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<title>openssl, branch OpenSSL_1_0_0t</title>
<subtitle>TLS/SSL and crypto library.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_0t</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/atom?h=OpenSSL_1_0_0t'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/'/>
<updated>2015-12-03T14:56:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Prepare for 1.0.0t release</title>
<updated>2015-12-03T14:56:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-03T14:56:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=ce052c8437fb97cbc57f034fa94b5bcd749dbf52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ce052c8437fb97cbc57f034fa94b5bcd749dbf52</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update CHANGES and NEWS</title>
<updated>2015-12-02T23:36:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Caswell</name>
<email>matt@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-01T14:39:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=a402b2b7bcff8d6901aa771e49c45cf38836e7bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a402b2b7bcff8d6901aa771e49c45cf38836e7bf</id>
<content type='text'>
Update the CHANGES and NEWS files for the new release.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Free up passed ASN.1 structure if reused.</title>
<updated>2015-12-02T20:40:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-23T12:57:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=d275dbe6eb7b720b8920f712eea79044f845a4bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d275dbe6eb7b720b8920f712eea79044f845a4bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Change the "reuse" behaviour in ASN1_item_d2i: if successful the old
structure is freed and a pointer to the new one used. If it is not
successful then the passed structure is untouched.

Exception made for primitive types so ssl_asn1.c still works.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper &lt;emilia@openssl.org&gt;

Conflicts:
	doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix leak with ASN.1 combine.</title>
<updated>2015-12-02T20:40:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-10T19:03:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=cf432b3b1bd7caa22943b41b94ec2472ae497dc6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf432b3b1bd7caa22943b41b94ec2472ae497dc6</id>
<content type='text'>
When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
this will leak any additional components in the parent.

This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.

CVE-2015-3195.

Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.

PR#4131

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte &lt;levitte@openssl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>_BSD_SOURCE is deprecated, use _DEFAULT_SOURCE instead</title>
<updated>2015-12-02T17:50:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Levitte</name>
<email>levitte@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-02T17:18:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=015b17257855e31003eb29a70280764c3c822710'/>
<id>urn:sha1:015b17257855e31003eb29a70280764c3c822710</id>
<content type='text'>
The feature_test_macros(7) manual tells us that _BSD_SOURCE is
deprecated since glibc 2.20 and that the compiler will warn about it
being used, unless _DEFAULT_SOURCE is defined as well.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit f9fd35248c9a3b1125d9ab82ffb19d62e86533ac)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix uninitialised p error.</title>
<updated>2015-11-24T16:55:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-24T16:37:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=295b9e8cbdd7dce3a0372a5990472f83acf3456b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:295b9e8cbdd7dce3a0372a5990472f83acf3456b</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 63eb10a07ee29a312e50a227f5b3a290b1ad22b4)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Limit depth of ASN1 parse printing.</title>
<updated>2015-11-24T15:30:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-03T13:27:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:275502eb41dbfc02910e48f6e55e65ea163854b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Thanks to Guido Vranken &lt;guidovranken@gmail.com&gt; for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 158e5207a794603f5d64ffa95e0247c7808ab445)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Typo.</title>
<updated>2015-10-10T23:38:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-10T23:06:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d7ebdc2e98f7cc1df99fd7dd675bb6cfd6adb1ba</id>
<content type='text'>
PR#4079

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson &lt;tjh@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit c69ce9351336f5b4a8b33890756b3fd185528210)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/e_des3.c
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't try and parse boolean type.</title>
<updated>2015-10-06T14:17:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dr. Stephen Henson</name>
<email>steve@openssl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-06T13:15:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/openssl/commit/?id=54edf96459dbece958707c6a8e92e82ada1d1c59'/>
<id>urn:sha1:54edf96459dbece958707c6a8e92e82ada1d1c59</id>
<content type='text'>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit e58c4d3cdde7a0a01df2884bfeec31a2b07be22d)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>GH367: use random data if seed too short.</title>
<updated>2015-09-29T16:50:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ismo Puustinen</name>
<email>ismo.puustinen@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-18T20:07:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:63bd50533e42ca1823a92e4ed18485d6b3dea27d</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz &lt;rsalz@openssl.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper &lt;emilia@openssl.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 6f997dc36504d67d1339ceb6bce4ecba673d8568)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
