<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>openssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_2d</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2d</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_2d'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2015-07-09T12:03:09Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Prepare for 1.0.2d release</title>
<updated>2015-07-09T12:03:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-09T12:03:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=33dd08320648ac71d7d9d732be774ed3818dccc5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:33dd08320648ac71d7d9d732be774ed3818dccc5</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson &lt;steve@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release</title>
<updated>2015-07-09T08:31:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-02T14:38:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=5627e0f77d333b3d6d2f87b0cc616a062cf54aeb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5627e0f77d333b3d6d2f87b0cc616a062cf54aeb</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson &lt;steve@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add documentation for some missing verify options</title>
<updated>2015-07-07T21:07:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-25T11:34:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=9dee5244e1d879ee94b203e618202be91936ff71'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9dee5244e1d879ee94b203e618202be91936ff71</id>
<content type='text'>
Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 79a55b1f2796bf6471360e8b6ab131cdedca256e)

Conflicts:
	doc/apps/verify.pod
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised</title>
<updated>2015-07-07T20:50:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-25T08:47:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=692f07c3e0c04180b56febc2feb57cd94395a7a2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:692f07c3e0c04180b56febc2feb57cd94395a7a2</id>
<content type='text'>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx-&gt;chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx-&gt;untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx-&gt;chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase  where
|ctx-&gt;chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx-&gt;chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx-&gt;chain| directly.

With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.

With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.

Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx-&gt;chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx-&gt;chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson &lt;steve@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add test for CVE-2015-1793</title>
<updated>2015-07-07T20:48:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-01T23:15:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=f404943bcab4898d18f3ac1b36479d1d7bbbb9e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f404943bcab4898d18f3ac1b36479d1d7bbbb9e6</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
verification tests.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson &lt;steve@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue</title>
<updated>2015-07-07T20:48:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-24T14:55:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=21376d8ae310cf0455ca2b73c8e9f77cafeb28dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:21376d8ae310cf0455ca2b73c8e9f77cafeb28dd</id>
<content type='text'>
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.

This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx-&gt;last_untrusted is decremented in error.

Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.

CVE-2015-1793

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson &lt;steve@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Relax CCM tag check.</title>
<updated>2015-07-06T17:35:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-09T22:17:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=c0b674b7cbd9146982850523293c74b9131b26d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c0b674b7cbd9146982850523293c74b9131b26d5</id>
<content type='text'>
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>document -2 return value</title>
<updated>2015-07-06T17:35:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-06T13:17:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=a229c2b805bb8c8081fe6d9cb5d9fc2fb9888c19'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a229c2b805bb8c8081fe6d9cb5d9fc2fb9888c19</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix PSK handling.</title>
<updated>2015-07-02T11:01:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-01T22:40:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c</id>
<content type='text'>
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).

Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Check for errors with SRP</title>
<updated>2015-06-29T18:21:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-25T14:07:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=f8f75a7e4a7746caba9cab843e14ed6a41dfad21'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f8f75a7e4a7746caba9cab843e14ed6a41dfad21</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell &lt;matt@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 5fced2395ddfb603a50fd1bd87411e603a59dc6f)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
