diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/seckey-cert.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/seckey-cert.c | 225 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c index 79cf22aeb..ad5b75603 100644 --- a/g10/seckey-cert.c +++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling - * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, + * 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * @@ -24,31 +25,32 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <assert.h> + +#include "gpg.h" #include "util.h" -#include "memory.h" #include "packet.h" -#include "mpi.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "main.h" #include "options.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "status.h" - +#include "pkglue.h" static int do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, int *canceled ) { + gpg_error_t err; byte *buffer; u16 csum=0; int i, res; - unsigned nbytes; + unsigned int nbytes; if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */ DEK *dek = NULL; u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */ - CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL; + gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd=NULL; PKT_secret_key *save_sk; if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) { @@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, } if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE ) BUG(); - if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) { + if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) { log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"), sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" ); if (sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) @@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, } return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; } - if(check_digest_algo(sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo)) + if(gcry_md_test_algo (sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo)) { log_info(_("protection digest %d is not supported\n"), sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo); @@ -85,26 +87,43 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, if (!dek && canceled && *canceled) return G10ERR_GENERAL; - cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo, - CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1); - cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ); + + err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, sk->protect.algo, + GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, + (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE + | (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ? + 0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC))); + if (err) + log_fatal ("cipher open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); + + err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen); + if (err) + log_fatal ("set key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); + xfree(dek); save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk ); - cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ); + + gcry_cipher_setiv ( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ); + csum = 0; if( sk->version >= 4 ) { - unsigned int ndata; + int ndata; + unsigned int ndatabits; byte *p, *data; u16 csumc = 0; i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) ); - p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata ); + + assert ( gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE )); + p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque ( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits ); + ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8; + if ( ndata > 1 ) csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1]; - data = xmalloc_secure( ndata ); - cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata ); - mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ; + data = xmalloc_secure ( ndata ); + gcry_cipher_decrypt ( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata ); + gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]); sk->skey[i] = NULL ; + p = data; if (sk->protect.sha1chk) { /* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect @@ -115,21 +134,23 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, if( ndata < 20 ) log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n"); else { - MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1); - if (!h) - BUG(); /* algo not available */ - md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); - md_final (h); - if (!memcmp (md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), - data + ndata - 20, 20) ) { - /* digest does match. We have to keep the old + gcry_md_hd_t h; + + if ( gcry_md_open (&h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1)) + BUG(); /* Algo not available. */ + gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); + gcry_md_final (h); + if (!memcmp (gcry_md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), + data + ndata - 20, 20) ) + { + /* Digest does match. We have to keep the old style checksum in sk->csum, so that the test used for unprotected keys does work. This test gets used when we are adding new keys. */ sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20); - } - md_close (h); + } + gcry_md_close (h); } } else { @@ -152,9 +173,8 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, because the length may have an arbitrary value */ if( sk->csum == csum ) { for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - nbytes = ndata; - sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 ); - if (!sk->skey[i]) + if ( gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, + p, ndata, &nbytes)) { /* Checksum was okay, but not correctly decrypted. */ @@ -174,22 +194,27 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { byte *p; - unsigned int ndata; + int ndata; + unsigned int ndatabits; - assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i])); - p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata); + assert (gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)); + p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndatabits); + ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8; assert (ndata >= 2); assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2); buffer = xmalloc_secure (ndata); - cipher_sync (cipher_hd); + gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd); buffer[0] = p[0]; buffer[1] = p[1]; - cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, p+2, ndata-2); + gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, ndata-2, + p+2, ndata-2); csum += checksum (buffer, ndata); - mpi_free (sk->skey[i]); - sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer (buffer, &ndata, 1); + gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]); + + err = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, + buffer, ndata, &ndata ); xfree (buffer); - if (!sk->skey[i]) + if (err) { /* Checksum was okay, but not correctly decrypted. */ @@ -200,21 +225,23 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, /* csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */ } } - cipher_close( cipher_hd ); - /* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */ + gcry_cipher_close ( cipher_hd ); + + /* Now let's see whether we have used the correct passphrase. */ if( csum != sk->csum ) { copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk ); passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo ); free_secret_key( save_sk ); - return G10ERR_BAD_PASS; + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); } - /* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */ - res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey ); + + /* The checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself. */ + res = pk_check_secret_key ( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey ); if( res ) { copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk ); passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo ); free_secret_key( save_sk ); - return G10ERR_BAD_PASS; + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); } free_secret_key( save_sk ); sk->is_protected = 0; @@ -242,11 +269,11 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode, int check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n ) { - int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS; + int rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); int i,mode; if (sk && sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) - return 0; /* Let the card support stuff handle this. */ + return 0; /* Let the scdaemon handle this. */ if(n<0) { @@ -259,7 +286,7 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n ) if( n < 1 ) n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */ - for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) { + for(i=0; i < n && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE; i++ ) { int canceled = 0; const char *tryagain = NULL; if (i) { @@ -267,7 +294,8 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n ) log_info (_("%s ...\n"), _(tryagain)); } rc = do_check( sk, tryagain, mode, &canceled ); - if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) { + if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE + && is_status_enabled () ) { u32 kid[2]; char buf[50]; @@ -316,23 +344,30 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek ) return 0; if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */ - CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL; + gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd=NULL; - if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) - rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */ + if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo ( sk->protect.algo ) ) { + /* Unsupport protection algorithm. */ + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO); + } else { print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo ); - cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo, - CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 ); - if( cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) ) + + if ( gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, sk->protect.algo, + GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, + (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE + | (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ? + 0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC))) ) + BUG(); + if ( gcry_cipher_setkey ( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) ) log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected" " - please change passphrase again.\n")); - sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize( sk->protect.algo ); + sk->protect.ivlen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (sk->protect.algo); assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) ); if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 ) BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */ - randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1); - cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ); + gcry_create_nonce (sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen); + gcry_cipher_setiv (cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen); if( sk->version >= 4 ) { byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; @@ -340,15 +375,20 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek ) int ndata=0; byte *p, *data; - for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) { - assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) ); - bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL ); - nbits[j] = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] ); + for (j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); + i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) + { + assert (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], + GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)); + if (gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, bufarr+j, + narr+j, sk->skey[i])) + BUG(); + nbits[j] = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]); ndata += narr[j] + 2; - } - for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ ) - bufarr[j] = NULL; + } + for ( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ ) + bufarr[j] = NULL; + ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */ data = xmalloc_secure( ndata ); @@ -372,27 +412,29 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek ) sk->protect.sha1chk = 0; } else { - MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1); - if (!h) - BUG(); /* algo not available */ - md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); - md_final (h); - memcpy (p, md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20); + gcry_md_hd_t h; + + if (gcry_md_open (&h, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 1)) + BUG(); /* Algo not available. */ + gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); + gcry_md_final (h); + memcpy (p, gcry_md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20); p += 20; - md_close (h); + gcry_md_close (h); sk->csum = csum = 0; sk->protect.sha1chk = 1; } assert( p == data+ndata ); - cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, data, ndata ); - for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); + gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data, ndata, NULL, 0); + for (i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); + i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) + { + gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]); sk->skey[i] = NULL; - } + } i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata ); + sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, ndata*8 ); } else { csum = 0; @@ -402,24 +444,31 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek ) unsigned int nbits; csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); - buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL ); - cipher_sync (cipher_hd); - assert ( !mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]) ); - data = xmalloc (nbytes+2); - nbits = mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]); + + if (gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &buffer, + &nbytes, sk->skey[i] )) + BUG(); + gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd); + assert (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], + GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)); + + data = xmalloc (nbytes+2); /* fixme: need xtrymalloc. */ + nbits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]); assert (nbytes == (nbits + 7)/8); data[0] = nbits >> 8; data[1] = nbits; - cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, buffer, nbytes); + gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, nbytes, + buffer, nbytes); xfree( buffer ); - mpi_free (sk->skey[i]); - sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, nbytes+2); + gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]); + sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, + data, (nbytes+2)*8 ); } sk->csum = csum; } sk->is_protected = 1; - cipher_close( cipher_hd ); + gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd); } } return rc; |
