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<title>gnupg/sm, branch debian-unstable-patch-queue</title>
<subtitle>The GNU Privacy Guard.</subtitle>
<id>http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/gnupg/atom?h=debian-unstable-patch-queue</id>
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<updated>2019-06-03T14:33:50Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Return better error code for some getinfo IPC commands.</title>
<updated>2019-06-03T14:33:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-03T14:31:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.bktus.com/gpgfrontend/gnupg/commit/?id=f3251023750d6bd9023dbb8373c804d7d4540a56'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3251023750d6bd9023dbb8373c804d7d4540a56</id>
<content type='text'>
* agent/command.c (cmd_getinfo): Return GPG_ERR_FALSE as boolean False.
* g13/server.c (cmd_getinfo): Ditto.
* sm/server.c (cmd_getinfo): Ditto.
--

GPG_ERR_FALSE was introduced with libgpg-error 1.21 and we now require
a later version for gnupg 2.  Thus we can switch to this more
descriptive code.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: Avoid confusing diagnostic for the default key.</title>
<updated>2019-05-27T13:48:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T13:44:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:32210e855c460ed60505bf9be9adea33d05c40eb</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/certlist.c (cert_usage_p): Add arg 'silent' and change all
callers.
(gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p): Add arg 'silent' and pass to cert_usage_p.
Change all callers.
* sm/sign.c (gpgsm_get_default_cert): Set SILENT when calling
gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p
--

GnuPG-bug-id: 4535
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: Fix a warning in an es_fopencooie function.</title>
<updated>2019-05-12T18:41:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-12T18:41:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8d0d61aca3d2713df8a33444af3658b859d72be8</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/certdump.c (format_name_writer): Take care of a flush request.
--

We won't see a flush here so that fix does not solve a real bug but we
want to be correct.  Note that this function seems to predate the
es_fopenmem function and thus in master (2.3) we should replace it
entirely.

GnuPG-bug-id: 4495
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: Allow decryption even if expired other keys are configured.</title>
<updated>2019-03-26T12:35:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T12:31:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:30972d21824264aef2088d30b4f2e5ce3aca889e</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): Add special handling for bad keys in decrypt
mode.
--

The problem can easily be tested by adding --encrypt-to EXPIRED_KEY to
a decryption command.  With that patch the errors are printed but
decryption continues and the process returns success unless other
errors occur.

GnuPG-bug-id: 4431
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm, w32: Translate logger and status fd to handles</title>
<updated>2019-03-25T13:09:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andre Heinecke</name>
<email>aheinecke@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-25T13:05:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b9d2759da19cb70c1f6243498480bea1d7ecaa46</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): Call translate_sys2libc_fd_int to
convert the FDs.

--
This is required to actually pass gpgsm an fd on windows
and not a windows handle.

For the passphrase-fd this was already done.

(cherry picked from commit e4e0804ed123516fa00f8a876a862b2c6d34ba5c)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: Print Yubikey attestation extensions with --dump-cert.</title>
<updated>2019-03-07T09:53:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-01T14:23:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b3c8ce9e4343f1b68b9ba94bdd71b7d8e13b139a</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/keylist.c (oidtranstbl): Add Yubikey OIDs.
(OID_FLAG_HEX): New.
(print_hex_extn): New.
(list_cert_raw): Make use of that flag.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 86c241a8c9a952ea8007066b70b04f435e2e483e)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: Don't mark a cert as de-vs compliant if it leads to SHA-1 sigs.</title>
<updated>2019-02-28T14:13:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-28T13:43:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:be69bf0cbd11cb8c0d452e07066669aacc6caafa</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/keylist.c (print_compliance_flags): Also check the digest_algo.
Add new arg 'cert'.
--

A certificate with algorithm sha1WithRSAEncryption can be de-vs
compliant (e.g. if the next in the chain used sha256WithRSAEncryption
to sign it and RSA is long enough) but flagging it as such is useless
because that certificate can't be used because it will create
signatures using the non-compliant SHA-1 algorithm.

Well, it could be used for encryption.  But also evaluating the
key-usage flags here would make it harder for the user to understand
why certain certificates are listed as de-vs compliant and others are
not.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 2c75af9f65d15653ed1bc191f1098ae316607041)

Reworked to also pass the CERT.  Note that 2.2 won't get the PK
Screening feature.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpgsm: default to 3072-bit keys.</title>
<updated>2019-02-28T10:00:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Kahn Gillmor</name>
<email>dkg@fifthhorseman.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-07T22:39:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:121286d9d1506dbaad9ba33bae2e459814fe5849</id>
<content type='text'>
* doc/gpgsm.texi, doc/howto-create-a-server-cert.texi: : update
default to 3072 bits.
* sm/certreqgen-ui.c (gpgsm_gencertreq_tty): update default to
3072 bits.
* sm/certreqgen.c (proc_parameters): update default to 3072 bits.
* sm/gpgsm.c (main): print correct default_pubkey_algo.

--

3072-bit RSA is widely considered to be 128-bit-equivalent security.
This is a sensible default in 2017.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;dkg@fifthhorseman.net&gt;

Gbp-Pq: Topic update-defaults
Gbp-Pq: Name 0014-gpgsm-default-to-3072-bit-keys.patch
(cherry picked from commit 7955262151a5c755814dd23414e6804f79125355)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: Fix certificate creation with key on card.</title>
<updated>2019-02-25T07:49:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-21T16:32:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:54c56230e305a38d6fd0c3bf1262172fd5fbcb87</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/certreqgen.c (create_request): Fix for certmode.
--

When using an existing key from a card for certificate signing (in
contrast to the default of generating a CSR), the code tried to use
the same key for signing instead of the Signing-Key parameter.  It is
perfectly okay to use the regular signing path via gpg-agent for
certificate creation - only self-signed certificates with a key on the
card require the direct use of the card key (via "SCD PKSIGN").

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit c1000c673814e552923cf1361346d7dfeee55608)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sm: In --gen-key with "key from card" show also the algorithm.</title>
<updated>2019-02-11T09:59:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Werner Koch</name>
<email>wk@gnupg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-08T11:35:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d1bee9d1efa28fa9d35b7eed1e616c6362fd044e</id>
<content type='text'>
* sm/certreqgen-ui.c (gpgsm_gencertreq_tty): Get and show algo.
--

This extends the prompt to show something like

  Serial number of the card: FF020001008A77F6
  Available keys:
     (1) 4130F84FA3704F4645924AEC3FFA48AD26D33656 PIV.9A nistp384
     (2) AB2988FB8C227BCD5175BF92F66AA3A95AE83214 PIV.9E rsa2048
     (3) DB7DDAEAA88534BA45CCD7A9B761425103EA2090 PIV.9C rsa2048
     (4) BABB48C3D80ACCF9839F101DF2910966C8B988DF PIV.9D nistp256
  Your selection? 1

Having the algorithm here is helpful in particular because right now
we support only RSA with X.509.  Take care: PIV card based certificate
creation does not yet work.

Signed-off-by: Werner Koch &lt;wk@gnupg.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 0328976c94adc2c518c7a7763a35319a0000c5e2)

Note that 2.2 does not support PIV cards, but the feature also works
also with other cards.
</content>
</entry>
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