From 909f6a0637b7111c294e5f6f37e4c3a0561bcd99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Shaw Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2003 15:24:12 +0000 Subject: * trustdb.c (validate_keys): Mask the ownertrust when building the list of fully valid keys so that disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust. (get_ownertrust_with_min): Do the same for the minimum ownertrust calculation. * parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Show the notation names for not-human-readable notations. Fix cosmetic off-by-one length counter. * options.skel: Add explantion and commented-out "no-mangle-dos-filenames". * mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Make string translatable. * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Quote ':', '%', and any 8-bit characters in the uid strings sent to the keyserver helper. * keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache): Lock the keyring while rebuilding the signature caches to prevent another gpg from tampering with the temporary copy. * keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Include AES192 and AES256 in default prefs. * keyedit.c (show_prefs): Make strings translatable. * keydb.c: Double the maximum number of keyrings to 40. * gpgv.c (main): Fix bug #113 - gpgv should accept the --ignore-time-conflict option. * g10.c (main): --openpgp disables --pgpX. Double the amount of secure memory to 32k (keys are getting bigger these days). * Makefile.am: Makefile.am: Use @CAPLIBS@ to link in -lcap if we are using capabilities. --- g10/parse-packet.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'g10/parse-packet.c') diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c index d270ece7d..7e390ae55 100644 --- a/g10/parse-packet.c +++ b/g10/parse-packet.c @@ -752,12 +752,12 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical, type, (unsigned)length ); } + buffer++; + length--; printf("\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*)*/ critical ? "critical ":"", hashed ? "hashed ":"", type, (unsigned)length ); - buffer++; - length--; if( length > buflen ) { printf("too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned)buflen ); return; @@ -823,8 +823,6 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical, fputs("notation: ", stdout ); if( length < 8 ) p = "[too short]"; - else if( !(*buffer & 0x80) ) - p = "[not human readable]"; else { const byte *s = buffer; size_t n1, n2; @@ -837,7 +835,11 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical, else { print_string( stdout, s, n1, ')' ); putc( '=', stdout ); - print_string( stdout, s+n1, n2, ')' ); + + if( *buffer & 0x80 ) + print_string( stdout, s+n1, n2, ')' ); + else + p = "[not human readable]"; } } } -- cgit