diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/trustdb.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c index 457d83b9d..d9b09063d 100644 --- a/g10/trustdb.c +++ b/g10/trustdb.c @@ -1572,10 +1572,14 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist, signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort, even if it is a statement being made by people other than the key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm - going with the latter. -dshaw */ + going with the latter. However, if the user ID was + explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that + should stop validity through the user ID until it is + resigned. -dshaw */ - /* && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created) */ - if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID + && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked + && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired) { if (uidnode && issigned) { @@ -1589,12 +1593,11 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist, } uidnode = node; uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id; -#if 0 - /* If the selfsig is going to expire... This is disabled as - we do count un-self-signed uids in the web of trust. */ + + /* If the selfsig is going to expire... */ if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire) *next_expire = uid->expiredate; -#endif + issigned = 0; get_validity_counts(pk,uid); mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist, |