<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_2r</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2r</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2r'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:20:55Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Prepare for 1.0.2r release</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:20:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T14:20:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=b34cf4eb616446a1ee7bd0db0a625edf25047342'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b34cf4eb616446a1ee7bd0db0a625edf25047342</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Updates CHANGES and NEWS for the new release</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:13:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T10:21:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=28c43df9288c50be6e03ee5b52dfc0e261d9eb60'/>
<id>urn:sha1:28c43df9288c50be6e03ee5b52dfc0e261d9eb60</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Clarify that SSL_shutdown() must not be called after a fatal error</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:13:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-20T14:21:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:48c8bcf5bca0ce7751f49599381e143de1b61786</id>
<content type='text'>
Follow on from CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Go into the error state if a fatal alert is sent or received</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:13:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-14T07:28:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e9bbefbf0f24c57645e7ad6a5a71ae649d18ac8e</id>
<content type='text'>
If an application calls SSL_shutdown after a fatal alert has occured and
then behaves different based on error codes from that function then the
application may be vulnerable to a padding oracle.

CVE-2019-1559

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update copyright year</title>
<updated>2019-02-26T14:11:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T14:07:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c81f16952bca7793074ac926b17aed3364db2c84</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8348)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Ensure bn_cmp_words can handle the case where n == 0</title>
<updated>2019-02-25T16:37:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T11:28:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=b250f2a431ab0cc03a8a1cc4cdc1a7e9ecb052a6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b250f2a431ab0cc03a8a1cc4cdc1a7e9ecb052a6</id>
<content type='text'>
Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
comments below.

This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
iqmp. Two mitigating factors:

- Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
- In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.

Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:

- OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
non-existent.
- OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
are equal.
- Side channel concerns.

The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.

Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
necessary for this issue.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale &lt;paul.dale@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni &lt;viktor@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)

(cherry picked from commit 576129cd72ae054d246221f111aabf42b9c6d76d)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Clear BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on BN_CTX_get()</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T21:02:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicola Tuveri</name>
<email>nic.tuv@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-08T10:42:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9acdddf1acd6f6be41ddb711b6b55fe7f5481320</id>
<content type='text'>
(cherry picked from commit c8147d37ccaaf28c430d3fb45a14af36597e48b8)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8295)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Test for constant-time flag leakage in BN_CTX</title>
<updated>2019-02-20T20:57:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicola Tuveri</name>
<email>nic.tuv@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-11T22:37:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=d769ce09b690237c35c32032edbaf0339c480e85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d769ce09b690237c35c32032edbaf0339c480e85</id>
<content type='text'>
This commit adds a simple unit test to make sure that the constant-time
flag does not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:

- test_ctx_consttime_flag() initializes (and later frees before
  returning) a BN_CTX object, then it calls in sequence
  test_ctx_set_ct_flag() and test_ctx_check_ct_flag() using the same
  BN_CTX object.
- test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and sets the
  BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained from the frame
  before ending it.
- test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a number of
  BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the BIGNUMs in the new
  frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.

In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at any
depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results depending on the
patterns of sibling trees of nested function calls sharing the same
BN_CTX object, and the effect of unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the
called BN_* functions.

This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies that
the leak does not happen between two sibling functions sharing the same
BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.

(manually cherry picked from commit fe16ae5f95fa86ddb049a8d1e2caee0b80b32282)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8295)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Move stray POD file into the fold</title>
<updated>2019-02-18T20:47:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-18T20:47:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=e30dfbebe7fa3af40fd840fc89b004376fc2b21f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e30dfbebe7fa3af40fd840fc89b004376fc2b21f</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre &lt;Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8273)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cygwin: drop explicit O_TEXT</title>
<updated>2019-02-15T16:44:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Corinna Vinschen</name>
<email>vinschen@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-15T11:22:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=3077dd40588e1ff5b7a1fda87ba845c291bb8055'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3077dd40588e1ff5b7a1fda87ba845c291bb8055</id>
<content type='text'>
Cygwin binaries should not enforce text mode these days, just
use text mode if the underlying mount point requests it

CLA: trivial

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen &lt;vinschen@redhat.com&gt;

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8249)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
