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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/trustdb.c | 2129 |
1 files changed, 2129 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..457d83b9d --- /dev/null +++ b/g10/trustdb.c @@ -0,0 +1,2129 @@ +/* trustdb.c + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 + * Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#ifndef DISABLE_REGEX +#include <sys/types.h> +#ifdef USE_GNU_REGEX +#include "_regex.h" +#else +#include <regex.h> +#endif +#endif /* !DISABLE_REGEX */ + +#include "errors.h" +#include "iobuf.h" +#include "keydb.h" +#include "memory.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "tdbio.h" +#include "trustdb.h" + + +/* + * A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff needed + * for validation + */ +struct key_item { + struct key_item *next; + unsigned int ownertrust,min_ownertrust; + byte trust_depth; + byte trust_value; + char *trust_regexp; + u32 kid[2]; +}; + + +typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */ + +/* + * Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre + * the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL. + * Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item + */ +struct key_array { + KBNODE keyblock; +}; + + +/* control information for the trust DB */ +static struct { + int init; + int level; + char *dbname; +} trustdb_args; + +/* some globals */ +static struct key_item *user_utk_list; /* temp. used to store --trusted-keys */ +static struct key_item *utk_list; /* all ultimately trusted keys */ + +static int pending_check_trustdb; + +static int validate_keys (int interactive); + + +/********************************************** + ************* some helpers ******************* + **********************************************/ + +static struct key_item * +new_key_item (void) +{ + struct key_item *k; + + k = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *k); + return k; +} + +static void +release_key_items (struct key_item *k) +{ + struct key_item *k2; + + for (; k; k = k2) + { + k2 = k->next; + m_free (k->trust_regexp); + m_free (k); + } +} + +/* + * For fast keylook up we need a hash table. Each byte of a KeyIDs + * should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except + * for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we + * can just use 10 bits to index a table of 1024 key items. + * Possible optimization: Don not use key_items but other hash_table when the + * duplicates lists gets too large. + */ +static KeyHashTable +new_key_hash_table (void) +{ + struct key_item **tbl; + + tbl = m_alloc_clear (1024 * sizeof *tbl); + return tbl; +} + +static void +release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl) +{ + int i; + + if (!tbl) + return; + for (i=0; i < 1024; i++) + release_key_items (tbl[i]); + m_free (tbl); +} + +/* + * Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table + */ +static int +test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid) +{ + struct key_item *k; + + for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next) + if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1]) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Add a new key to the hash table. The key is identified by its key ID. + */ +static void +add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid) +{ + struct key_item *k, *kk; + + for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next) + if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1]) + return; /* already in table */ + + kk = new_key_item (); + kk->kid[0] = kid[0]; + kk->kid[1] = kid[1]; + kk->next = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; + tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)] = kk; +} + +/* + * Release a key_array + */ +static void +release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys ) +{ + struct key_array *k; + + if (keys) { + for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++) + release_kbnode (k->keyblock); + m_free (keys); + } +} + + +/********************************************* + ********** Initialization ***************** + *********************************************/ + + + +/* + * Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done + * before initializing the validation module. + * FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb. + */ +void +register_trusted_key( const char *string ) +{ + KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; + struct key_item *k; + + if (classify_user_id (string, &desc) != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID ) { + log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string ); + return; + } + + k = new_key_item (); + k->kid[0] = desc.u.kid[0]; + k->kid[1] = desc.u.kid[1]; + k->next = user_utk_list; + user_utk_list = k; +} + +/* + * Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys. + * Retruns: true = inserted, false = already in in list. + */ +static int +add_utk (u32 *kid) +{ + struct key_item *k; + + for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next) + { + if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1]) + { + return 0; + } + } + + k = new_key_item (); + k->kid[0] = kid[0]; + k->kid[1] = kid[1]; + k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE; + k->next = utk_list; + utk_list = k; + if( opt.verbose > 1 ) + log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key\n"), (ulong)kid[1]); + return 1; +} + + +/**************** + * Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list. + */ +static void +verify_own_keys(void) +{ + TRUSTREC rec; + ulong recnum; + int rc; + struct key_item *k; + + if (utk_list) + return; + + /* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */ + for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) + { + if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST + && (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE) + { + byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint; + int fprlen; + u32 kid[2]; + + /* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but + * we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only + * use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20 + * butes fpr - it does not work always so we better change + * the whole validation code to only work with + * fingerprints */ + fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20; + keyid_from_fingerprint (fpr, fprlen, kid); + if (!add_utk (kid)) + log_info(_("key %08lX occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"), + (ulong)kid[1]); + } + } + + /* Put any --trusted-key keys into the trustdb */ + for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next) + { + if ( add_utk (k->kid) ) + { /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */ + PKT_public_key pk; + + memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk); + rc = get_pubkey (&pk, k->kid); + if (rc) { + log_info(_("key %08lX: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"), + (ulong)k->kid[1] ); + } + else { + update_ownertrust (&pk, + ((get_ownertrust (&pk) & ~TRUST_MASK) + | TRUST_ULTIMATE )); + release_public_key_parts (&pk); + } + log_info (_("key %08lX marked as ultimately trusted\n"), + (ulong)k->kid[1]); + } + } + + + /* release the helper table table */ + release_key_items (user_utk_list); + user_utk_list = NULL; + return; +} + + +/********************************************* + *********** TrustDB stuff ******************* + *********************************************/ + +/* + * Read a record but die if it does not exist + */ +static void +read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype ) +{ + int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype); + if (rc) + { + log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"), + recno, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) ); + tdbio_invalid(); + } + if (rectype != rec->rectype) + { + log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"), + rec->recnum, rectype); + tdbio_invalid(); + } +} + +/* + * Write a record and die on error + */ +static void +write_record (TRUSTREC *rec) +{ + int rc = tdbio_write_record (rec); + if (rc) + { + log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"), + rec->recnum, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) ); + tdbio_invalid(); + } +} + +/* + * sync the TrustDb and die on error + */ +static void +do_sync(void) +{ + int rc = tdbio_sync (); + if(rc) + { + log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) ); + g10_exit(2); + } +} + +static const char * +trust_model_string(void) +{ + switch(opt.trust_model) + { + case TM_PGP: return "PGP"; + case TM_CLASSIC: return "classic"; + case TM_ALWAYS: return "always"; + default: return "unknown"; + } +} + +/**************** + * Perform some checks over the trustdb + * level 0: only open the db + * 1: used for initial program startup + */ +int +setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname ) +{ + /* just store the args */ + if( trustdb_args.init ) + return 0; + trustdb_args.level = level; + trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? m_strdup(dbname): NULL; + return 0; +} + +void +init_trustdb() +{ + int rc=0; + int level = trustdb_args.level; + const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname; + + if( trustdb_args.init ) + return; + + trustdb_args.init = 1; + + if ( !level || level==1) + { + rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level ); + if( !rc ) + { + if( !level ) + return; + + /* verify that our own keys are in the trustDB + * or move them to the trustdb. */ + verify_own_keys(); + + /* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted + * key in the database? */ + } + } + else + BUG(); + if( rc ) + log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) ); + + if(opt.trust_model==TM_AUTO) + { + /* Try and set the trust model off of whatever the trustdb says + it is. */ + opt.trust_model=tdbio_read_model(); + + /* Sanity check this ;) */ + if(opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP && opt.trust_model!=TM_CLASSIC) + { + log_info(_("unable to use unknown trust model (%d) - " + "assuming %s trust model\n"),opt.trust_model,"PGP"); + opt.trust_model=TM_PGP; + } + + if(opt.verbose) + log_info(_("using %s trust model\n"),trust_model_string()); + } + + if((opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC) + && !tdbio_db_matches_options()) + pending_check_trustdb=1; +} + + + + +/*********************************************** + ************* Print helpers **************** + ***********************************************/ + +/**************** + * This function returns a letter for a trustvalue Trust flags + * are ignore. + */ +static int +trust_letter (unsigned int value) +{ + switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) + { + case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return '-'; + case TRUST_EXPIRED: return 'e'; + case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q'; + case TRUST_NEVER: return 'n'; + case TRUST_MARGINAL: return 'm'; + case TRUST_FULLY: return 'f'; + case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return 'u'; + default: return '?'; + } +} + +/* The strings here are similar to those in + pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust() */ +const char * +trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value) +{ + switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) + { + case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return _("unknown"); + case TRUST_EXPIRED: return _("expired"); + case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return _("undefined"); + case TRUST_NEVER: return _("never"); + case TRUST_MARGINAL: return _("marginal"); + case TRUST_FULLY: return _("full"); + case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return _("ultimate"); + default: return "err"; + } +} + +int +string_to_trust_value (const char *str) +{ + if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"undefined")==0) + return TRUST_UNDEFINED; + else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"never")==0) + return TRUST_NEVER; + else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"marginal")==0) + return TRUST_MARGINAL; + else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"full")==0) + return TRUST_FULLY; + else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"ultimate")==0) + return TRUST_ULTIMATE; + else + return -1; +} + +/**************** + * Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts. Special + * feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done + * when a check is due. This can be used to run the check from a crontab + */ +void +check_trustdb () +{ + init_trustdb(); + if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC) + { + if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes) + { + ulong scheduled; + + scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck (); + if (!scheduled) + { + log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n")); + return; + } + + if (scheduled > make_timestamp ()) + { + log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"), + strtimestamp (scheduled)); + return; + } + } + + validate_keys (0); + } + else + log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check with \"%s\" trust model\n"), + trust_model_string()); +} + + +/* + * Recreate the WoT. + */ +void +update_trustdb() +{ + init_trustdb(); + if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC) + validate_keys (1); + else + log_info (_("no need for a trustdb update with \"%s\" trust model\n"), + trust_model_string()); +} + +void +revalidation_mark (void) +{ + init_trustdb(); + /* we simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970) + * so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled */ + if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (1)) + do_sync (); + pending_check_trustdb = 1; +} + +int +trustdb_pending_check(void) +{ + return pending_check_trustdb; +} + + +/*********************************************** + *********** Ownertrust et al. **************** + ***********************************************/ + +static int +read_trust_record (PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec) +{ + int rc; + + init_trustdb(); + rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (pk, rec); + if (rc == -1) + return -1; /* no record yet */ + if (rc) + { + log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n", + g10_errstr (rc)); + return rc; + } + + if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST) + { + log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n", + rec->recnum); + return G10ERR_TRUSTDB; + } + + return 0; +} + +/**************** + * Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key. + * The key should be the primary key. + */ +unsigned int +get_ownertrust ( PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + TRUSTREC rec; + int rc; + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec); + if (rc == -1) + return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */ + if (rc) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + return rc; /* actually never reached */ + } + + return rec.r.trust.ownertrust; +} + +unsigned int +get_min_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + TRUSTREC rec; + int rc; + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec); + if (rc == -1) + return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */ + if (rc) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + return rc; /* actually never reached */ + } + + return rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust; +} + +/* + * Same as get_ownertrust but this takes the minimum ownertrust value + * into into account, and will bump up the value as needed. + */ +static int +get_ownertrust_with_min (PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + unsigned int otrust,otrust_min; + + otrust = (get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_MASK); + otrust_min = get_min_ownertrust (pk); + if(otrust<otrust_min) + { + /* If the trust that the user has set is less than the trust + that was calculated from a trust signature chain, use the + higher of the two. We do this here and not in + get_ownertrust since the underlying ownertrust should not + really be set - just the appearance of the ownertrust. */ + + otrust=otrust_min; + } + + return otrust; +} + +/* + * Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust letter instead of an + * value. This takes the minimum ownertrust value into account. + */ +int +get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + return trust_letter(get_ownertrust_with_min(pk)); +} + +/* + * Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust string instead of an + * value. This takes the minimum ownertrust value into account. + */ +const char * +get_ownertrust_string (PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + return trust_value_to_string(get_ownertrust_with_min(pk)); +} + +/* + * Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value. + * The key should be a primary one. + */ +void +update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust ) +{ + TRUSTREC rec; + int rc; + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec); + if (!rc) + { + if (DBG_TRUST) + log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n", + (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust ); + if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust) + { + rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust; + write_record( &rec ); + revalidation_mark (); + do_sync (); + } + } + else if (rc == -1) + { /* no record yet - create a new one */ + size_t dummy; + + if (DBG_TRUST) + log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust ); + + memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec); + rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (); + rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST; + fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy); + rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust; + write_record (&rec); + revalidation_mark (); + do_sync (); + rc = 0; + } + else + { + tdbio_invalid (); + } +} + +static void +update_min_ownertrust (u32 *kid, unsigned int new_trust ) +{ + PKT_public_key *pk; + TRUSTREC rec; + int rc; + + pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *pk); + rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid); + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("public key %08lX not found: %s\n"), + (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc) ); + return; + } + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec); + if (!rc) + { + if (DBG_TRUST) + log_debug ("key %08lX: update min_ownertrust from %u to %u\n", + (ulong)kid[1],(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust, + new_trust ); + if (rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust != new_trust) + { + rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust; + write_record( &rec ); + revalidation_mark (); + do_sync (); + } + } + else if (rc == -1) + { /* no record yet - create a new one */ + size_t dummy; + + if (DBG_TRUST) + log_debug ("insert min_ownertrust %u\n", new_trust ); + + memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec); + rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (); + rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST; + fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy); + rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust; + write_record (&rec); + revalidation_mark (); + do_sync (); + rc = 0; + } + else + { + tdbio_invalid (); + } +} + +/* Clear the ownertrust and min_ownertrust values. Return true if a + change actually happened. */ +int +clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + TRUSTREC rec; + int rc; + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec); + if (!rc) + { + if (DBG_TRUST) + { + log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n", + (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust); + log_debug ("clearing min_ownertrust (old value %u)\n", + (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust); + } + if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust || rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust) + { + rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0; + rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = 0; + write_record( &rec ); + revalidation_mark (); + do_sync (); + return 1; + } + } + else if (rc != -1) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note: Caller has to do a sync + */ +static void +update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid, + int depth, int validity) +{ + TRUSTREC trec, vrec; + int rc; + ulong recno; + + namehash_from_uid(uid); + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec); + if (rc && rc != -1) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + return; + } + if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - create a new one */ + { + size_t dummy; + + rc = 0; + memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec); + trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (); + trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST; + fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy); + trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0; + } + + /* locate an existing one */ + recno = trec.r.trust.validlist; + while (recno) + { + read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID); + if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) ) + break; + recno = vrec.r.valid.next; + } + + if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */ + { + memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec); + vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (); + vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID; + memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20); + vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist; + trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum; + } + vrec.r.valid.validity = validity; + vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count; + vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count; + write_record (&vrec); + trec.r.trust.depth = depth; + write_record (&trec); +} + + +/* reset validity for all user IDs. Caller must sync. */ +static int +clear_validity (PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + TRUSTREC trec, vrec; + int rc; + ulong recno; + int any = 0; + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec); + if (rc && rc != -1) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + return 0; + } + if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - no need to clear it then ;-) */ + return 0; + + /* Clear minimum ownertrust, if any */ + if(trec.r.trust.min_ownertrust) + { + trec.r.trust.min_ownertrust=0; + write_record(&trec); + } + + recno = trec.r.trust.validlist; + while (recno) + { + read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID); + if ((vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) + || vrec.r.valid.marginal_count || vrec.r.valid.full_count) + { + vrec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK; + vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = vrec.r.valid.full_count = 0; + write_record (&vrec); + any = 1; + } + recno = vrec.r.valid.next; + } + + return any; +} + +/*********************************************** + ********* Query trustdb values ************** + ***********************************************/ + +/* Return true if key is disabled */ +int +cache_disabled_value(PKT_public_key *pk) +{ + int rc; + TRUSTREC trec; + int disabled=0; + + if(pk->is_disabled) + return (pk->is_disabled==2); + + init_trustdb(); + + rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec); + if (rc && rc != -1) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + goto leave; + } + if (rc == -1) /* no record found, so assume not disabled */ + goto leave; + + if(trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) + disabled=1; + + /* Cache it for later so we don't need to look at the trustdb every + time */ + if(disabled) + pk->is_disabled=2; + else + pk->is_disabled=1; + + leave: + return disabled; +} + +/* + * Return the validity information for PK. If the namehash is not + * NULL, the validity of the corresponsing user ID is returned, + * otherwise, a reasonable value for the entire key is returned. + */ +unsigned int +get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid) +{ + static int did_nextcheck; + TRUSTREC trec, vrec; + int rc; + ulong recno; + unsigned int validity; + u32 kid[2]; + PKT_public_key *main_pk; + + if(uid) + namehash_from_uid(uid); + + init_trustdb (); + if (!did_nextcheck + && (opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)) + { + ulong scheduled; + + did_nextcheck = 1; + scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck (); + if (scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ()) + { + if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb) + { + pending_check_trustdb = 1; + log_info (_("please do a --check-trustdb\n")); + } + else + { + log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n")); + validate_keys (0); + } + } + } + + keyid_from_pk (pk, kid); + if (pk->main_keyid[0] != kid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1] != kid[1]) + { /* this is a subkey - get the mainkey */ + main_pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *main_pk); + rc = get_pubkey (main_pk, pk->main_keyid); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("error getting main key %08lX of subkey %08lX: %s\n", + (ulong)pk->main_keyid[1], (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc)); + validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN; + goto leave; + } + } + else + main_pk = pk; + + rc = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec); + if (rc && rc != -1) + { + tdbio_invalid (); + return 0; + } + if (rc == -1) /* no record found */ + { + validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN; + goto leave; + } + + /* loop over all user IDs */ + recno = trec.r.trust.validlist; + validity = 0; + while (recno) + { + read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID); + + if(uid) + { + /* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that + user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then there + is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't + signed). */ + if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0) + { + validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK); + break; + } + } + else + { + /* If no namehash is given, we take the maximum validity + over all user IDs */ + if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) ) + validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK); + } + + recno = vrec.r.valid.next; + } + + if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) + { + validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED; + pk->is_disabled=2; + } + else + pk->is_disabled=1; + + leave: + /* set some flags direct from the key */ + if (main_pk->is_revoked) + validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED; + if (main_pk != pk && pk->is_revoked) + validity |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED; + /* Note: expiration is a trust value and not a flag - don't know why + * I initially designed it that way */ + if (main_pk->has_expired || pk->has_expired) + validity = (validity & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_EXPIRED; + + if (pending_check_trustdb) + validity |= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK; + + if (main_pk != pk) + free_public_key (main_pk); + return validity; +} + +int +get_validity_info (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid) +{ + int trustlevel; + + trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid); + if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED ) + return 'r'; + return trust_letter ( trustlevel ); +} + +const char * +get_validity_string (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid) +{ + int trustlevel; + + trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid); + if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED ) + return _("revoked"); + return trust_value_to_string(trustlevel); +} + +static void +get_validity_counts (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid) +{ + TRUSTREC trec, vrec; + ulong recno; + + if(pk==NULL || uid==NULL) + BUG(); + + namehash_from_uid(uid); + + uid->help_marginal_count=uid->help_full_count=0; + + init_trustdb (); + + if(read_trust_record (pk, &trec)!=0) + return; + + /* loop over all user IDs */ + recno = trec.r.trust.validlist; + while (recno) + { + read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID); + + if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0) + { + uid->help_marginal_count=vrec.r.valid.marginal_count; + uid->help_full_count=vrec.r.valid.full_count; + /* printf("Fetched marginal %d, full %d\n",uid->help_marginal_count,uid->help_full_count); */ + break; + } + + recno = vrec.r.valid.next; + } +} + +void +list_trust_path( const char *username ) +{ +} + +/**************** + * Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for + * the given key. This function does not return the key itself or + * the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only + * certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key + * are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding + * value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s). + * + * 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL + * 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function. + * Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference. + * 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1 + * to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web + * 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL, + * so that it can free its context. + * + * Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID + */ +int +enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid, + unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity ) +{ + return -1; +} + + +/**************** + * Print the current path + */ +void +enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp, + int refresh, ulong selected_lid ) +{ + return; +} + + + +/**************************************** + *********** NEW NEW NEW **************** + ****************************************/ + +static int +ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid,int minimum) +{ + PKT_public_key *pk; + int rc; + int ot; + + pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *pk); + rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid); + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("public key %08lX not found: %s\n"), + (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc) ); + return TRUST_UNKNOWN; + } + + if(opt.force_ownertrust) + { + log_info("force trust for key %08lX%08lX to %s\n", + (ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1], + trust_value_to_string(opt.force_ownertrust)); + update_ownertrust(pk,opt.force_ownertrust); + ot=opt.force_ownertrust; + } + else + { + ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0); + if(ot>0) + ot = get_ownertrust (pk); + else if(ot==0) + ot = minimum?minimum:TRUST_UNDEFINED; + else + ot = -1; /* quit */ + } + + free_public_key( pk ); + + return ot; +} + + +static void +mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node) +{ + for ( ;node; node = node->next ) + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + { + u32 aki[2]; + + keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki); + add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki); + } +} + + +static void +dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys) +{ + struct key_array *kar; + + for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++) + { + KBNODE node = kar->keyblock; + u32 kid[2]; + + keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid); + printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n", + depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?'); + + for (; node; node = node->next) + { + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) + { + int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len; + + if (len > 30) + len = 30; + printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::", + depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], + (node->flag & 4)? 'f': + (node->flag & 2)? 'm': + (node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-'); + print_string (stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, len, ':'); + putchar (':'); + putchar ('\n'); + } + } + } +} + + +static void +store_validation_status (int depth, KBNODE keyblock, KeyHashTable stored) +{ + KBNODE node; + int status; + int any = 0; + + for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next) + { + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) + { + PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; + if (node->flag & 4) + status = TRUST_FULLY; + else if (node->flag & 2) + status = TRUST_MARGINAL; + else if (node->flag & 1) + status = TRUST_UNDEFINED; + else + status = 0; + + if (status) + { + update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, + uid, depth, status); + + mark_keyblock_seen(stored,keyblock); + + any = 1; + } + } + } + + if (any) + do_sync (); +} + +/* + * check whether the signature sig is in the klist k + */ +static struct key_item * +is_in_klist (struct key_item *k, PKT_signature *sig) +{ + for (; k; k = k->next) + { + if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1]) + return k; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it. + * To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and + * from the remain ones we look for the latest one. If this is not a + * certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting + * node flag bit 8. Note that flag bits 9 and 10 are used for internal + * purposes. + */ +static void +mark_usable_uid_certs (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode, + u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist, + u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire) +{ + KBNODE node; + PKT_signature *sig; + + /* first check all signatures */ + for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next) + { + node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10); + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + break; /* ready */ + if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) + continue; + + sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + if (sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1]) + continue; /* ignore self-signatures */ + if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig)) + continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */ + if (!is_in_klist (klist, sig)) + continue; /* no need to check it then */ + if (check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL)) + continue; /* ignore invalid signatures */ + node->flag |= 1<<9; + } + /* reset the remaining flags */ + for (; node; node = node->next) + node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1 << 10); + + /* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider, + * bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already + * processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures */ + + /* for each cert figure out the latest valid one */ + for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next) + { + KBNODE n, signode; + u32 kid[2]; + u32 sigdate; + + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + break; + if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) ) + continue; /* not a node to look at */ + if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) ) + continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */ + node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */ + sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + signode = node; + sigdate = sig->timestamp; + kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1]; + for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next) + { + if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + break; + if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) ) + continue; + if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) ) + continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */ + sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature; + if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1]) + continue; + n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */ + + /* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't, + then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is + older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n + as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're + automatically fine. */ + + if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) && + !signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable && + (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 || + signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) && + (!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) && + !n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable && + (n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 || + n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime)))) + continue; + + /* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't, + then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if + n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is + nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're + automatically fine. */ + + if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) && + !signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable && + (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 || + signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) && + ((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) && + !n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable && + (n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 || + n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime)))) + { + signode = n; + sigdate = sig->timestamp; + continue; + } + + /* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only + remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either + revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired. + If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered + packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in + their original order. */ + + if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate) + { + signode = n; + sigdate = sig->timestamp; + } + } + sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature; + if (IS_UID_SIG (sig)) + { /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked. + * Just need to check whether there is an expiration time, + * We do the expired certification after finding a suitable + * certification, the assumption is that a signator does not + * want that after the expiration of his certificate the + * system falls back to an older certification which has a + * different expiration time */ + const byte *p; + u32 expire; + + p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL ); + expire = p? sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p) : 0; + + if (expire==0 || expire > curtime ) + { + signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */ + if (expire && expire < *next_expire) + *next_expire = expire; + } + } + } +} + +/* Used by validate_one_keyblock to confirm a regexp within a trust + signature. Returns 1 for match, and 0 for no match or regex + error. */ +static int +check_regexp(const char *exp,const char *string) +{ +#ifdef DISABLE_REGEX + /* When DISABLE_REGEX is defined, assume all regexps do not + match. */ + return 0; +#elif defined(__riscos__) + return riscos_check_regexp(exp, string, DBG_TRUST); +#else + int ret; + regex_t pat; + + if(regcomp(&pat,exp,REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB|REG_EXTENDED)!=0) + return 0; + + ret=regexec(&pat,string,0,NULL,0); + + regfree(&pat); + + if(DBG_TRUST) + log_debug("regexp \"%s\" on \"%s\": %s\n",exp,string,ret==0?"YES":"NO"); + + return (ret==0); +#endif +} + +/* + * Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given + * key ID list. User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node + * flags as follows: + * flag bit 0: There is at least one signature + * 1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid + * 2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid. + * 8: Used for internal purposes. + * 9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs()) + * 10: Ditto (ditto) + * This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry. + */ +static int +validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist, + u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire) +{ + struct key_item *kr; + KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL; + PKT_user_id *uid=NULL; + PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key; + u32 main_kid[2]; + int issigned=0, any_signed = 0; + + keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid); + for (node=kb; node; node = node->next) + { + /* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust + to be built among only self-signed uids? On the one hand, a + self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely + intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a + signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort, + even if it is a statement being made by people other than the + key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm + going with the latter. -dshaw */ + + /* && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created) */ + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) + { + if (uidnode && issigned) + { + if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed + || uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed ) + uidnode->flag |= 4; + else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count) + uidnode->flag |= 2; + uidnode->flag |= 1; + any_signed = 1; + } + uidnode = node; + uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id; +#if 0 + /* If the selfsig is going to expire... This is disabled as + we do count un-self-signed uids in the web of trust. */ + if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire) + *next_expire = uid->expiredate; +#endif + issigned = 0; + get_validity_counts(pk,uid); + mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist, + curtime, next_expire); + } + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE + && (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid) + { + /* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */ + PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + + kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig); + /* If the trust_regexp does not match, it's as if the sig + did not exist. This is safe for non-trust sigs as well + since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a + trust sig. */ + if (kr && (kr->trust_regexp==NULL || opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP || + (uidnode && check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp, + uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name)))) + { + if(DBG_TRUST && opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth) + log_debug("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d, kr depth is %d\n", + uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,sig->trust_depth, + kr->trust_depth); + + /* Are we part of a trust sig chain? We always favor + the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or + lesser trust sig or value. I could make a decent + argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be + what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */ + if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth + && pk->trust_timestamp<=sig->timestamp + && (sig->trust_depth<=kr->trust_depth + || kr->ownertrust==TRUST_ULTIMATE)) + { + /* If we got here, we know that: + + this is a trust sig. + + it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust + sig on this key (not uid). + + it is legal in that it was either generated by an + ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust + chain, and the depth does not violate the + original trust sig. + + if there is a regexp attached, it matched + successfully. + */ + + if(DBG_TRUST) + log_debug("replacing trust value %d with %d and " + "depth %d with %d\n", + pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value, + pk->trust_depth,sig->trust_depth); + + pk->trust_value=sig->trust_value; + pk->trust_depth=sig->trust_depth-1; + + /* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it + on the pk for the next round. */ + if(sig->trust_regexp) + pk->trust_regexp=sig->trust_regexp; + } + + if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE) + uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed; + else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY) + uid->help_full_count++; + else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL) + uid->help_marginal_count++; + issigned = 1; + } + } + } + + if (uidnode && issigned) + { + if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed + || uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed ) + uidnode->flag |= 4; + else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count) + uidnode->flag |= 2; + uidnode->flag |= 1; + any_signed = 1; + } + + return any_signed; +} + + +static int +search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid) +{ + return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid); +} + + +/* + * Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from + * kllist. The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use + * to create our own. Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of + * an error. No results found are indicated by an empty array. + * Caller hast to release the returned array. + */ +static struct key_array * +validate_key_list (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable full_trust, + struct key_item *klist, u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire) +{ + KBNODE keyblock = NULL; + struct key_array *keys = NULL; + size_t nkeys, maxkeys; + int rc; + KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; + + maxkeys = 1000; + keys = m_alloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys); + nkeys = 0; + + rc = keydb_search_reset (hd); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + m_free (keys); + return NULL; + } + + memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc); + desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST; + desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc; + desc.skipfncvalue = full_trust; + rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1); + if (rc == -1) + { + keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL; + return keys; + } + if (rc) + { + log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + m_free (keys); + return NULL; + } + + desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */ + do + { + PKT_public_key *pk; + + rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + m_free (keys); + return NULL; + } + + if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) + { + log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n", + keyblock->pkt->pkttype); + dump_kbnode (keyblock); + release_kbnode(keyblock); + continue; + } + + /* prepare the keyblock for further processing */ + merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock); + clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock); + pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; + if (pk->has_expired || pk->is_revoked) + { + /* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */ + mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock); + } + else if (validate_one_keyblock (keyblock, klist, curtime, next_expire)) + { + KBNODE node; + + if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime + && pk->expiredate < *next_expire) + *next_expire = pk->expiredate; + + if (nkeys == maxkeys) { + maxkeys += 1000; + keys = m_realloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys); + } + keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock; + + /* Optimization - if all uids are fully trusted, then we + never need to consider this key as a candidate again. */ + + for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next) + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 4)) + break; + + if(node==NULL) + mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock); + + keyblock = NULL; + } + + release_kbnode (keyblock); + keyblock = NULL; + } + while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) ); + if (rc && rc != -1) + { + log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + m_free (keys); + return NULL; + } + + keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL; + return keys; +} + +/* Caller must sync */ +static void +reset_trust_records (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable exclude) +{ + int rc; + KBNODE keyblock = NULL; + KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; + int count = 0, nreset = 0; + + rc = keydb_search_reset (hd); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + return; + } + + memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc); + desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST; + if(exclude) + { + desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc; + desc.skipfncvalue = exclude; + } + rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1); + if (rc && rc != -1 ) + log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + else if (!rc) + { + desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */ + do + { + rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + break; + } + count++; + + if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) /* paranoid assertion*/ + { + nreset += clear_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key); + release_kbnode (keyblock); + } + } + while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) ); + if (rc && rc != -1) + log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + } + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("%d keys processed (%d validity counts cleared)\n"), + count, nreset); +} + +/* + * Run the key validation procedure. + * + * This works this way: + * Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK). + * mark them all as seen and put them into klist. + * Step 2: loop max_cert_times + * Step 3: if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined + * ask user to assign ownertrust + * Step 4: Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen + * Step 5: if key is revoked or expired + * mark key as seen + * continue loop at Step 4 + * Step 6: For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist + * Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures. + * Set validity of user ID + * Step 7: If any signed user ID was found + * mark key as seen + * End Loop + * Step 8: Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6 + * End Loop + * Ready + * + */ +static int +validate_keys (int interactive) +{ + int rc = 0; + int quit=0; + struct key_item *klist = NULL; + struct key_item *k; + struct key_array *keys = NULL; + struct key_array *kar; + KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL; + KBNODE node; + int depth; + int key_count; + int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate; + KeyHashTable stored,used,full_trust; + u32 start_time, next_expire; + + start_time = make_timestamp (); + next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */ + stored = new_key_hash_table (); + used = new_key_hash_table (); + full_trust = new_key_hash_table (); + /* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it + * here when needed */ + if (!utk_list) + { + log_info (_("no ultimately trusted keys found\n")); + goto leave; + } + + kdb = keydb_new (0); + + reset_trust_records (kdb,NULL); + + /* mark all UTKs as used and fully_trusted and set validity to + ultimate */ + for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next) + { + KBNODE keyblock; + PKT_public_key *pk; + + keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid); + if (!keyblock) + { + log_error (_("public key of ultimately" + " trusted key %08lX not found\n"), (ulong)k->kid[1]); + continue; + } + mark_keyblock_seen (used, keyblock); + mark_keyblock_seen (stored, keyblock); + mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock); + pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; + for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next) + { + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) + update_validity (pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE); + } + if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time + && pk->expiredate < next_expire) + next_expire = pk->expiredate; + + release_kbnode (keyblock); + do_sync (); + } + + klist = utk_list; + + log_info(_("%d marginal(s) needed, %d complete(s) needed, %s trust model\n"), + opt.marginals_needed,opt.completes_needed,trust_model_string()); + + for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++) + { + /* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in + utk_list. */ + ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0; + ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0; + for (k=klist; k; k = k->next) + { + int min=0; + + /* 120 and 60 are as per RFC2440 */ + if(k->trust_value>=120) + min=TRUST_FULLY; + else if(k->trust_value>=60) + min=TRUST_MARGINAL; + + if(min!=k->min_ownertrust) + update_min_ownertrust(k->kid,min); + + if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN) + { + k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid,min); + + if (k->ownertrust == -1) + { + quit=1; + goto leave; + } + } + + /* This can happen during transition from an old trustdb + before trust sigs. It can also happen if a user uses two + different versions of GnuPG or changes the --trust-model + setting. */ + if(k->ownertrust<min) + { + if(DBG_TRUST) + log_debug("key %08lX: " + "overriding ownertrust \"%s\" with \"%s\"\n", + (ulong)k->kid[1], + trust_value_to_string(k->ownertrust), + trust_value_to_string(min)); + + k->ownertrust=min; + } + + if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN) + ot_unknown++; + else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED) + ot_undefined++; + else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER) + ot_never++; + else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL) + ot_marginal++; + else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY) + ot_full++; + else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE) + ot_ultimate++; + } + + /* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */ + keys = validate_key_list (kdb, full_trust, klist, + start_time, &next_expire); + if (!keys) + { + log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n"); + rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; + goto leave; + } + + for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++) + ; + + /* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */ + if (opt.verbose > 1) + dump_key_array (depth, keys); + + for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++) + store_validation_status (depth, kar->keyblock, stored); + + log_info (_("checking at depth %d valid=%d" + " ot(-/q/n/m/f/u)=%d/%d/%d/%d/%d/%d\n"), + depth, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined, + ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate ); + + /* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */ + if (klist != utk_list) + release_key_items (klist); + klist = NULL; + for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++) + { + for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next) + { + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4)) + { + u32 kid[2]; + + /* have we used this key already? */ + keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid); + if(test_key_hash_table(used,kid)==0) + { + /* Normally we add both the primary and subkey + ids to the hash via mark_keyblock_seen, but + since we aren't using this hash as a skipfnc, + that doesn't matter here. */ + add_key_hash_table (used,kid); + k = new_key_item (); + k->kid[0]=kid[0]; + k->kid[1]=kid[1]; + k->ownertrust = + (get_ownertrust (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key) + & TRUST_MASK); + k->min_ownertrust = + get_min_ownertrust(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key); + k->trust_depth= + kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_depth; + k->trust_value= + kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_value; + if(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_regexp) + k->trust_regexp= + m_strdup(kar->keyblock->pkt-> + pkt.public_key->trust_regexp); + k->next = klist; + klist = k; + break; + } + } + } + } + release_key_array (keys); + keys = NULL; + if (!klist) + break; /* no need to dive in deeper */ + } + + leave: + keydb_release (kdb); + release_key_array (keys); + release_key_items (klist); + release_key_hash_table (full_trust); + release_key_hash_table (used); + release_key_hash_table (stored); + if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */ + { + if (next_expire == 0xffffffff || next_expire < start_time ) + tdbio_write_nextcheck (0); + else + { + tdbio_write_nextcheck (next_expire); + log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"), + strtimestamp (next_expire)); + } + + if(tdbio_update_version_record()!=0) + { + log_error(_("unable to update trustdb version record: " + "write failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc)); + tdbio_invalid(); + } + + do_sync (); + pending_check_trustdb = 0; + } + + return rc; +} |