725451f201e784599687'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50eaac9f3337667259de725451f201e784599687</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Clarify that SSL_shutdown() must not be called after a fatal error</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:12:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-20T14:21:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=ab874dfd3e22a7c6ea3d45bc352294546af5afff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab874dfd3e22a7c6ea3d45bc352294546af5afff</id>
<content type='text'>
Follow on from CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update copyright year</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:05:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T14:05:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=72a7a7021fa8bc82a11bc08bac1b0241a92143d0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72a7a7021fa8bc82a11bc08bac1b0241a92143d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8347)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>e_devcrypto: set digest input_blocksize</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T13:38:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eneas U de Queiroz</name>
<email>cote2004-github@yahoo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-21T17:16:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=047463833ebb713480c057a5a788a111f54b4f2e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:047463833ebb713480c057a5a788a111f54b4f2e</id>
<content type='text'>
This restores the behavior of previous versions of the /dev/crypto
engine, in alignment with the default implementation.

Reported-by: Gerard Looije &lt;lglooije@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz &lt;cote2004-github@yahoo.com&gt;

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri &lt;nic.tuv@gmail.com&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8306)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eng_devcrypto: close open session on init</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T13:38:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eneas U de Queiroz</name>
<email>cote2004-github@yahoo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-12T12:44:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=02f84c3e4abcae027ed8fb8b2c318afb8e191995'/>
<id>urn:sha1:02f84c3e4abcae027ed8fb8b2c318afb8e191995</id>
<content type='text'>
cipher_init may be called on an already initialized context, without a
necessary cleanup.  This separates cleanup from initialization, closing
an eventual open session before creating a new one.

Move the /dev/crypto session cleanup code to its own function.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz &lt;cote2004-github@yahoo.com&gt;

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri &lt;nic.tuv@gmail.com&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8306)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update NEWS for new release</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T10:46:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T10:28:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=86f1d6ca3a7705de923cbcc942b4b74902f47053'/>
<id>urn:sha1:86f1d6ca3a7705de923cbcc942b4b74902f47053</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8344)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Disable 02-test_errstr.t on msys/mingw as well as MSWin32</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T10:44:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T10:22:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=a2854abe54df44d01a147ebaf8ca810361904783'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a2854abe54df44d01a147ebaf8ca810361904783</id>
<content type='text'>
There is too high a risk that perl and OpenSSL are linked with
different C RTLs, and thereby get different messages for even the most
mundane error numbers.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8343)

(cherry picked from commit 565a19eef35926b4b9675f6cc3964fb290a5b380)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VMS: disable the shlibload test for now</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T10:02:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T09:41:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=f30022cd581200a4c434f0db41b596c42fafd9de'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f30022cd581200a4c434f0db41b596c42fafd9de</id>
<content type='text'>
test/shlibloadtest.c needs added code for VMS shared libraries

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8342)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Rearrange the inclusion of curve448/curve448_lcl.h</title>
<updated>2019-02-25T18:37:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T18:27:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=f408e2a352b59f2e7aa2160bfb6285725fe88ea7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f408e2a352b59f2e7aa2160bfb6285725fe88ea7</id>
<content type='text'>
The real cause for this change is that test/ec_internal_test.c
includes ec_lcl.h, and including curve448/curve448_lcl.h from there
doesn't work so well with compilers who always do inclusions relative
to the C file being compiled.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8334)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Ensure bn_cmp_words can handle the case where n == 0</title>
<updated>2019-02-25T16:32:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T11:28:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=df2cb82ae397ac7e1466f674ecd2309ac6de14e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:df2cb82ae397ac7e1466f674ecd2309ac6de14e7</id>
<content type='text'>
Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
comments below.

This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
iqmp. Two mitigating factors:

- Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
- In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.

Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:

- OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
non-existent.
- OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
are equal.
- Side channel concerns.

The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.

Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
necessary for this issue.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni &lt;viktor@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)

(cherry picked from commit 576129cd72ae054d246221f111aabf42b9c6d76d)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
