diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/seskey.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c index 7d0429278..410f0bfa6 100644 --- a/g10/seskey.c +++ b/g10/seskey.c @@ -255,20 +255,20 @@ gcry_mpi_t encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo) { gcry_mpi_t frame; - int pkalgo; size_t mdlen; assert (hash_algo); assert (pk); - pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (pk->pubkey_algo); - - if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA && openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pk->pkey[0])) + if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { + /* EdDSA signs data of arbitrary length. Thus no special + treatment is required. */ frame = gcry_mpi_set_opaque_copy (NULL, gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), 8*gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo)); } - else if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA || pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA) + else if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA + || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) { /* It's a DSA signature, so find out the size of q. */ @@ -276,11 +276,10 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo) /* pkey[1] is Q for ECDSA, which is an uncompressed point, i.e. 04 <x> <y> */ - if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA) + if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) qbits = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (qbits); /* Make sure it is a multiple of 8 bits. */ - if ((qbits%8)) { log_error(_("DSA requires the hash length to be a" @@ -297,7 +296,8 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo) if (qbits < 160) { log_error (_("%s key %s uses an unsafe (%zu bit) hash\n"), - gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo), keystr_from_pk (pk), qbits); + openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo), + keystr_from_pk (pk), qbits); return NULL; } @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo) /* ECDSA 521 is special has it is larger than the largest hash we have (SHA-512). Thus we chnage the size for further processing to 512. */ - if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits > 512) + if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA && qbits > 512) qbits = 512; /* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll @@ -315,8 +315,8 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo) { log_error (_("%s key %s requires a %zu bit or larger hash " "(hash is %s)\n"), - gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo), - keystr_from_pk(pk), qbits, + openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo), + keystr_from_pk (pk), qbits, gcry_md_algo_name (hash_algo)); return NULL; } |