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-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c1358
1 files changed, 1358 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..73286fcb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1358 @@
+/* sign.c - sign data
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+ * 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h> /* need sleep() */
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#define LF "\r\n"
+void __stdcall Sleep(ulong);
+#define sleep(a) Sleep((a)*1000)
+#else
+#define LF "\n"
+#endif
+
+static int recipient_digest_algo=0;
+
+/****************
+ * Create a notation. It is assumed that the stings in STRLIST
+ * are already checked to contain only printable data and have a valid
+ * NAME=VALUE format.
+ */
+static void
+mk_notation_and_policy( PKT_signature *sig,
+ PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+ const char *string;
+ char *s=NULL;
+ byte *buf;
+ unsigned n1, n2;
+ STRLIST nd=NULL,pu=NULL;
+ struct expando_args args;
+
+ memset(&args,0,sizeof(args));
+ args.pk=pk;
+ args.sk=sk;
+
+ /* notation data */
+ if(IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_notation_data)
+ {
+ if(sig->version<4)
+ log_info("can't put notation data into v3 signatures\n");
+ else
+ nd=opt.sig_notation_data;
+ }
+ else if( IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_notation_data )
+ {
+ if(sig->version<4)
+ log_info("can't put notation data into v3 key signatures\n");
+ else
+ nd=opt.cert_notation_data;
+ }
+
+ for( ; nd; nd = nd->next ) {
+ char *expanded;
+
+ string = nd->d;
+ s = strchr( string, '=' );
+ if( !s )
+ BUG(); /* we have already parsed this */
+ n1 = s - string;
+ s++;
+
+ expanded=pct_expando(s,&args);
+ if(!expanded)
+ {
+ log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand notation "
+ "(too large). Using unexpanded.\n"));
+ expanded=m_strdup(s);
+ }
+
+ n2 = strlen(expanded);
+ buf = m_alloc( 8 + n1 + n2 );
+ buf[0] = 0x80; /* human readable */
+ buf[1] = buf[2] = buf[3] = 0;
+ buf[4] = n1 >> 8;
+ buf[5] = n1;
+ buf[6] = n2 >> 8;
+ buf[7] = n2;
+ memcpy(buf+8, string, n1 );
+ memcpy(buf+8+n1, expanded, n2 );
+ build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION
+ | ((nd->flags & 1)? SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0),
+ buf, 8+n1+n2 );
+ m_free(expanded);
+ m_free(buf);
+ }
+
+ if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_NOTATION)
+ show_notation(sig,0,0);
+
+ /* set policy URL */
+ if( IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_policy_url )
+ {
+ if(sig->version<4)
+ log_info("can't put a policy URL into v3 signatures\n");
+ else
+ pu=opt.sig_policy_url;
+ }
+ else if( IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_policy_url )
+ {
+ if(sig->version<4)
+ log_info("can't put a policy URL into v3 key signatures\n");
+ else
+ pu=opt.cert_policy_url;
+ }
+
+ for(;pu;pu=pu->next)
+ {
+ string = pu->d;
+
+ s=pct_expando(string,&args);
+ if(!s)
+ {
+ log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand policy url "
+ "(too large). Using unexpanded.\n"));
+ s=m_strdup(string);
+ }
+
+ build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY|
+ ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0),
+ s,strlen(s));
+
+ m_free(s);
+ }
+
+ if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_POLICY)
+ show_policy_url(sig,0,0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Helper to hash a user ID packet.
+ */
+static void
+hash_uid (MD_HANDLE md, int sigversion, const PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+ if ( sigversion >= 4 ) {
+ byte buf[5];
+
+ if(uid->attrib_data) {
+ buf[0] = 0xd1; /* indicates an attribute packet */
+ buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24; /* always use 4 length bytes */
+ buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16;
+ buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >> 8;
+ buf[4] = uid->attrib_len;
+ }
+ else {
+ buf[0] = 0xb4; /* indicates a userid packet */
+ buf[1] = uid->len >> 24; /* always use 4 length bytes */
+ buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
+ buf[3] = uid->len >> 8;
+ buf[4] = uid->len;
+ }
+ md_write( md, buf, 5 );
+ }
+
+ if(uid->attrib_data)
+ md_write (md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len );
+ else
+ md_write (md, uid->name, uid->len );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Helper to hash some parts from the signature
+ */
+static void
+hash_sigversion_to_magic (MD_HANDLE md, const PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+ if (sig->version >= 4)
+ md_putc (md, sig->version);
+ md_putc (md, sig->sig_class);
+ if (sig->version < 4) {
+ u32 a = sig->timestamp;
+ md_putc (md, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
+ md_putc (md, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
+ md_putc (md, (a >> 8) & 0xff );
+ md_putc (md, a & 0xff );
+ }
+ else {
+ byte buf[6];
+ size_t n;
+
+ md_putc (md, sig->pubkey_algo);
+ md_putc (md, sig->digest_algo);
+ if (sig->hashed) {
+ n = sig->hashed->len;
+ md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
+ md_putc (md, n );
+ md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
+ n += 6;
+ }
+ else {
+ md_putc (md, 0); /* always hash the length of the subpacket*/
+ md_putc (md, 0);
+ n = 6;
+ }
+ /* add some magic */
+ buf[0] = sig->version;
+ buf[1] = 0xff;
+ buf[2] = n >> 24; /* hmmm, n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0 */
+ buf[3] = n >> 16;
+ buf[4] = n >> 8;
+ buf[5] = n;
+ md_write (md, buf, 6);
+ }
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_sign( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig,
+ MD_HANDLE md, int digest_algo )
+{
+ MPI frame;
+ byte *dp;
+ int rc;
+
+ if( sk->timestamp > sig->timestamp ) {
+ ulong d = sk->timestamp - sig->timestamp;
+ log_info( d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second "
+ "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n")
+ : _("key has been created %lu seconds "
+ "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"), d );
+ if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict )
+ return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
+ }
+
+
+ print_pubkey_algo_note(sk->pubkey_algo);
+
+ if( !digest_algo )
+ digest_algo = md_get_algo(md);
+
+ print_digest_algo_note( digest_algo );
+ dp = md_read( md, digest_algo );
+ sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
+ sig->digest_start[0] = dp[0];
+ sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
+ frame = encode_md_value( sk->pubkey_algo, md,
+ digest_algo, mpi_get_nbits(sk->skey[0]), 0 );
+ if (!frame)
+ return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+ rc = pubkey_sign( sk->pubkey_algo, sig->data, frame, sk->skey );
+ mpi_free(frame);
+ if (!rc && !opt.no_sig_create_check) {
+ /* check that the signature verification worked and nothing is
+ * fooling us e.g. by a bug in the signature create
+ * code or by deliberately introduced faults. */
+ PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+
+ if( get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid ) )
+ rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ else {
+ frame = encode_md_value (pk->pubkey_algo, md,
+ sig->digest_algo,
+ mpi_get_nbits(pk->pkey[0]), 0);
+ if (!frame)
+ rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+ else
+ rc = pubkey_verify (pk->pubkey_algo, frame,
+ sig->data, pk->pkey,
+ NULL, NULL );
+ mpi_free (frame);
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ log_error (_("checking created signature failed: %s\n"),
+ g10_errstr (rc));
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ }
+ if( rc )
+ log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ else {
+ if( opt.verbose ) {
+ char *ustr = get_user_id_string_printable (sig->keyid);
+ log_info(_("%s/%s signature from: \"%s\"\n"),
+ pubkey_algo_to_string(sk->pubkey_algo),
+ digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo),
+ ustr );
+ m_free(ustr);
+ }
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_key *sk, MD_HANDLE md )
+{
+ int rc=0;
+
+ if( !(rc=check_secret_key( sk, 0 )) )
+ rc = do_sign( sk, sig, md, 0 );
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+hash_for(int pubkey_algo, int packet_version )
+{
+ if( opt.def_digest_algo )
+ return opt.def_digest_algo;
+ else if( recipient_digest_algo )
+ return recipient_digest_algo;
+ else if(PGP2 && pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && packet_version < 4 )
+ {
+ /* Old-style PGP only understands MD5 */
+ return DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+ }
+ else if( pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+ {
+ /* We need a 160-bit hash for DSA, so we can't just take the first
+ in the pref list */
+
+ if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+ {
+ prefitem_t *prefs;
+
+ for(prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;prefs->type;prefs++)
+ if(md_digest_length(prefs->value)==20)
+ return prefs->value;
+ }
+
+ return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+ }
+ else if( opt.personal_digest_prefs )
+ {
+ /* It's not DSA, so we can use whatever the first hash algorithm
+ is in the pref list */
+ return opt.personal_digest_prefs[0].value;
+ }
+ else
+ return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;
+}
+
+static int
+only_old_style( SK_LIST sk_list )
+{
+ SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+ int old_style = 0;
+
+ /* if there are only old style capable key we use the old sytle */
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ if( sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && sk->version < 4 )
+ old_style = 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return old_style;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_status_sig_created ( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig, int what )
+{
+ byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+ char buf[100+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2];
+ size_t i, n;
+
+ sprintf(buf, "%c %d %d %02x %lu ",
+ what, sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class,
+ (ulong)sig->timestamp );
+
+ fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
+ p = buf + strlen(buf);
+ for(i=0; i < n ; i++ )
+ sprintf(p+2*i, "%02X", array[i] );
+
+ write_status_text( STATUS_SIG_CREATED, buf );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Loop over the secret certificates in SK_LIST and build the one pass
+ * signature packets. OpenPGP says that the data should be bracket by
+ * the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we build these onepass
+ * packet here in reverse order
+ */
+static int
+write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
+{
+ int skcount;
+ SK_LIST sk_rover;
+
+ for (skcount=0, sk_rover=sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
+ skcount++;
+
+ for (; skcount; skcount--) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk;
+ PKT_onepass_sig *ops;
+ PACKET pkt;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ for (i=0, sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ if (++i == skcount)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ ops = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *ops);
+ ops->sig_class = sigclass;
+ ops->digest_algo = hash_for (sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
+ ops->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+ keyid_from_sk (sk, ops->keyid);
+ ops->last = (skcount == 1);
+
+ init_packet(&pkt);
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
+ pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops;
+ rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
+ free_packet (&pkt);
+ if (rc) {
+ log_error ("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n",
+ g10_errstr(rc));
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to write the plaintext (literal data) packet
+ */
+static int
+write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
+{
+ PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
+ u32 filesize;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!opt.no_literal) {
+ if (fname || opt.set_filename) {
+ char *s = make_basename (opt.set_filename? opt.set_filename
+ : fname,
+ iobuf_get_real_fname(inp));
+ pt = m_alloc (sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1);
+ pt->namelen = strlen (s);
+ memcpy (pt->name, s, pt->namelen);
+ m_free (s);
+ }
+ else { /* no filename */
+ pt = m_alloc (sizeof *pt - 1);
+ pt->namelen = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* try to calculate the length of the data */
+ if (fname && *fname && !(*fname=='-' && !fname[1])) {
+ if( !(filesize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
+ log_info (_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), fname);
+
+ /* we can't yet encode the length of very large files,
+ * so we switch to partial length encoding in this case */
+ if (filesize >= IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT)
+ filesize = 0;
+
+ /* because the text_filter modifies the length of the
+ * data, it is not possible to know the used length
+ * without a double read of the file - to avoid that
+ * we simple use partial length packets.
+ */
+ if ( ptmode == 't' )
+ filesize = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
+ }
+
+ if (!opt.no_literal) {
+ PACKET pkt;
+
+ pt->timestamp = make_timestamp ();
+ pt->mode = ptmode;
+ pt->len = filesize;
+ pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !RFC1991;
+ pt->buf = inp;
+ init_packet(&pkt);
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+ pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
+ /*cfx.datalen = filesize? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;*/
+ if( (rc = build_packet (out, &pkt)) )
+ log_error ("build_packet(PLAINTEXT) failed: %s\n",
+ g10_errstr(rc) );
+ pt->buf = NULL;
+ }
+ else {
+ byte copy_buffer[4096];
+ int bytes_copied;
+
+ while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
+ if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
+ rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+ log_error ("copying input to output failed: %s\n",
+ g10_errstr(rc));
+ break;
+ }
+ wipememory(copy_buffer,4096); /* burn buffer */
+ }
+ /* fixme: it seems that we never freed pt/pkt */
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the signatures from the SK_LIST to OUT. HASH must be a non-finalized
+ * hash which will not be changes here.
+ */
+static int
+write_signature_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, MD_HANDLE hash,
+ int sigclass, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+ int status_letter)
+{
+ SK_LIST sk_rover;
+
+ /* loop over the secret certificates */
+ for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk;
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ MD_HANDLE md;
+ int rc;
+
+ sk = sk_rover->sk;
+
+ /* build the signature packet */
+ sig = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *sig);
+ if(opt.force_v3_sigs || RFC1991)
+ sig->version=3;
+ else if(duration || opt.sig_policy_url || opt.sig_notation_data)
+ sig->version=4;
+ else
+ sig->version=sk->version;
+ keyid_from_sk (sk, sig->keyid);
+ sig->digest_algo = hash_for (sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
+ sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+ if(timestamp)
+ sig->timestamp = timestamp;
+ else
+ sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+ if(duration)
+ sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp+duration;
+ sig->sig_class = sigclass;
+
+ md = md_copy (hash);
+
+ if (sig->version >= 4)
+ build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig);
+ mk_notation_and_policy (sig, NULL, sk);
+
+ hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
+ md_final (md);
+
+ rc = do_sign( sk, sig, md, hash_for (sig->pubkey_algo, sk->version) );
+ md_close (md);
+
+ if( !rc ) { /* and write it */
+ PACKET pkt;
+
+ init_packet(&pkt);
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+ pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
+ rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
+ if (!rc && is_status_enabled()) {
+ print_status_sig_created ( sk, sig, status_letter);
+ }
+ free_packet (&pkt);
+ if (rc)
+ log_error ("build signature packet failed: %s\n",
+ g10_errstr(rc) );
+ }
+ if( rc )
+ return rc;;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Sign the files whose names are in FILENAME.
+ * If DETACHED has the value true,
+ * make a detached signature. If FILENAMES->d is NULL read from stdin
+ * and ignore the detached mode. Sign the file with all secret keys
+ * which can be taken from LOCUSR, if this is NULL, use the default one
+ * If ENCRYPTFLAG is true, use REMUSER (or ask if it is NULL) to encrypt the
+ * signed data for these users.
+ * If OUTFILE is not NULL; this file is used for output and the function
+ * does not ask for overwrite permission; output is then always
+ * uncompressed, non-armored and in binary mode.
+ */
+int
+sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
+ int encryptflag, STRLIST remusr, const char *outfile )
+{
+ const char *fname;
+ armor_filter_context_t afx;
+ compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+ md_filter_context_t mfx;
+ text_filter_context_t tfx;
+ progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+ encrypt_filter_context_t efx;
+ IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+ PACKET pkt;
+ int rc = 0;
+ PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
+ SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+ SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+ int multifile = 0;
+ u32 duration=0;
+
+ memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+ memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+ memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
+ memset( &efx, 0, sizeof efx);
+ init_packet( &pkt );
+
+ if( filenames ) {
+ fname = filenames->d;
+ multifile = !!filenames->next;
+ }
+ else
+ fname = NULL;
+
+ if( fname && filenames->next && (!detached || encryptflag) )
+ log_bug("multiple files can only be detached signed");
+
+ if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.force_v3_sigs && !opt.batch && !RFC1991)
+ duration=ask_expire_interval(1);
+
+ if( (rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )) )
+ goto leave;
+
+ if(PGP2 && !only_old_style(sk_list))
+ {
+ log_info(_("you can only detach-sign with PGP 2.x style keys "
+ "while in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+ compliance_failure();
+ }
+
+ if(encryptflag && (rc=build_pk_list( remusr, &pk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )))
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* prepare iobufs */
+ if( multifile ) /* have list of filenames */
+ inp = NULL; /* we do it later */
+ else {
+ if( !(inp = iobuf_open(fname)) ) {
+ log_error("can't open %s: %s\n", fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+ strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ handle_progress (&pfx, inp, fname);
+ }
+
+ if( outfile ) {
+ if( !(out = iobuf_create( outfile )) ) {
+ log_error(_("can't create %s: %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ else if( opt.verbose )
+ log_info(_("writing to `%s'\n"), outfile );
+ }
+ else if( (rc = open_outfile( fname, opt.armor? 1: detached? 2:0, &out )))
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
+ if( opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile )
+ {
+ memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+ iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
+ }
+
+ mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+
+ /* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the
+ hash algorithm to use out of the recepient key prefs. */
+ if(pk_list)
+ {
+ if(opt.def_digest_algo)
+ {
+ if(!opt.expert &&
+ select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
+ opt.def_digest_algo,
+ NULL)!=opt.def_digest_algo)
+ log_info(_("forcing digest algorithm %s (%d) "
+ "violates recipient preferences\n"),
+ digest_algo_to_string(opt.def_digest_algo),
+ opt.def_digest_algo);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int hashlen=0,algo;
+
+ /* Of course, if the recipient asks for something
+ unreasonable (like a non-160-bit hash for DSA, for
+ example), then don't do it. Check all sk's - if any
+ are DSA, then the hash must be 160-bit. In the future
+ this can be more complex with different hashes for each
+ sk, but so long as there is only one signing algorithm
+ with hash restrictions, this is ok. -dms */
+
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
+ if(sk_rover->sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)
+ hashlen=20;
+
+ if((algo=
+ select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,-1,
+ hashlen?&hashlen:NULL))>0)
+ recipient_digest_algo=algo;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ md_enable(mfx.md, hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version ));
+ }
+
+ if( !multifile )
+ iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx );
+
+ if( detached && !encryptflag && !RFC1991 )
+ afx.what = 2;
+
+ if( opt.armor && !outfile )
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+ if( encryptflag ) {
+ efx.pk_list = pk_list;
+ /* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, encrypt_filter, &efx );
+ }
+
+ if( opt.compress && !outfile && ( !detached || opt.compress_sigs) )
+ {
+ int compr_algo=opt.def_compress_algo;
+
+ /* If not forced by user */
+ if(compr_algo==-1)
+ {
+ /* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs
+ will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are
+ encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since
+ there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data.
+ Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the
+ default. */
+
+ if((compr_algo=
+ select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,-1,NULL))==-1)
+ compr_algo=default_compress_algo();
+ }
+ else if(!opt.expert && pk_list
+ && select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,
+ compr_algo,NULL)!=compr_algo)
+ log_info(_("forcing compression algorithm %s (%d) "
+ "violates recipient preferences\n"),
+ compress_algo_to_string(compr_algo),compr_algo);
+
+ /* algo 0 means no compression */
+ if( compr_algo )
+ {
+ zfx.algo = compr_algo;
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, compress_filter, &zfx );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */
+ if (!detached && !RFC1991) {
+ rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
+ opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* setup the inner packet */
+ if( detached ) {
+ if( multifile ) {
+ STRLIST sl;
+
+ if( opt.verbose )
+ log_info(_("signing:") );
+ /* must walk reverse trough this list */
+ for( sl = strlist_last(filenames); sl;
+ sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl ) ) {
+ if( !(inp = iobuf_open(sl->d)) ) {
+ log_error(_("can't open %s: %s\n"),
+ sl->d, strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ handle_progress (&pfx, inp, sl->d);
+ if( opt.verbose )
+ fprintf(stderr, " `%s'", sl->d );
+ if(opt.textmode)
+ {
+ memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+ iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
+ }
+ iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx );
+ while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 )
+ ;
+ iobuf_close(inp); inp = NULL;
+ }
+ if( opt.verbose )
+ putc( '\n', stderr );
+ }
+ else {
+ /* read, so that the filter can calculate the digest */
+ while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 )
+ ;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname,
+ opt.textmode && !outfile ? 't':'b');
+ }
+
+ /* catch errors from above */
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* write the signatures */
+ rc = write_signature_packets (sk_list, out, mfx.md,
+ opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00,
+ 0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S');
+ if( rc )
+ goto leave;
+
+
+ leave:
+ if( rc )
+ iobuf_cancel(out);
+ else {
+ iobuf_close(out);
+ if (encryptflag)
+ write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+ }
+ iobuf_close(inp);
+ md_close( mfx.md );
+ release_sk_list( sk_list );
+ release_pk_list( pk_list );
+ recipient_digest_algo=0;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * make a clear signature. note that opt.armor is not needed
+ */
+int
+clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
+{
+ armor_filter_context_t afx;
+ progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+ MD_HANDLE textmd = NULL;
+ IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+ PACKET pkt;
+ int rc = 0;
+ SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+ SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+ int old_style = RFC1991;
+ int only_md5 = 0;
+ u32 duration=0;
+
+ memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+ init_packet( &pkt );
+
+ if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.force_v3_sigs && !opt.batch && !RFC1991)
+ duration=ask_expire_interval(1);
+
+ if( (rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )) )
+ goto leave;
+
+ if( !old_style && !duration )
+ old_style = only_old_style( sk_list );
+
+ if(PGP2 && !only_old_style(sk_list))
+ {
+ log_info(_("you can only clearsign with PGP 2.x style keys "
+ "while in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+ compliance_failure();
+ }
+
+ /* prepare iobufs */
+ if( !(inp = iobuf_open(fname)) ) {
+ log_error("can't open %s: %s\n", fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+ strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ handle_progress (&pfx, inp, fname);
+
+ if( outfile ) {
+ if( !(out = iobuf_create( outfile )) ) {
+ log_error(_("can't create %s: %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ else if( opt.verbose )
+ log_info(_("writing to `%s'\n"), outfile );
+ }
+ else if( (rc = open_outfile( fname, 1, &out )) )
+ goto leave;
+
+ iobuf_writestr(out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" LF );
+
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ if( hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version) == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
+ only_md5 = 1;
+ else {
+ only_md5 = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( !(old_style && only_md5) ) {
+ const char *s;
+ int any = 0;
+ byte hashs_seen[256];
+
+ memset( hashs_seen, 0, sizeof hashs_seen );
+ iobuf_writestr(out, "Hash: " );
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ int i = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version);
+
+ if( !hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] ) {
+ s = digest_algo_to_string( i );
+ if( s ) {
+ hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] = 1;
+ if( any )
+ iobuf_put(out, ',' );
+ iobuf_writestr(out, s );
+ any = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ assert(any);
+ iobuf_writestr(out, LF );
+ }
+
+ if( opt.not_dash_escaped )
+ iobuf_writestr( out,
+ "NotDashEscaped: You need GnuPG to verify this message" LF );
+ iobuf_writestr(out, LF );
+
+ textmd = md_open(0, 0);
+ for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ md_enable(textmd, hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version));
+ }
+ if ( DBG_HASHING )
+ md_start_debug( textmd, "clearsign" );
+ copy_clearsig_text( out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped,
+ opt.escape_from, (old_style && only_md5) );
+ /* fixme: check for read errors */
+
+ /* now write the armor */
+ afx.what = 2;
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+ /* write the signatures */
+ rc=write_signature_packets (sk_list, out, textmd, 0x01, 0, duration, 'C');
+ if( rc )
+ goto leave;
+
+ leave:
+ if( rc )
+ iobuf_cancel(out);
+ else
+ iobuf_close(out);
+ iobuf_close(inp);
+ md_close( textmd );
+ release_sk_list( sk_list );
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file.
+ * FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file.
+ */
+int
+sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr)
+{
+ armor_filter_context_t afx;
+ progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+ compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+ md_filter_context_t mfx;
+ text_filter_context_t tfx;
+ cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
+ IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+ PACKET pkt;
+ STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+ SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+ int algo;
+ u32 duration=0;
+
+ memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+ memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+ memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
+ memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+ memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
+ init_packet( &pkt );
+
+ if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.force_v3_sigs && !opt.batch && !RFC1991)
+ duration=ask_expire_interval(1);
+
+ rc = build_sk_list (locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* prepare iobufs */
+ inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+ if( !inp ) {
+ log_error("can't open %s: %s\n", fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+ strerror(errno) );
+ rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ handle_progress (&pfx, inp, fname);
+
+ /* prepare key */
+ s2k = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
+ s2k->mode = RFC1991? 0:opt.s2k_mode;
+ s2k->hash_algo = opt.s2k_digest_algo;
+
+ algo = default_cipher_algo();
+ if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
+ log_info (_("%s encryption will be used\n"),
+ cipher_algo_to_string(algo) );
+ cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 2, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
+ rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
+ log_error(_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* now create the outfile */
+ rc = open_outfile (fname, opt.armor? 1:0, &out);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
+ if (opt.textmode)
+ iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
+ mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+
+ for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) {
+ PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+ md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk->pubkey_algo, sk->version ));
+ }
+
+ iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);
+
+ /* Push armor output filter */
+ if (opt.armor)
+ iobuf_push_filter (out, armor_filter, &afx);
+
+ /* Write the symmetric key packet */
+ /*(current filters: armor)*/
+ if (!RFC1991) {
+ PKT_symkey_enc *enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
+ enc->version = 4;
+ enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
+ enc->s2k = *s2k;
+ pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
+ pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
+ if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+ log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ m_free(enc);
+ }
+
+ /* Push the encryption filter */
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
+
+ /* Push the Zip filter */
+ if (opt.compress && default_compress_algo())
+ {
+ zfx.algo = default_compress_algo();
+ iobuf_push_filter( out, compress_filter, &zfx );
+ }
+
+ /* Write the one-pass signature packets */
+ /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+ if (!RFC1991) {
+ rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
+ opt.textmode? 0x01:0x00);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff */
+ /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+ rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname, opt.textmode ? 't':'b');
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* Write the signatures */
+ /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+ rc = write_signature_packets (sk_list, out, mfx.md,
+ opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00,
+ 0, duration, 'S');
+ if( rc )
+ goto leave;
+
+
+ leave:
+ if( rc )
+ iobuf_cancel(out);
+ else {
+ iobuf_close(out);
+ write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+ }
+ iobuf_close(inp);
+ release_sk_list( sk_list );
+ md_close( mfx.md );
+ m_free(cfx.dek);
+ m_free(s2k);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Create a signature packet for the given public key certificate and
+ * the user id and return it in ret_sig. User signature class SIGCLASS
+ * user-id is not used (and may be NULL if sigclass is 0x20) If
+ * DIGEST_ALGO is 0 the function selects an appropriate one.
+ * SIGVERSION gives the minimal required signature packet version;
+ * this is needed so that special properties like local sign are not
+ * applied (actually: dropped) when a v3 key is used. TIMESTAMP is
+ * the timestamp to use for the signature. 0 means "now" */
+int
+make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+ PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk,
+ PKT_secret_key *sk,
+ int sigclass, int digest_algo,
+ int sigversion, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+ int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque
+ )
+{
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ int rc=0;
+ MD_HANDLE md;
+
+ assert( (sigclass >= 0x10 && sigclass <= 0x13) || sigclass == 0x1F
+ || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18
+ || sigclass == 0x30 || sigclass == 0x28 );
+
+ if (opt.force_v4_certs)
+ sigversion = 4;
+
+ if (sigversion < sk->version)
+ sigversion = sk->version;
+
+ /* If you are making a signature on a v4 key using your v3 key, it
+ doesn't make sense to generate a v3 sig. After all, no v3-only
+ PGP implementation could understand the v4 key in the first
+ place. Note that this implies that a signature on an attribute
+ uid is usually going to be v4 as well, since they are not
+ generally found on v3 keys. */
+ if (sigversion < pk->version)
+ sigversion = pk->version;
+
+ if( !digest_algo )
+ {
+ /* Basically, this means use SHA1 always unless it's a v3 RSA
+ key making a v3 cert (use MD5), or the user specified
+ something (use whatever they said). They still must use a
+ 160-bit hash with DSA, or the signature will fail. Note
+ that this still allows the caller of make_keysig_packet to
+ override the user setting if it must. */
+
+ if(opt.cert_digest_algo)
+ digest_algo=opt.cert_digest_algo;
+ else if((sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ||
+ sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S) &&
+ pk->version<4 && sigversion < 4)
+ digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+ else
+ digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+ }
+
+ md = md_open( digest_algo, 0 );
+
+ /* hash the public key certificate and the user id */
+ hash_public_key( md, pk );
+ if( sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x28 ) { /* subkey binding/revocation*/
+ hash_public_key( md, subpk );
+ }
+ else if( sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20 ) {
+ hash_uid (md, sigversion, uid);
+ }
+ /* and make the signature packet */
+ sig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
+ sig->version = sigversion;
+ sig->flags.exportable=1;
+ sig->flags.revocable=1;
+ keyid_from_sk( sk, sig->keyid );
+ sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+ sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
+ if(timestamp)
+ sig->timestamp=timestamp;
+ else
+ sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
+ if(duration)
+ sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+duration;
+ sig->sig_class = sigclass;
+ if( sig->version >= 4 )
+ build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+ mk_notation_and_policy( sig, pk, sk );
+
+ /* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
+ to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
+ function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
+ if( sig->version >= 4 && mksubpkt )
+ rc = (*mksubpkt)( sig, opaque );
+
+ if( !rc ) {
+ hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
+ md_final(md);
+
+ rc = complete_sig( sig, sk, md );
+ }
+
+ md_close( md );
+ if( rc )
+ free_seckey_enc( sig );
+ else
+ *ret_sig = sig;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Create a new signature packet based on an existing one.
+ * Only user ID signatures are supported for now.
+ * TODO: Merge this with make_keysig_packet.
+ */
+int
+update_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig,
+ PKT_signature *orig_sig,
+ PKT_public_key *pk,
+ PKT_user_id *uid,
+ PKT_public_key *subpk,
+ PKT_secret_key *sk,
+ int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *),
+ void *opaque
+ )
+{
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ int rc=0;
+ MD_HANDLE md;
+
+ if ((!orig_sig || !pk || !sk)
+ || (orig_sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && orig_sig->sig_class <= 0x13 && !uid)
+ || (orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18 && !subpk))
+ return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+ md = md_open( orig_sig->digest_algo, 0 );
+
+ /* hash the public key certificate and the user id */
+ hash_public_key( md, pk );
+
+ if( orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
+ hash_public_key( md, subpk );
+ else
+ hash_uid (md, orig_sig->version, uid);
+
+ /* create a new signature packet */
+ sig = copy_signature (NULL, orig_sig);
+
+ /* We need to create a new timestamp so that new sig expiration
+ calculations are done correctly... */
+ sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
+
+ /* ... but we won't make a timestamp earlier than the existing
+ one. */
+ while(sig->timestamp<=orig_sig->timestamp)
+ {
+ sleep(1);
+ sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
+ }
+
+ /* Note that already expired sigs will remain expired (with a
+ duration of 0) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
+ detects this case. */
+
+ if( sig->version >= 4 )
+ {
+ /* Put the updated timestamp into the sig. Note that this
+ will automagically lower any sig expiration dates to
+ correctly correspond to the differences in the timestamps
+ (i.e. the duration will shrink). */
+ build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+
+ if (mksubpkt)
+ rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);
+ }
+
+ if (!rc) {
+ hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
+ md_final(md);
+
+ rc = complete_sig( sig, sk, md );
+ }
+
+ md_close (md);
+ if( rc )
+ free_seckey_enc (sig);
+ else
+ *ret_sig = sig;
+ return rc;
+}