openssl, branch OpenSSL_1_1_0a

Prepare for 1.1.0a release

2016-09-22T10:14:50Z

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte

Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte

Avoid KCI attack for GOST

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell

Fix a hang with SSL_peek()

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. CVE-2016-6305 GitHub Issue #1563 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Fix a mem leak in NPN handling

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Add some more OCSP testing

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

Test that the OCSP callbacks work as expected. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Add OCSP_RESPID_match()

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

Add a function for testing whether a given OCSP_RESPID matches with a certificate. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Add the ability to set OCSP_RESPID fields

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth

2016-09-22T08:28:07Z

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar problem but I could not find any other issues. CVE-2016-6304 Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Fix error message typo, wrong function code

2016-09-22T08:26:37Z

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell (cherry picked from commit a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889)